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The main aim of this thesis was to investigate children's reasoning abilities, 
especially their ability to solve counterfactual tasks. This thesis studied counterfactual 
thinking as an independent ability but also in relation to both types of the false belief 
tasks that measure theory of mind and contrary-to-fact syllogisms. Four experiments 
were conducted with typically developing children between the ages of 3 to 5. The first 
experiment studied the difference between affirmative and negative counterfactual 
questions and found that the former was easier than the latter. The second 
experiment replicated these results and investigated the link between counterfactual 
thinking and the false belief task but failed to find a link between the two. The third 
experiment found a link between counterfactual and both types of false belief tasks; 
false belief to others and false belief to self task. This experiment also identified a 
discrepancy between counterfactual thinking and contrary-to-fact syllogisms. When 
examining contrary-to-fact syllogisms it was found that the ones requiring a yes 
answer were easier than the ones requiring a no answer. This discrepancy between 
counterfactual thinking and contrary-to-fact syllogisms was confirmed in experiment 4 
as a fantasy context influenced performance on these tasks differently. Fantasy 
context increased performance on contrary-to-fact syllogisms but decreased 
performance on counterfactual tasks. 
In conclusion, this thesis confirmed a link between counterfactual thinking and the 
false belief task. It identified an important difference between counterfactual thinking 
and contrary-to-fact reasoning. It also highlighted the importance of the polarity 
(affirmative versus negative) of questions as well as answers on performance. 
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L I T E R A T U R E REVIEW 
The main goal of this research project was to investigate children's 
reasoning abilities, especially to solve counterfactual tasks. The nature of 
counterfactual thinking itself was explored, in particular in relation to future 
hypothetical thinking and to the negative or positive formulation of counterfactual 
questions. Counterfactual thinking was also studied as a possible sub-component 
of the false belief task that Is usually used to assess children's theory of mind. 
Finally this thesis also explored the effect of context on children's performance on 
counterfactual and syllogistic reasoning tasks. 
The first chapter will give a review of the literature on theory of mind and the 
false belief task, and on reasoning in children, looking at the development of 
conditional reasoning, counterfactual reasoning and contrary-to-fact reasoning. 
Chapters two, three, four and five will report the studies conducted and the 
results of these studies. Chapter six will be the final discussion. 
This first chapter will review the literature on theory of mind and its methods 
of assessment; in particular the false belief task. Secondly the literature on 
reasoning development in children will be reviewed. This part will focus on the 
development of conditional reasoning, counterfactual reasoning and the ability to 
solve contrary4o-fact syllogisms in children. The link between all the types of 
reasoning mentioned above and the false belief task will be reviewed as well. 
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1 Theory of mind 
1.1 Definition 
Theory of mind has been at the centre of a considerable number of 
research projects In the last 25 years. Most research on theory of mind has been 
conducted with typically developing pre-school children with the view to 
understand how children develop a social understanding in the first few years of 
their life. However, theory of mind has also been studied with older children, adults 
with acquired brain injury and nonhuman primates, and a vast literature reports 
studies conducted with special populations especially deaf children and children 
with autism. This literature with older and/or special populations was conducted 
with the aim to contribute to the debate about the theoretical backgrounds to social 
understanding as well as understanding some specific disorders. 
The pioneers in the area of theory of mind were Premack and Woodruff 
(1978) who were the first ones to use the term 'theory of mind' for which they gave 
the following definition: 'In saying that an individual has a theory of mind, it means 
that the individual imputes mental states to himself and others (...)' (p.515). 
Having a theory of mind is the ability to understand that people have different 
mental states than our own and to understand what these mental states are. 
Premack and Woodruffs (1978) research examined whether chimpanzees 
have a theory of mind. They reported an experiment where a chimpanzee was 
shown a video of a human being trying to solve a problem and was then asked to 
pick a still photo that showed the accurate solution to the problem. They used a 
variety of videos and problems. Some of them were simple and were the type of 
problems the chimpanzee could often be confronted with, such as inaccessible 
bananas. Others were more complex, more the type of problems humans are 
confronted with; for example, in one of the scenarios, the experimenter tried to 
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play a gramophone that was not plugged in. The 14-year-old chimpanzee tested in 
this study performed well above chance level answering correctly 22 of the 24 
scenarios presented to her for the simple problem and performed again above 
chance level for the more complex problems. 
Premack and Woodruff (1978) argued that the chimpanzee was able to 
solve these problems by attributing mental states to the human actor. For 
example, regarding the simple problems where the human actor was confronted 
with a physically Inaccessible banana, Premack and Woodruff (1978) explained 
that in order to solve that problem the chimpanzee needed to make sense of the 
situation, understanding that the human actor wanted the banana but could not 
reach It. She also needed to assume that the human actor knew what he needed 
to do to reach it, so when she was presented with photographs presenting 
solutions to the problem she would choose the correct one. They therefore 
concluded that the main mental states involved in that task were intention, or 
purpose, and knowledge, or belief. They argued that theory of mind is not a 
sophisticated act but a primitive one, as a chimpanzee can show signs of having a 
theory of mind, and that It seems to be innate rather than learned. However, 
human beings have a much more developed theory of mind as they can 
understand a vast number of mental states In a wide variety of situations. It is also 
worth noting that the chimpanzee that took part in this experiment was a highly 
trained chimpanzee that was used to human beings. It is very difficult to generalise 
these findings to chimpanzees and animals as a whole. The specific aspects of 
humans' theory of mind will be discussed in this chapter. 
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1.2 Mental states 
Having a theory of mind is the ability to attribute mental states to 
individuals, but what are these mental states? Mental states are by definition not 
directly observable (Premack and Woodruff, 1978) as they are people's thoughts 
and feelings. However, they can be detected through observable behaviours and 
through the mental verbs people use such as to believe, to think, to know, to like, 
to guess, to doubt, to pretend, to promise, to trust. The variety of mental verbs 
reflects the variety of mental states but Premack and Woodnjff (1978) stated that 
the mental states we impute most often are 'purpose' and 'intention'. Bartsch and 
Wellman (1989) identified two main categories of mental states: 'desires' and 
'beliefs' and those two main categories of mental states will drive a person's 
behaviour. It also can be said that 'purpose' and 'intention' drive people's 
behaviour. Human behaviour is very complex and mental states are just one of the 
factors that influence it. A large variety of other mental states also exist, such as 
pretence and imagination (Slaughter and Repacholi, 2003), wishes, hopes and 
ideas (Wellman and Woolley, 1990). 
The mental states described above are the ones adults will impute. 
Although they are all present in adulthood they do not all develop at the same time 
in children (Wellman and Woolley, 1990; Wellman and Liu, 2004). Wellman and 
Liu (2004) conducted a meta-analysis of 45 different studies and found that 
children can correctly understand people's desires before they can understand 
their beliefs. This had previously been suggested by Wellman and Woolley's 
(1990) findings that showed that older two-year-olds can predict characters' 
behaviour/action according to their desires. This could be explained by the fact 
that desires are more important in children's life than beliefs are. 
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As mentioned above, mental states do not all develop at the same time but 
it can also be noticed that each particular mental state develops in a particular 
manner. Wellman and Bartsch (1994) described children as 'Desire Psychologists' 
as they tend to use desire mental state verbs (e.g.: want, wish, hope...) before 
belief mental state verbs (e.g.: think, know...). Wellman and Liu (2004) reported 
the development of desire in children. They explained that children can first judge 
that two different people can have different beliefs, then they can judge how a 
person will act according to their own beliefs, and finally they can judge whether a 
person's belief is tme or false. 
Bartsch and Wellman (1989) showed that children have some appreciation 
of the existence and implication of false beliefs. They can explain a character's 
action according to their false belief, which is easier than predicting behaviour from 
false belief as at three years of age the satisfaction of desires is more important 
than beliefs. 
1.3 The function of having a theory of mind 
Having a theory of mind, being able to perceive other people's mental state, 
is extremely important to human beings. It is an essential component of social 
interactions. It allows us to make sense of ourselves and others (Wellman, 1990). 
It can help us understand the reasons why people behave in the way they do as 
behaviour is a product of mental states and attitudes (Wellman and Woolley, 
1990). Wellman (1990) explained that the conception of mind relies on the 
interaction between belief, desire (two mental states) and action, with belief and 
desire preceding the action. If a child wants some chocolate (desire), he will look 
where he believes the chocolate is (belief), and then the search can start (action). 
In this particular example action is a product of desire and belief. Therefore, belief 
and action can help explain and even predict people's behaviours. Being able to 
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Interpret our own as well as other people's behaviour is very useful but we cannot 
be sure that our interpretation is the right one. People are not always aware of the 
reasons that make them behave in a certain way. Interpreting other people's 
behaviour can be even more uncertain. 
In order to understand people we need a theory of mind. Wellman and 
Lagattuta (2000) claimed that when we think of people we do it in terms of mental 
states, in terms of their beliefs, desires, hopes. Having a theory of mind Is 
Important for social interactions and communication. 
Having a theory of mind has an implication for every day social interactions, 
and delays or deficits that can be observed in theory of mind can have important 
consequences for social development (Keenan, 2003). Being able to understand 
other people's mental states is essential to be Integrated in human society. There 
is a positive correlation behveen success on the false belief task (a task that 
measures theory of mind) and quality of social development (see Keenan, 2003, 
for a review). However, it Is difficult to know which one comes first. Does having a 
good theory of mind facilitate social development or does social development 
influence theory of mind? We need to understand people's thoughts and feelings 
to be integrated, to be 'popular' and Mitchell (1997) made a very strong claim 
saying that a human being who is not able to do so could become a social outcast. 
Understanding people's mental states allows us to communicate more 
efficiently with them. Having a theory of mind helps us better understand what 
people really mean when they communicate. Knowing what the speaker's factual 
beliefs are allows us to interpret his, or her, discourse correctly (Mitchell, 1997); 
the communication then becomes clearer. The same discourse can be interpreted 
differently according to who the speaker Is and what his. or her, own beliefs are. 
Most human interactions are very subtle. What people say with language is not 
always a true translation of their thoughts and beliefs. We need to understand 
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what people really mean to form friendships and love relationships that are 
essential to human beings (Mitchell, 1997). At a more sophisticated level having a 
theory of mind allows us to understand nonliteral language such as sarcasm and 
irony (Keenan, 2003). In order to understand sarcasm the listener needs to 
recognise through non verbal cues and context that the speaker's intention is to 
mean the opposite of what he said. For example, If the speaker says 'What a nice 
car' referring to an old car in poor condition he actually means the opposite of what 
was said. In order to understand this sarcasm the listener needs to have a good 
theory of mind. Understanding sarcasm is a sophisticated skill and children do not 
seem to be able to understand it until the age of 6 or 10 (Keenan, 2003). This 
shows that theory of mind develops progressively in childhood. 
1.4 Theoretical background of theory of mind 
The vast literature on theory of mind has studied the development of theory of 
mind with young children and has also tried to give a theoretical explanation to that 
development. The theoretical debate has mainly been centred domain general 
versus domain specific approaches, but more theories within each approach have 
also been developed. 
In domain general approaches knowledge of the mind is seen as conceptual 
and conceptual knowledge arises from general processes (Wellman, 1992). The 
first domain general approach suggests that executive functions are necessary to 
built up a theory of mind but then, once this theory is acquired, they are no longer 
necessary (McKinnon and Moscovitch, 2007), therefore executive functions are 
necessary during the developmental phase of theory of mind only. The executive 
functions required are planning. Inhibition, self-regulation and cognitive flexibility 
(Wellman, 1992). The importance of inhibition was demonstrated by Carlson and 
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Moses (2001) who found a link between performance on the false belief task and 
Inhibitory control. 
Another domain general approach is the representational-mind account 
described by Perner (1991). According to Perner (1991) children eventually 
understand mental representation after developing representations and multi-
models of the world. Children need to be able to understand that multi-models are 
some representations of the world and they need to be able to manipulate their 
models to understand false beliefs. False beliefs understanding requires them to 
compare their own model of the situations with somebody else's. Pemer (1991) 
suggested that understanding mental representations could be just a part of 
domain-general understanding of representation. 
In contrast to domain general approaches, domain specific approaches have 
also been developed. These approaches assume that human understanding of 
mental states stems from specific knowledge, processes and mechanisms; that 
there is a domain specific mechanism that governs social cognition (Wellman, 
1992). One of these approaches Is the dominant account in theory of mind: the 
theory-theory account (Morton, 1980). The theory4heory has mainly been 
developed over the years by Wellman. Wellman and colleagues argued that in 
order to explain people's behaviour and talk children need to formulate a domain 
specific theory (Wellman, 1990). This approach sees the child as a scientist who is 
going to develop a theory for a domain (Wellman, 1990; Perner, 1991) which 
means that children actually need to learn theory of mind. The children need to 
modify their theory in light of new evidence. In this approach belief and desires fit 
into a wider causal network where each piece of knowledge has its place within a 
larger conceptual framework in a domain (Carpendale and Lewis, 2006). 
Another domain specific approach that was developed alongside the theory-
theory is the simulation approach. According to the simulation view children 
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develop an understanding of mental states through projecting themselves into 
other people's situations. They can then imagine the experience and then simulate 
hovj they would feel and finally generalise their perspective to others (Harris, 
1989). 
These approaches contrast with the modular approach that was influenced by 
Fodor's (1983) work. Fodor (1983) revived the idea of the modularity of the mind. 
He argued for a nativist perspective where the cognitive system would be modular, 
or in other words, the cognitive system would be made of subsets of cognitive 
systems called modules. In this theory modules are information-specific units that 
are domain specific. The modules are highly specialised, autonomous, automatic 
and fast. Fodor's work has been widely influential across psychology and the 
concept of modularity was applied to theory of mind suggesting that theory of mind 
arises from an innate, encapsulated and domain specific module (Scholl and 
Leslie. 1999). 
Scholl and Leslie (1999; 2001) argued more specifically for a ToMM (Theory 
of Mind Mechanism) that is an innate module specialised in computing mental 
states. ToMM is an innate meta-representational basis that incorporates innate 
concepts such as belief and pretence. Being innate this module is available to 
children before they have developed general problem-solving resources and it 
allows children to have an insight into others' mind very early on. According to 
Scholl and Leslie (2001) this module allows children to spontaneously process 
behaviours and understand mental states. This module is very specific to theory of 
mind and does not apply to any other cognitive domain. However, Scholl and 
Leslie (1999; 2001) also explained that not all the theory of mind is modular; 
theory of mind has a specific innate basis that is ToMM, but it also includes a 
general executive process that they called SP (Selection Processing). The SP is 
non modular and is necessary to impute false beliefs. It allows the children to 
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inhibit the unwanted responses, such as, for example, a false belief. The SP is 
domain general support the hypothesis that executive functions are necessary to 
solve a false belief task. The difference between this theory and the domain 
general theory suggesting that inhibition is necessary to build up a theory of mind 
is the timeframe. In the domain general approach inhibition is required at the 
beginning, while the child is developing a theory of mind whereas in the domain 
specific approach inhibition is necessary in the long term as it is a selection 
process required for at least some of the theory of mind tasks. This domain 
general theory was further supported by subsequent studies conducted by 
McKinnon and Moscovitch (2007) who found that even with adult and older adult 
central processing is required to solve some complex false belief tasks. 
The concept of modularity was also supported by the studies conducted with 
special populations, in particular children with autism. It appears that children with 
autism have a specific Impairment of theory of mind (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Happe, 
1990) with a specific difficulty in understanding thought and feeling of others while 
other abilities, such as inhibition, are spared. This suggests that the module ToMM 
is specifically impaired in autism. 
In summary, no consensus has been reached and the debate between 
whether theory of mind is domain general or domain specific is on-going. Scholl 
and Leslie (1999; 2001) tried to reconcile the two by argumenting that both types 
of abilities are necessary to solve theory of mind situations. 
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2 Assessing Theory of Mind: The False Belief Task 
In order to study theory of mind in the most valid and reliable way possible, 
a wide range of tasks has been developed to assess children, from naturalistic 
types of tasks involving free play and free speech to very structured tasks 
following a clearly defined protocol. 
Naturalistic language transcripts have been used in the literature to analyse 
the different mental states children can represent (see Bartsch and Wellman, 
1995). This activity involves sampling children's spontaneous speech and 
recording the use of mental state verbs by the children. This allows the researcher 
to investigate whether the children show signs of having a theory of mind, and use 
it when playing freely. However, these naturalistic tasks are not the most 
commonly used tasks as they tend to be difficult to put in place, time consuming 
and can lack reliability. It is more for controlled tasks to be used. 
Most tasks assessing theory of mind require children to explain and predict 
a character's behaviour, assuming that they are going to act according to their 
mental states and beliefs. For example, if a character wants to retrieve a target 
object the children need to understand this character is going to look for the object 
where he, or she, thinks it is even if it is not where the object really is. The most 
widely used task measuring theory of mind is the false belief task in which 
'accurate predictions about another person's behaviour can be derived by referring 
to that person's mental (mis)representation' (Repacholi and Slaughter. 2003, p. 4). 
We will consider this task in detail shortly. 
Other controlled tasks have been used too, especially with high functioning 
children and teenagers with autism. Brent, Rios, Happe and Charman (2004) used 
advanced theory of mind tasks to test high-functioning 6- to 12-year-old children 
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with autism: Strange Stories and Cartoons that were first designed by Happe 
(1994b). In the context of Strange Stories the participants were presented with 
some stories involving mental states and some physical stories without any mental 
states as a control. In order to understand the first type of stories the participants 
needed to identify the underlying intention of the character. These stories 
assessed whether the participants could understand lies, white lies, double bluff, 
persuasion and misunderstanding. These concepts are more complex than simple 
false beliefs. Regarding the Cartoons, half of them required the participants to 
understand characters' mental states and the other half were based on 
mechanical/behavioural humour and did not involve any mental states. 
A more advanced stage of theory of mind is the 'second order theory of 
mind' which is the ability to understand a person's thought about another person's 
thought (Perner and Wimmer, 1985). Steele, Joseph and Tager-Flusberg (2003) 
presented children with autism with second-order false belief tasks in the format of 
picture stories. In one of them a child character is about to receive a surprise gift 
from a parent. Without the parents being aware of it the child inadvertently finds 
the present. The autistic children were then asked second-order ignorance, belief 
and justification questions. They needed to show that they were aware of what the 
parent knew, or thought, about what the child knew, or thought. These tasks are 
much more complex than the simple false belief task. 
The purpose of this thesis was to study the classic false belief task in 
relation to counterfactual thinking so the next part will analyse the structure of this 
task in more detail. 
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2.1 Description of the false belief task 
The prolific amount of research conducted in the domain of theory of mind 
has seen an Important increase in the number of tasks used. One of the main 
ways of assessing theory of mind is the false belief task. 
A variety of false belief tasks have been used in the literature but most 
follow a similar framework to that was described by Wimmer and Perner (1983). In 
that framework, the participant is aware that another character Is aware of a 
particular state of affairs, X. This other character leaves the scene and as he/she 
is away the participant witnesses a change of state of affairs from X to Y. The 
participant knows that the present state of affairs is now Y but that the other 
person still believes that it is X. In order to pass the false belief task the participant 
needs to acknowledge the character's false belief regarding the state of affairs. 
The change of state of affairs usually consists of the change of location of a 
particular object. 
Most false belief tasks include two control questions at the end: the reality 
question and the memory question. The reality question checks that the child is 
really aware of the final state of affairs and the memory question checks that the 
child remembers the first state of affairs. It is argued that if children fail either of 
these control questions, their answer to the critical question should be discarded 
as it then seems that the child is not fully aware of the situation In front of him/her 
(e.g.: Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith, 1985). These short stories are usually acted 
out with puppets and toys, but in some cases the story is presented on paper as a 
story board. 
One of the first controlled false belief tasks reported In the literature was the 
Maxi task that was designed by Wimmer and Perner (1983). The Maxi task related 
a story involving two characters, a little boy called Maxi and his mother. The 
following story was told to the children and acted out with dolls and props. Maxl's 
23 
mother comes back from the shop. She has bought some chocolate to bake a 
cake. Maxi helps her put the things away. He asks his mum where he should put 
the chocolate and his mother replies: 'in the blue cupboard*. Maxi puts the 
chocolate in the blue cupboard. The children are then told that Maxi remembers 
exactly where he put the chocolate so that he can gel some later, and that he 
loves chocolate. Then Maxi goes to the playground. At this stage, the boy doll is 
removed from the scene. While Maxi is away the mother starts preparing the cake. 
She removes the chocolate from the blue cupboard. She grates some chocolate to 
put in the mix and then she puts it back in the green cupboard instead of the blue 
one. She then realises that she forgot to buy some eggs so she goes to her 
neighbour's house for some eggs. Then Maxi comes back from the playground; he 
is hungry and he wants some chocolate. The boy doll is then brought back to the 
scene. The children are reminded that Maxi still remembers where he had put the 
chocolate and they are asked the false belief question: 'Where will Maxi look for 
the chocolate?' The correct answer is 'in the blue cupboard" as Maxi is not aware 
of the change of location. The answer can be verbal or the child can just point to 
the right location. The child is then asked two control questions: the reality 
question and the memory question. The reality question is: 'Where is the chocolate 
really?' This control question is meant to assess whether the child is aware of the 
real situation, the real location of the chocolate. The memory question is: 'Do you 
remember where Maxi put the chocolate in the beginning?' This question is meant 
to assess whether the child can remember the first state of affairs. This scenario 
described the basic Maxi task. In their paper, Wimmer and Perner (1983) 
presented the children with two different versions of this task: the cooperative story 
version and the competitive story version. In the cooperative version, the 
cupboards are fixed high on the wall and Mummy needs to lift up Maxi so he can 
put the chocolate in the cupboard, therefore when Maxi comes backs he needs 
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somebody to help him retrieve the chocolate. He askes his grandfather to help 
him. His grandfather asks him where the chocolate his and the children are asked 
the following question: 'Where will Maxi say the chocolate is?" The children need 
to acknowledge that Maxi is not aware of the change of location and that he is 
going to tell the truth to his grandfather as he wants the chocolate. In the 
competitive version the cupboards are fixed low on the wall. In this story when 
Maxi comes back from the park, his big brother is already in the kitchen and is 
looking for the chocolate. The children are told that Maxi wants to tell something 
wrong to his brother so he does not find the chocolate. So when the children are 
asked 'where will Maxi say the chocolate is?" they should say in the green 
cupboard. This version seems more complicated because the child needs to 
understand that Maxi will say what he believes to be the wrong location which is 
actually the true location of the chocolate. The results showed that when the 
children answered the belief questions correctly there was then no difference 
between the competitive and the cooperative versions. 
The Sally and Ann task (Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith, 1985), another 
extremely widely used task, was developed following the paradigm described by 
Wimmer and Perner (1983). This task was primarily designed to test theory of 
mind is children with autism but has also been used with typically developing 
children. The task involves two dolls, Sally and Anne. Sally has a basket and Anne 
has a box. Sally places a marble in her basket and then leaves the scene. While 
she is away, Anne takes the marble and puts it in her box. Sally then comes back 
and the child is asked the critical question: 'Where will Sally look for her marble?' 
In order to pass this task the child needs to point to the previous location of the 
marble: Sally's basket. As previously two control questions are then asked; the 
reality question: 'Where is the marble really?', and the memory question: 'Where 
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was the marble at the beginning?' This task follows a simpler scenario than the 
Maxi task and includes fewer narrative elements. 
Other tasks have been developed more recently. An example of a more 
recent false belief task is the Post Office story created by Riggs. Peterson. 
Robinson and Mitchell (1998). In this story Sally and Peter (two little characters) 
are in their house. Peter is not feeling very well so he goes to bed. Then, Sally 
goes to the shops to get some medicine. While she is away the man from the post 
office rings Peter to ask him to come to help put out a fire. Peter gets out of bed 
and goes to the post office. The children are then asked whether Sally knows 
where Peter is, and they are corrected if they give the wrong answer. Sally then 
comes back and the children are asked the critical question: 'Where does Sally 
think Peter is?' This story again was acted out with toys. In the particular task the 
authors did not mention the use of control questions. 
All these tasks follow the same pattern regarding the change in the state of 
affairs described at the beginning of this section. These tasks can all be described 
as 'false belief to others' tasks because the participants are requested to attribute 
false beliefs to another person. In the literature there is also a range of tasks 
testing false belief to self, where the children have to attribute false beliefs to 
themselves. The false belief to others tasks described previously are all based on 
a change of location of the target object whereas the false belief to self tasks are 
based on a change of identity or content. 
The main false belief to self task is the Smartie task which was designed by 
Perner, Leekam and Wimmer (1987). Prior to testing, the content of a Smartie 
container is replaced by a pencil, without the participants witnessing this change. 
The participants are shown the Smartie box and are asked 'What's inside the 
box?' This container is highly familiar to children so they generally give the right 
answer 'Smarties' or 'sweeties'. They are then shown that the box actually 
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contains a pencil, and not Smarties. The pencil is then put back into the box and 
the box closed again. At this stage the children are asked a control question to 
check if they can remember the actual content of the box: 'Can you remember 
what's inside here?', and then the test question about their previous belief: 'But 
what did you think was in here?' If the children are able to acknowledge their own 
false belief they should say: 'Smarties'. Other versions of the task have been used 
in the literature. However, the false belief to others task has been used more 
frequently In the literature than the false belief to self task. At this stage the reason 
why Is not clear. These two tasks will be studied in more depth later on in this 
thesis. 
2.2 Main findings 
The false belief task has been used in a vast number of studies looking at 
different aspects of theory of mind. The link between theory of mind and language 
or social environment has been studied in particular, as well as the components of 
the task itself. Wel lman, Cross and Watson (2001) ran a meta-analysis of theory of 
mind development and the false belief task that included 178 separate studies, 
published or unpublished up to January 1998 across seven different countries. 
This meta-analysis included 479 conditions and 4 000 typically developing 
children. The size Itself of this meta-analysis makes it more reliable than individual 
studies. 
Wellman et al. (2001) looked at many conditions individually and found that 
some of them did not have any effect on the children's performance. For example, 
the year of publication of the studies did not influence the results nor did the 
medium of presentation (i.e.: toys, pictures or video). Whether the false belief task 
is presented with real people, puppets, storybooks or videotapes the performance 
Is the same. This finding gives some freedom to the experimenter regarding the 
27 
choice of material used. It therefore allows for a greater variety in the support 
material to be used, which allows the experimenter to specifically adapt the 
material to the population to be tested especially regarding their age, abilities or 
special needs. However, Wellman et al. (2001) reported five variables that have a 
significant effect on performance; they were motive, participation, salience, real 
presence and country. For example, stating deception explicitly during the 
presentation of the false belief task enhanced the performance of children of all 
ages. If the children made the transformation themselves, for example, they 
moved the target object from one location to the other, it improved their 
performance. If the false belief of the character is made more salient, i.e. clearly 
stated, it improved the children's performance but only for the younger children, 
whereas the real presence of the object improved the performance of the older 
children. Wellman et al.'s (2001) meta-analysis included studies from different 
countries from Europe, North America, South America. East Asia, and Africa and 
from Australia. They found that the pattern of development was very similar across 
countries despite some slight difference in performance between countries. They 
used the United States and the United Kingdom as a baseline as they represented 
the largest sample. The meta-analysis showed that children in Korea performed as 
well as the baseline but that children in Australia and Canada performed better 
than the baseline, whereas children from Austria and Japan performed worse. 
Their results also showed a strong age effect. The performance consistently 
increased with age, as could be expected, with most children failing the task 
before the age of 3 but most of them passing it at the age of 4, therefore four 
seems to be the critical age to be able to solve the false belief task. The research 
suggested that there is an important developmental change between the ages of 3 
and 5. with younger children performing below chance level and older children 
28 
above chance level. The false belief task also showed good reliability across the 
different studies, with the results being highly comparable between studies. 
Wellman et al. (2001) also compared the false belief to others and the false 
belief to self task and they did not find any difference in performance between 
those two types of task, with the younger children performing exactly at the same 
level. Attributing false belief to themselves or to another character does not seem 
to be easier or more difficult. 
The false belief task has also been used with non typically developing 
children such as children with autism, children with learning disability, children with 
Down syndrome and Deaf children. It appears that some children experience 
difficulty in developing a theory of mind. This development can be simply delayed 
or sometimes children do not fully develop a theory of mind. The performance on 
the false belief task with special populations will be discussed in the next section. 
2.3 Clinical populations and the false belief task 
The work on autism and theory of mind has been very important in the past 
20 years. Autism is a severe childhood disorder that appears in the first three 
years of life (American Psychiatric Association, 1987). It is often described as a 
psychosis as the children affected seem to be isolated in their own world (Baron-
Cohen, 1994). Children with autism present three fundamental impairments 
captured in Wing's triad: they have a qualitative impairment of social interaction, a 
qualitative impairment of communication and a restricted repertoire of activities 
and interests (Happe, 1994a). These impairments directly affect the way children 
with autism interact with other people and the way they play. They display very 
little pretend play and cannot engage with complex cooperative play with their 
peers because of their communication difficulties. 
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Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith (1985) were at the origin of this important 
research area on autism. They predicted that autistic children lacked a theory of 
mind. They designed the now famous 'Sally and Anne task' (as described above) 
to test their hypothesis. In this study they found that the autistic children 
consistently pointed to the location where the marble really was, rather than where 
Sally thought it was. They concluded that these children could not pass this task 
because they did not distinguish their own beliefs from the doll's. They could not 
see the situation from the doll's perspective. Baron-Cohen et al. (1985) explained 
these results by saying that autistic children were not able to represent mental 
states. They argued that this is a specific deficit that is attributable to autism, and 
that cannot be attributed to general intellectual level, as the children with Down 
syndrome included as a control in their study did not show this deficit. This specific 
deficit potentially explains the lack of pretend play and social impairment in autism. 
If children with autism are not able to represent mental states then they cannot 
share pretence with other children and communication becomes very difficult as 
they do not know what knowledge they share, or do not share, with their 
interlocutor. 
More evidence tends to suggest that performance on the false belief task is 
not directly linked to intelligence as even high functioning older children with 
autism have been shown to be impaired in advanced theory of mind ability in 
comparison to typically developing children. (Brent, Rios, Happe and Chamrian, 
2004; Steele et al., 2003). It seems that theory of mind impairment is specific to 
autism and tends to still be present with high functioning autistic children and 
continues even in older children who perform at a lower level than control groups 
(typically developing children matched on intelligence and verbal abilities) on more 
advanced theory of mind tasks. However, it appears that children with autism can 
improve their performance on theory of mind tasks with age (Steele et al., 2003). 
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All these findings suggesting a specific theory of mind impairment in autism 
support the hypothesis presented by Scholl and Leslie (1999; 2001) that theory of 
mind is, at least partially, an innate module. 
The modular hypothesis Is also supported by some data collected with 
patient with acquired neurological disorders. It has been shown, for example, that 
adults with no anterior difficulty in theory of mind can present some problems in 
this area following a stroke, especially when the right hemisphere Is affected. 
Happe, Brownwell and Winner (1999) tested brain damaged patients after a stroke 
in the right hemisphere using theory of mind tasks that did not necessarily require 
the acknowledgement of false beliefs. The tasks used were stories or cartoons 
involving some double bluff, persuasion or white lies. Happe et al. (1999) showed 
that these patients had a specific impairment in understanding stories and 
cartoons requiring mental state attribution, but they did not find this impairment in 
patients suffering from damage In the left hemisphere. This tends to suggest that 
the right hemisphere of the brain might be involved in theory of mind 
understanding. This supports Fodor's (1983) claim that modules are a fixed 
specialised portion of the neurological architecture. 
The false belief task has also been studied with other special populations 
which this time highlighted the role of the environment. For example there is a 
large literature looking at deaf children and the false belief task. The results from 
these studies overall tend to show that language and communication are crucial to 
the development of theory of mind. The first studies published on this topic 
suggested a significant delay in the development of theory of mind in deaf 
children. For example, Peterson and Siegal (1995) found that only 35% of deaf 
children, aged 8 to 13. could pass the false belief task. These deaf children 
performed as badly as children with autism in the control group. Deaf children from 
hearing families seemed to show a deficit in theory of mind due to the lack of 
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communication with their family and their lack of familiarity with mental state 
conversation, whereas deaf children from deaf families, i.e. with a rich linguistic 
environment, did not have any difficulty with theory of mind, especially when tested 
in their preferred language: Sign Language, (e.g.: Courtin and Melot, 1998; 
Peterson and Siegal, 1999). These findings can still be coherent with the modular 
hypothesis as modules need to be triggered by the environment (Leslie and 
Scholl, 2001). 
Following the work with special populations, it seems that theory of mind 
can be affected by developmental and acquired disorders. Some specific disorders 
such as autism or brain injuries in the right hemisphere of the brain have an impact 
but environmental factors such as lack of eariy rich interactions can influence its 
development too. 
As the false belief task is one of the most commonly used tasks to assess 
theory of mind it will be assessed in the next section. 
2.4 Evaluation of the false belief task 
The false belief task, as described eariier in this section, is widely used in 
theory of mind research, probably because it presents several advantages. First of 
all it is quick and easy to administer. Running one false belief task just takes a few 
minutes, and only some simple material, such as everyday toys, is necessary. It is 
also very engaging for the children who like being told short stories and being 
shown toys. Children usually enjoy doing the task. Finally it requires a simple 
answer. In most tasks, in particular in the change of location type task, such as the 
Sally and Anne task for example, the children do not even need to give a verbal 
answer; they just need to point to a particular location. This is always an 
advantage when testing very young children as they can be very shy and not 
inclined to speak to a stranger. 
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The false belief task has also shown good reliability across the literature: 
the results are robust and consistent, with most children passing this task from the 
age of four (Wellman, Cross and Watson, 2001); however, its validity has been 
questioned more recently. It has been argued that younger children do not fail the 
task because of their lack of conceptual competence but because of the cognitive 
demands of the task (Wellman et al., 2001). Children under the age of four show 
signs of having a theory of mind, by using mental state verbs for example, but 
cannot pass the false belief task (Wimmer and Perner, 1983). 
Bloom and German (2000) even claimed that the false belief task should 
not be used to test theory of mind. They argued that the false belief task is a 
complex task requiring other skills than just having a theory of mind, and that 
theory of mind cannot be only restricted to passing the false belief task. 
Astington (2003) supported this view by saying that the literature showed a 
difference between competence and performance on the false belief task. The 
complexity of the task and the other skills involved (memory, language, 
inhibition...) can prevent children from passing the false belief task although they 
do have a theory of mind, and they can understand people's mental states in a 
real world situation. The opposite situation is also possible; some high functioning 
individuals can pass the false belief task but cannot use their skills in a real life 
situation. However, Astington (2003) stated that the false belief task has some 
ecological validity as it relates to individual social behaviours in real life situations 
but it does not always reflect the children's social interaction in the real world. 
Some children with autism have shown ceiling effects in the traditional false belief 
task but their everyday communication was still odd. They could not use their full 
theory of mind in a communication situation. Although they could pass the false 
belief task they could not fully use this ability when communicating with others. 
The false belief task only assesses a basic theory of mind ability; everyday 
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communication requires a more sophisticated theory of mind. Everyday 
communication is complex and it involves dealing with several mental states 
simultaneously. 
Some authors have claimed that other cognitive abilities than theory of 
mind, such as inhibition for example, are important to pass the false belief task. 
Inhibition is defined by Flynn, O'Malley and Wood (2004) as 'the ability to stop 
oneself from performing an action that is dictated by a prepotent response' 
(p. 103). Inhibition develops between the age of 3 and 5 (Flynn et al., 2004), 
therefore at the same time as children start being able to pass the false belief task. 
Flynn et al. (2004) conducted a longitudinal study with children from the age of 3 to 
5 to investigate the parallel development of inhibition and false belief 
understanding. The children were tested every four to six weeks for six sessions. 
Each session included two false belief tasks and two inhibitory tasks. The initial 
and the final sessions also included a measure of receptive vocabulary using the 
British Picture Vocabulary Scale. No significant correlations were found between 
BPVS scores and change in scores of inhibition and false belief understanding. 
However, they found that more children performed well on the executive inhibition 
task before they could understand false beliefs. When looking at children who 
were just starting to pass the false belief task they found that these children had 
good inhibition skills before they began to pass the false belief task. It therefore 
seems that inhibition could be a prerequisite to the false belief task. Leslie and 
Polizzi (2000) argued that inhibition is necessary to pass the false belief task. 
Children need to inhibit the true-belief target in order to pass this task, they need 
to be able to activate the SP (Scholl and Leslie, 1999; 2001). 
It has also been argued that the ability to pass the false belief task is closely 
linked to the ability to solve counterfactual problems. The domain general 
hypothesis suggested that learning theory of mind is linked to executive functions 
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including reasoning abilities (Wellman. 1992). Riggs et al. (1998) argued that the 
classic false belief task includes a counterfactual element, so in order to pass the 
false belief task children need to be able to reason counterfactually. This link 
between the false belief task and counterfactual reasoning will be discussed in 
more depth later on in the thesis. Before exploring this relationship in depth it is 
necessary to have a good understanding of reasoning skills and their development 
in children, and in particular of counterfactual reasoning. The next part will review 
the literature published in these areas. 
3 Reasoning 
3.1 Development of thinking and reasoning in children 
The term 'thinking' embraces a variety of cognitive skills such as conceptual 
understanding, remembering, language, problem solving and reasoning, amongst 
other cognitive abilities (Siegler & Wagner Alibali, 2005). Thinking develops mainly 
from birth to adolescence (Siegler & Wagner Alibali. 2005) but its development is 
extremely rapid in the first few years of life. The main focus of this thesis is on 
typically developing children from the ages of 3 to 5, and by this age children have 
very good communication skills and show some logical reasoning abilities. 
These rapid changes in children's thinking can be explained by two factors: 
biological changes in children and the social environment. Biological 
developments such as changes in the brain as a whole, changes in the structures 
within the brain and changes in neurones underpin this evolution in children's 
thinking (Siegler & Wagner Alibali. 2005). The contribution of the social 
environment is also of paramount importance as Vygotsky suggested in his theory. 
Vygotsky claimed that development occurs in social interaction, especially 
between the child and an adult or a more advanced peer (Siegler & Wagner 
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Alibali, 2005). This thesis focuses on one particular aspect of thinking: reasoning. 
Therefore the next section will address the development of reasoning in children. 
Research on children's reasoning first started with Piaget In the middle of 
the 20*^ century. He was a pioneer in research in cognitive development in children 
from birth to adolescence. His work mainly explored how knowledge grows in 
children, and how children develop logical thinking. His main findings suggested 
that formal reasoning appears at the stage of formal operations around the age of 
11 or 12 (Inhelder and Piaget. 1958). This finding has since been criticised as 
young children seem to be able to reason logically from a much earlier age (eg.: 
Leevers and Harris, 2000). Those findings will be discussed in more detail later on. 
By the age of 3. children have usually experienced many physical causes 
and their effects (Goswami, 1998). They know, for example, that scissors cut 
paper, that if they spill water on their jumper it will get wet. They experience a lot of 
these physical situations as soon as their motor skills allow them to interact 
physically with their environment. In infancy, causality is tested using mechanical 
tasks: one agent object moves and has physical contact with a recipient object 
which then moves (Koslowski & Masnik, 2002). Research seems to show that 
young children understand causality in terms of spatial and temporal continuity, 
and there is no evidence of abstraction of the notion of causation being already in 
place (see Koslowski & Masnik, 2002 for a review). Older children can reason 
about non-mechanical causation, such as electrical phenomena. They then use 
formal rules and content interdependently to inform their judgement (see 
Koslowski & Masnik. 2002 for a review). Koslowski and Masnik (2002) claimed 
that being able to reason causally is linked to learning empirical relations in the 
world. Children need to evaluate the likeliness of a causal agent. For example. 
they need to evaluate whether car colour is linked to reliability. They also need to 
integrate some background information about the situation of the problem. These 
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results lay in the fact that most of the time, causal reasoning in children is a guess 
about plausibility. 
Logical reasoning includes different types of reasoning such as deductive 
logic and reasoning by analogy that children acquire at an early age. and transitive 
and scientific reasoning acquired at a later age (Goswami, 1998). Transitive 
reasoning is close to what Piaget called the 'concrete operational stage' that 
children reach around the age of 6, and scientific reasoning is similar to Piaget's 
'formal operation stage' reached at the age of 11 to 12. although the processes 
might not be as described by Piaget. 
Inductive and deductive reasoning are both, to some extent, linked to the 
child's knowledge of the world. Inductive reasoning requires the child to include 
knowledge of the world to make inferences, whereas deductive reasoning 
problems can be solved without any other knowledge but can help to fill the gaps 
in knowledge (Goswami, 2002). Children are more likely to successfully solve an 
inductive reasoning problem if the premise and the conclusion are similar in 
content and if the premise categories are very typical (eg: a robin; a very typical 
bird) (See Goswami, 2002, for a review). Analogical reasoning is a particular type 
of inductive reasoning. It requires the present novel situation to be related to a 
past familiar one (Goswami, 1998). It is the basis of a lot of everyday problem 
solving. Faced with a novel situation, human beings, and children in particular, try 
to identify the similarities between this situation and a previous one. In order to 
reason by analogy the child needs to be able to match up situations. It seems that 
from the age of 4 children can reason by analogy when the context is familiar to 
them (see Goswami, 1998 for a review). The results are again influenced by the 
similarity of the premise and conclusion categories. The more the context is 
familiar to the child, the more successful the child will be (Goswami, 2002). 
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In order to solve deductive reasoning problems the child will have to 
reason; that is follow a mental process, using the information provided in the 
problem (Goswami, 2002). One of the simplest forms of deductive reasoning is the 
syllogism. Syllogisms include two premises and a conclusion. The premises and 
the conclusion contain some quantifiers such as 'all', 'some', or 'no' (Evans, 
Newstead and Byrne. 1993). The participants are then asked to evaluate whether 
the conclusion is valid. One example would be: 'All cows are mammals, all 
mammals are animals, therefore all cows are animals'. Sometimes the conclusion 
can be replaced by a question, and the syllogism therefore is: 'All cows are 
mammals, all mammals are animals. Are all cows animals?' This format is used 
more frequently with children. Adults and children tend to find syllogistic reasoning 
difficult. Although no reference to the real world is necessary to solve a syllogism, 
research has shown that adults and children perform better when they are familiar 
with the content of the syllogism is presented in. If the content is unfamiliar, 
participants tend to make empirical mistakes (see Goswami. 2002 for a review). 
The issues relating to syllogisms in an unfamiliar context will be developed further 
in the next section. 
3.2 Syl logisms and Contrary-to-fact reasoning 
Children's reasoning on contrary-to-fact problems has been one of the main 
foci in studies of reasoning development. As mentioned in the previous section, 
children and adults find reasoning more difficult when performed with unfamiliar 
content; therefore reasoning with contrary-to-fact premises is an interesting way of 
studying the impact of content on performance. It also allows us to study how 
children can reason independently of the content of the problem. When solving a 
false belief task children are required to reason about beliefs, and about false 
beliefs in particular. They need to disengage from reality and then reason. 
38 
One of the first research papers on contrary4o-fact reasoning was 
published by Hawkins. Pea, Click and Scribner in 1984. They presented children 
v\rtth syllogistic problems and varied the content from fantasy, to congruent or 
incongruent with practical knowledge. Their findings confirmed that young children 
can reason deductively and that the content of the problem affects the reasoning 
performance of the children. When children were asked to solve contrary-to-fact 
problems their performance was lower than when they tried to solve problems 
congruent with their practical knowledge of the world. 
Several researchers have worked on contrary-to-fact problems with 
children, and investigated what type of information or context could help children 
improve their performance. There is a general consensus in the literature that a 
fantasy, or play, context helps children solve more contrary-to-fact syllogisms, (eg: 
Markovits and Vachon, 1989; Leevers and Harris, 2000). 
Markovits and Vachon (1989) asked children between the ages of 10 and 
18 to solve contrary-to-fact modus ponens problems such as: 'If it rains, then the 
street will become dry. It is raining. The street will become wet.' Modus ponens are 
conditional inferences following the model: If p then q, p is true, therefore the 
conclusion is q (Evans et al., 1993). Half of the problems were set in an ordinary 
context and the other half in a fantasy context. In the fantasy context the children 
were told that the stories were set in an imaginary country where curious things 
happened. The results showed that the children's performance was improved in 
the fantasy context. Markovits and Vachon (1989) then argued that the fantasy 
context encourages children to accept the premises as if they were true. 
However, the effect of fantasy context on contrary-to-fact problems seems 
to be different according to the type of reasoning problem. Markovits, Venet, 
Janveau-Brennan and Vadeboncoeur (1996) asked children questions equivalent 
to modus ponens, affirming the consequent, modus tollens, and denying the 
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antecedent (MP, AC, MT. DA). In all these types of conditional inferences the first 
premise is always 'If p then q' but the second premise varies as therefore does the 
conclusion. Modus ponens was explained above. The second premise of modus 
tollens (MT) is 'not-q' therefore the conclusion is 'not-p'. The second premise for 
affirmation of the consequence (AC) is 'q' and the conclusion 'p'. Finally the 
second premise for denial of the antecedent (DA) 'not-p' and the conclusion 'not-
q'. One example was given by Evans et al. (1997) where the first premise was: 'If 
the key is turned then the engine will run'. The second premise and the conclusion 
of the four possible inferences were as follows: MP: the key is turned, therefore 
the engine is running; DA: the key is not turned, therefore the engine is not 
running; AC: the engine is running, therefore the key is turned; MT: the engine is 
not running, therefore the key is not turned. MP and MT are valid inferences and 
AC and DA are uncertain logical forms and they cannot always lead to a certain 
conclusion. 
Half of the problems in Markovits et al.'s (1996) experiment were presented 
in an everyday context and the other half in a fantasy context. The results showed 
that when true premises were presented in a fantasy context the performance was 
reduced for the uncertain logical forms AC and DA. Markovits et al. (1996) 
explained these results by saying that the fantasy context reduces the probability 
of retrieving appropriate alternative relations. They argued that fantasy context 
acts as a cognitive filter reducing access to real world knowledge, in other words 
to long term memory (LTM). This explains why it improves performance on 
contrary-to-fact problems. The children can no longer access their real world 
knowledge so they reason with the premises only, therefore they cannot produce 
empirical responses. It allows them to make direct inferences but reduces their 
ability to make more complex inferences. 
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Another series of studies on contrary4o-fact reasoning has concentrated on 
syllogistic reasoning in the form of 'All cows quack. Susie is a cow, does Susie 
quack?' (e.g: Dias and Harris, 1988). The first premise of these syllogisms has a 
contrary-to-fact content. A variety of research papers have studied the types of 
contexts that would improve the children's performance by reducing the empirical 
bias they tend to make (e.g. Dias and Harris. 1990). The reasoning bias occurs 
when children reason according to their own belief about the world rather than the 
premises; for example when they answer 'no' to the example given above, as in 
the real world cows do not quack. A range of contexts has been shown to reduce 
this empirical bias. When the children were asked to engage in a pretend worid 
through play (Dias and Harris, 1988) their performance improved. Giving them 
some make believe clues such as using imagery, using a different intonation or 
setting (Dias and Harris. 1990; Leevers and Harris, 1999) or even just asking them 
to think about the premises (Leevers and Harris, 1999) has the same effect. This 
effect is very robust as it can carry over a week (Leevers and Harris, 1999) and 
even two to three weeks (Leevers and Harris, 2000). According to Leevers and 
Harris (2000), the fact that this effect can persist for a few weeks goes against the 
theory of the cognitive filter suggested by Markovits et al. (1996). Leevers and 
Harris (2000) believe that these make believe clues only give a pragmatic 
clarification to the children. The make believe clues make clear to the children that 
they have to behave as if the premises were true. They help clarify the 
experimenter's intention. The children understand they are tested on their 
reasoning skills rather than their knowledge of the real worid. 
A closely related type of reasoning to contrary-to-fact syllogism is 
counterfactual reasoning. Counterfactual reasoning also requires children to 
suppress some aspect of their knowledge. This type of reasoning is going to be 
discussed in the following section. 
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3.3 Counterfactual reasoning 
3.3.1 Definition 
Roese (1997) defines counterfactuals as alternative versions of the pasL 
He explains that 'counterfactual does not refer to future prospects but only to 
negations of established facts.' (p. 133-134). They are contrary to the actual facts 
and events that have happened (Roese, 2003). Counterfactuals are characterised 
by a false antecedent. An example of a counterfactual could be 'If I had left eariy I 
wouldn't have missed my plane.' The antecedent, 'leave early', is false. So you 
infer that in reality the speaker did not leave early and did miss their plane. 
Both contrary-to-fact and counterfactual reasoning require the suppression 
of some knowledge but they differ in their content. The content of a contrary-to-fact 
premise could not happen in the real world. An example is: 'all cows quack'. In the 
real worid cows never quack. This type of premise is different from a 
counterfactual premise. The content of a counterfactual premise is contrary to 
what really happened but it could still have happened in the real worid. In the 
example above ('If I had left early I wouldn't have missed the plane'), 'had left 
eariy' is the counterfactual premise. This premise implies that the speaker did not 
leave eariy but they could have left eariy, it could have been possible in the real 
worid. In the literature, the term 'counterfactual' is sometimes used instead of 
'contrary-to-fact'. Throughout this thesis the terms 'contrary-to-fact' and 
'counterfactual' will be used as just defined. 
A counterfactual reasoning problem implies that the antecedent is falsified but 
the antecedent can be falsified in two different ways: by the negation of the event 
or the affirmation of an alternative event. When thinking counterfactually we 
suppress a past event or replace it by another one and imagine what the present 
would then be like. For example the starting situation could be: Peter missed his 
train. On the way to the station he stopped at bakery A where there was a queue. 
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After he missed his train he could think counterfactually. He could try to cancel the 
antecedent (stopping at the bakery): 'If I had not stopped at the bakery I wouldn't 
have missed my train'. Or he could replace the antecedent by another one such as 
'If I'd stopped at bakery B (where there was no queue) I wouldn't have missed the 
train.' After suppressing or modifying the antecedent he can imagine a different 
present situation. Counterfactual thinking is linked to imagination. You need to be 
able to imagine alternative versions of the past and the present. 
When people reason counterfactually and falsify an antecedent it is usually 
with the aim of modifying the present situation. Counterfactuals can be classified 
according to two main ways: direction and structure (Roese, 2003). The direction 
of a counterfactual can be 'upward' or 'downward. In upward counterfactuals the 
alternative circumstances are better than the reality and in downward 
counterfactuals where the alternative circumstances are worse than reality 
(Markman, Gavanski, Sherman and McMullen, 1993; McMullen. Markman and 
Gavanski, 1995). Upward counterfactuals are an attempt to modify an unpleasant 
present situation; for example 'If I had left early I wouldn't have missed the plane'. 
Downward counterfactuals are generally generated when a negative effect was 
narrowly avoided (Roese, 1997). People reflect on a lucky escape. An example 
could be as follows: Mary's alarm clock did not work, so she arrived late at the 
airport, and missed her plane that later on crashed. All the passengers were killed. 
The downward counterfactual generated could be: 'If my alarm clock had worked I 
would have died.' 
3.3.2 Why do we need counterfactual thinking? 
Counterfactual thinking is omnipresent in everyday life (Byrne, 2002) but 
sometimes it tends to be stimulated in particular types of situation. Counterfactuals 
are usually activated in response to a negative outcome (Roese, 1997) for 
43 
example missing a train, getting poorly, having an accident or being in a near miss 
situation. However, some negative outcomes trigger more counterfactual 
statement than others. For example, the evaluation of the distance between the 
reality and some once possible but unrealised situation is an important factor when 
generating counterfactuals (Kahneman and Tversky. 1982). Failing an exam by 1 
point will lead to more counterfactual thinking than failing the same exam by 20 
points. In the first case it seems easier to undo the bad outcome than in the 
second case. The antecedent needs less modifying. For example the participant 
could think: 'If only I'd studied one more evening, if I hadn't gone out one 
evening... I would have passed the exam.' It gives them more hope of doing better 
next t ime. When we have missed a good outcome by a long shot, it is more 
difficult to think of alternatives to change the outcome. The antecedent would have 
to change radically. This closeness could be temporal, geographical or numerical 
(Roese, 1997). A temporal closeness could be missing a plane by 10 minutes 
(versus 1 hour), a geographical closeness missing a train by going to the wrong 
platform in the same station (versus going to the wrong station) and a numerical 
closeness failing an exam by one point (versus 20 points). 
However, Roese (1997) stated that the main determinant of counterfactual 
generation is the affect: counterfactuals are mainly generated after a bad outcome. 
Roese (1997) explained that negative affect acts as a trigger telling us that a 
problem needs to be solved but it is also often link to emotion such as regret in 
that particular case (Roese, 2003). In conclusion, counterfactual thinking should 
have a beneficial effect. Counterfactual thinking gives some insight into the 
problem individuals are facing and gives them potential solutions (Roese, 1997). It 
helps them think about an alternative antecedent that could be chosen, so that the 
next time the same situation occurs the bad outcome will hopefully be avoided, 
and a bad outcome that was closely avoided will again be avoided. 
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3.3.3 Counterfactual thinking and developmental work 
Counterfactual thinking in children has not been studied as a separate 
entity on its own to any great extent. Most of the work done is this area has 
studied the relationships between counterfactual thinking and other abilities, such 
as theory of mind in particular (eg: Grant, Riggs. Boucher, 2004; Perner, Sprung, 
Steinkogler. 2004; Riggs et al. 1998) or causal reasoning (e.g.: Harris et al., 1996). 
Harris, German and Mills (1996) studied counterfactual thinking in children 
in relation to causality. They argued that in order to solve a counterfactual problem 
children need to use their existing knowledge of causal relationships in the world. 
Harris et al. (1996) used short scenarios they acted out with puppets and props to 
test the children. One of the scenarios involves a doll called Carol. The children 
were told the following short story: 
'One day, the floor is nice and clean like that (experimenter points to a 
square of white plastic). But guess what? Carol comes home and she 
doesn't take her shoes off. (A doll is brought to the edge of the surface). She 
comes inside and makes the floors all dirty with her shoes. (The doll is 
walked across the floor, leaving dirty footprints).' (p.238) 
The experimenter then asked two control questions to the children. The 
Now control question referring to the final situation; 'Is the floor dirty now?'; and 
the Before control question referring to the initial situation; 'Was the floor dirty 
before?' Finally the experimenter asked them the counterfactual test question: 
'What if Carol had taken her shoes off - would the floor be dirty?' In order to 
answer that question the children have to imagine what the reality could be now if 
a particular event had happened (Carol took her shoes off). 
Harris et al. (1996) used a variety of scenarios requiring some yes/no 
answers or some pointing. The findings showed that children were accurate when 
answering the counterfactual questions, even from the age of 3 for some of them. 
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They also showed that young children can understand what caused a particular 
consequence and how to prevent it. In the example above they demonstrated that 
they understood that if Carol had taken her shoes off the floor would not be dirty. 
In the second experiment included in their paper they found that children could 
differentiate between antecedents that could have prevented a particular outcome. 
In this second experiment they used a slightly different type of scenario. For 
example the children were told: 
One day the floor was nice and clean like thai [experimenter points to a 
square of white plastic]. But guess what? Naughty Teddy comes along and 
paints the floor like this [experimenter makes Teddy, a hand puppet, paint 
the floor red]. 
The children were then asked the Before control questions (Was the floor 
clean before) and the Now control question (Is the floor clean now?). Finally they 
were asked the two test questions requiring imagining another situation. They 
were asked the preserve test question (If Teddy hadn't painted the floor with his 
bnjsh, would the floor be clean now?) with an antecedent that would preserve the 
initial state. And they were asked the change test question (If Teddy had painted 
the floor with his finger instead, would the floor be clean now?) with an antecedent 
that would change the initial state into the final state. The children, from the age of 
three, could distinguish between the antecedents the one that could block the 
observed outcome. 
Following this work. Harris (2000) explained that in order to solve 
counterfactual scenarios children need to use their knowledge of causal 
relationships (for example: they need to know that if you paint the floor then it is 
dirty) but they also need to use their imagination to consider possible alternative 
outcomes if the antecedent had been different. 
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Guajardo and Turley-Ames (2004) also conducted some research on 
counterfactual thinking with young children. They studied the generation of 
counterfactual statements by children. They told short stories to the children as 
follows: 
'Imagine that you are playing outside in the muddy yard. You are thirsty so 
you go inside to the kitchen to get a drink of juice. You walk through the 
mud, you step over the doormat, and you keep your shoes on. Because your 
shoes are muddy, you get dirt all over the floor.' (p.59) 
After being told this story the children were asked a question prompting 
them to imagine some different antecedents: 'What could you have done so that 
the kitchen floor would not have gotten dirty?' And after each response they were 
asked 'Can you think of anything else?' to prompt them to provide as many 
different answers as possible. 
A different type of story (similar to the Post Office scenario designed by 
Riggs et al.. 1998) was used to help the children to think about a different set of 
consequences. One of the stories was as follows: 
'Peter is in his house, but Peter is not feeling very well. So he goes to bed. 
The phone rings and the man from the Post Office asks Peter to come and 
help put out the fire. Peter gets out of bed and goes to the Post Office.' 
The children were then asked a question to prompt them to give some 
alternative consequence; 'If there had not been a fire, where would Peter be?' 
In their studies Guajardo and Turley-Ames (2004) showed that children as 
young as 3 could generate counterfactual statements when prompted to do so 
which was slightly earlier that what had been shown in previous research as, for 
example, Kuczaj and Day (1979) found that children could not produce 
counterfactual statements until the age of 4 or 5. In Guajardo and Turley-Ames' 
47 
(2004) study children could generate upward and downward counterfactual 
statements equally well, just as adults do. They produced additive counterfactual 
statements but very few subtractive statements which was also consistent with 
adults' performance. For an additive counterfactual an element was added to the 
antecedent and for a subtractive counterfactual an element was removed. An 
additive counterfactual could be 'If I had studied more I would have passed my 
exam', 'studying more' being the added element. A subtractive counterfactual 
would be 'If I hadn't gone on holiday before the exam, I would have passed my 
exam', 'going on holiday' being the element removed from the antecedent. 
Guajardo and Turley-Ames (2004) found that performance on 
counterfactual reasoning tasks was related to language comprehension. They 
found a significant positive correlation between these two measures. This result is 
not surprising as all the scenarios they used involved listening to the short story. 
The children needed to be able to understand the story in the first place before 
they could reason counterfactually correctly. 
As with adults, research has shown that the nature of the outcome 
influenced when children use counterfactual statements. Children are more likely 
to use counterfactuals when the outcome is negative or unpleasant. Harris (2000) 
reported one of these previous experiments where the children, aged 3 and 4. 
were tested. The children were^ presented with a character called Sally. Sally had a 
choice between two options: drawing with a pen or drawing with a pencil. There 
were two possible outcomes, a negative one. where Sally had inky fingers, and a 
positive one where Sally had clean fingers. Harris (2000) reported that children 
generated more counterfactuals in the first situation. These findings were also 
confirmed by German (1999). German (1999) presented 5-year-old children with a 
series of 'decisive choice' scenarios which had either a positive or a negative 
outcome. In one of the scenarios, for example, a little girl called Sally was going on 
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a trip. Her mother gave her the choice between white chocolate or a cheese 
sandwich for her lunch. In the negative outcome scenario Sally chose the white 
chocolate and ended up being hungry whereas in the positive outcome scenario 
Sally chose the cheese sandwich and ended up being full. A series of scenarios 
including 'irrelevant choices' were also presented. In one of those, for example, 
Sally was given two choices that both lead to either a negative or a positive 
outcome. In the first case, she was given the choice between brown or white 
chocolate and always ended up hungry, In the second case, she was given the 
choice between cheese or ham sandwich and always ended up being full. The 
children were then asked to explain the outcome of the stories. The results 
showed that children were more likely to generate counterfactual statement with 
the negative outcome of the decisive choice scenario. 
In conclusion, it seems that children are more likely to generate 
counterfactual statements with negative outcomes and they will try to think of ways 
to avoid this negative outcome from happening in the future. The research has 
also shown that they have this ability from an early age. 
3.4 Counterfactual thinking and the false belief task 
As previously discussed, children under the age of 4 do not seem to be able 
to pass the false belief task (see Wellman, Cross and Watson, 2000, for a review). 
When tested with a standard false belief task involving an unexpected transfer of 
an object they tend to make realist errors by pointing to the actual object location 
rather than where it was before, where the character should think it is. 
Some research has looked at potential reasons why children could not pass 
this task, especially as at the same age they show signs of having a theory of 
mind, of being able to understand other people's mental states. The domain 
general view of theory of mind would suggest that general abilities are involved 
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and therefore a link might be found between theory of mind and executive 
functions, such as for example, reasoning abilities therefore some researcher 
studied the link between counterfactual reasoning and theory of mind. This link 
can be further supported by the representational mind view (Perner, 1991) as 
theory of mind and counterfactual reasoning require children to compare different 
models of the world. 
Riggs et al. (1998) argued that in order to pass the false belief task children 
need to disengage from their knowledge of the situation and infer or recall a 
counterfactual situation. The children need to ignore the situation in front of them 
and engage in some counterfactual thinking. With the classic 'Sally and Anne' 
false belief task described earlier, the children need to ignore the fact that the 
marble is in the box now. and need to think of the following implicit counterfactual 
question: 'If Anne had not moved the marble where would it be now?' The link 
between counterfactual thinking and false belief tasks was Initially investigated by 
Riggs et al. (1998) through three different experiments. In the first two 
experiments, they presented the children with some scenarios acted out with 
puppets and props. Each scenario was followed by either a theory of mind 
question or a counterfactual question. One of them was called the Post Office 
story (as described above). The results showed a significant positive correlation 
between these tasks, even when controlling for verbal abilities. For their third 
experiment, they created new scenarios not requiring the children to follow a long 
narration, and still found this correlation. One of these tasks was called the Shape 
Task. The children were presented with a puppet called Donald. They were told 
that Donald brought a few things to nursery, including some dough. They were 
shown that the dough was in the shape of a ball. The experimenter told them that 
Donald was going to play with it later but that he was going first into his/her bag to 
go to sleep. The experimenter carried on saying that that they could play with the 
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dough and roll it Into a sausage shape. At this point the child was asked a prompt 
question: 'Does Donald know that we've played with the dough?', and was 
corrected if he/she gave the wrong answer. Finally the child was asked one of the 
test questions. The counterfactual question was: 'If I had not played with the 
dough, what shape would it be?' and the false belief question was: 'What shape 
does Donald think the dough is?'. 
Riggs et al. (1998) argued that this consistent correlation between the false 
belief task and counterfactual reasoning suggested that these tasks required 
similar abilities. They suggested that the false belief task required children to solve 
a counterfactual situation. The implicit counterfactual question would be for 
example, 'If there had been no fire, where would Peter be?'. 
This finding seems to be robust as it has been confirmed by other 
researchers with a variety of groups of children. Peterson and Bowler (2000) 
tested children with autism and two other groups as a control: children with severe 
learning disability and typically developing children. Both groups of children with 
special needs were matched on chronological age and verbal mental age. They 
used the cake scenario and the fire scenario previously designed by Riggs and al. 
(1998). Grant, Riggs and Boucher (2004) also tested children with autism and 
found the same results. These results confirmed Riggs' et al. (1998), as they found 
a correlation between performance on the false belief task and counterfactual 
reasoning tasks for the three groups. 
As well as finding a correlation between performance on these tasks the 
pattern of acquisition seems to be regular: children seem to be able to reason 
counterfactually before they can pass the false belief task, and this seems to be 
the case with typically developing children (Riggs et al., 1998; Grant et al. 2004); 
children with severe learning disability (Peterson and Bowler, 2004); children with 
autism (Grant et al., 2004; Peterson and Bowler, 2004). However, Peterson and 
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Bowler did not find the same pattern with the group of typically developing children 
they used as a control in their study. Typically developing children performed the 
same on the false belief task and the counterfactual tasks. Children with autism 
and children with severe learning disability performed worse on the false belief 
task than the counterfactual task. Children with autism and children with severe 
learning disability found the false belief task more difficult than the counterfactual 
task, but this was not the case for the typically developing children. Peterson and 
Bowler (2000) therefore argued that counterfactual tasks make fewer demands 
than false belief tasks. They explained that the false belief task is driven by at least 
two components. The first component is necessary to pass the false belief task but 
not the counterfactual task, the second component is the ability to reason 
counterfactually and does not develop until the age of 4. Only the first component, 
allowing children to understand false beliefs, is deficient in autism. Children with 
autism can pass counterfactual tasks because the counterfactual proposition is 
explicitly provided but they cannot pass the false belief task because the 
counterfactual element is implicit and needs to be generated. This finding could 
suggest that children with autism find this task difficult because of impaired 
spontaneous generativity. These results seem to suggest that being able to reason 
counterfactually is necessary but not sufficient to pass the false belief task 
The studies mentioned so far tested counterfactual thinking by presenting 
short scenarios followed by questions to the children. Guajardo and Turley-Ames 
(2004) studied the relation between the false belief task and counterfactuals by 
looking at the generation of counterfactual statements. Their study included 
upward and downward counterfactual statements (as defined by Roese above) 
and also made the distinction between antecedent counterfactuals, where the 
children were asked to modify the antecedent, and consequent counterfactuals, 
where the children are asked to modify the consequent. In the antecedent task the 
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children were told a story where they came into the house with dirty shoes on and 
consequently made the floor dirty. They were then asked the test question: 'What 
could you have done so that the kitchen floor would not have got dirty?' The 
consequent counterfactual tasks were based on Riggs et al.'s (1998) work. For 
example in one of the scenarios the children were told that Peter was not very well 
and went to bed. The man from the post office rang him to ask him to come to put 
out a fire. So Peter got out of bed and went to the post office. The test question 
was: 'If there had been no fire, where would Peter be?' The results from this study 
confirmed Riggs et al.'s (1998) finding by reporting a correlation between theory of 
mind tasks and consequence counterfactual thinking, but extended it by finding 
this same relationship with antecedent counterfactual thinking, with antecedent 
counterfactuals accounting for 16% of the variance in the scores obtained for the 
theory of mind tasks. 
Most of the research on counterfactual thinking and theory of mind tasks 
has found a relationship between these tasks. Peterson and Riggs (1999) studied 
these correlations in the light of the adaptative modelling theory. Adaptative 
modelling allows us to obtain knowledge about inaccessible information by 
temporarily modifying our database regarding a particular object. The process of 
modified derivation does not require an up-date of our database of knowledge but 
some modification in the process of answer-derivation we use to solve a problem 
(Peterson and Riggs, 1999). Through this process we can ignore facts already 
present in our database, or add some new facts to it. This modified derivation 
process supports counterfactual reasoning (Peterson and Riggs. 1999). Peterson 
and Riggs (1999) argued that this same process is necessary to solve a false 
belief task, making reference in particular to the Maxi task first designed by 
Wimmer and Perner (1983), They explained that in order to correctly answer the 
false belief task, children need to identify the element that Maxi does not know, 
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implement a modification-instruction that is to Ignore this fact (because Maxi 
ignores it too), ask themselves the test question and attribute the answer to MaxL 
They argued that the false belief task requires two types of abilities: having a 
theory of mind and a mechanism of simulation (i.e. the modified derivation 
process). The difficulty that children have when they try to apply the adaptatlve 
modelling process Is that they do not have sufficient cognitive control to deal with 
conflictive cases. Conflictive cases are present in counterfactual scenarios when 
the premise conflicts with the real world, and in the false belief task where the 
protagonist's beliefs are not consistent with the real world and with the child's own 
beliefs. Peterson and RIggs (1999) concluded that this difficulty with modified 
derivation is what underlies difficulties with counterfactual reasoning and false 
belief tasks, especially when theory of mind has already been acquired by the 
children. They argued that this conclusion is applicable to standard false belief 
tasks, deceptive box tasks (e.g. : Smarties tasks), and other simpler reasoning 
problems. 
Although the correlation between the false belief task and counterfactual 
thinking seems often present it is not always the case. Perner, Sprung and 
Steingogler (2004) conducted experiments looking at this relationship. They used 
similar scenarios followed by either a counterfactual or a theory of mind question, 
and varied some parameters, especially the complexity of the scenario. In both the 
experiments they reported a correlation between the false belief task and 
counterfactual thinking in their first data analysis but this correlation became non-
significant when partialling out age and verbal mental age. In the first analysis it 
appeared that performance on the false belief task correlated differently with the 
simple counterfactual scenario and the complex counterfactual scenario. Following 
these findings Perner et al. (2004) argued for a dissociation between the false 
belief task and counterfactual thinking. 
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Perner explained why their results differed from Riggs's regarding the 
correlation between counterfactuals and false belief tasks. All the counterfactual 
questions Perner et al. (2004) used had false antecedents that would therefore 
require a modification of the known database and the application of real world 
knowledge to deduce the consequence of that modification (modified derivation). 
In the simple problem derivation could proceed without recourse to the actual 
sequence of events, whereas for the difficult problems the derivation needed to 
take into account at least some part of the actual sequence of events. With the 
complex scenarios the children needed to relate the derivation to actual events 
which Is a similarity these scenarios have with the false belief tasks. They 
therefore rejected the simulation view to explain their results. 
4 Conclusion 
Having a theory of mind Is the ability to understand and attribute mental 
states to others. It is essential for efficient communication in everyday life. Theory 
of mind is often assessed using the false belief task that requires Imputing false 
beliefs to a character in a short story or scenario. Research has shown that this 
task is very reliable; in most cases children can pass the task from the age of 4. 
This result is very robust as it does not change with the type of task or the country 
where the research was conducted. The false belief task has been studied in the 
light of other domain general cognitive abilities it might require, such as inhibition, 
memory and language, and In particular in relation to counterfactual reasoning. A 
variety of research papers have mainly shown that there is a consistent strong 
correlation between the false belief tasks and counterfactual reasoning. Some 
research suggests that counterfactual thinking is a prerequisite to pass the false 
belief task. In order to pass each task the children need to be able to suppress 
their knowledge of current reality, and imagine what reality could be if a past event 
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had been modified, or what reality is thought to be for somebody who did not 
witness a particular past event. 
To some extent contrary4o-fact syllogisms also require the suppression of 
knowledge of current reality. Children need to reason in a pretend world and 
ignore their empirical knowledge. 
This thesis will investigate the relationship between these three types of 
task (false belief tasks, counterfactual scenarios and contrary-to-fact syllogisms) 
as they all involve suppressing knowledge of current reality, they all require 
children to manipulate their representations of the world. 
Before studying the relationship between these tasks, it is important to 
better understand the nature of counterfactual thinking, which is going to be the 
focus of the second chapter. The first experiment will investigate whether there is 




EXPERIMENT 1: AFFIRMATIVE AND NEGATIVE 
COUNTERFACTUAL QUESTIONS 
The aim of the first experiment of this thesis was to investigate whether 
there is a difference in difficulty between future hypothetical reasoning and 
counterfactual reasoning as claimed by Riggs et al. (1998). This chapter will 
review the literature related to this area, and will then present the study and its 
findings. 
1 Introduction 
Counterfactual thinking has been defined and discussed in the previous 
chapter. As a reminder, a counterfactual is an alternative to the past (Roese, 
1997). In order to reason counterfactually children need to negate or change a 
past event and imagine that, as a consequence, a present situation would be 
different. Counlerfactual thinking has been studied extensively with adults (see 
chapter 1) whereas the research with children is more limited. As we have seen 
counterfactual thinking in developmental studies has mainly been investigated in 
relation to the false belief task which is a task used to evaluate theory of mind in 
children (e.g: Riggs et al. 1998; Grant et al., 2004; Guajardo and Turley-Ames, 
2004). Children are said to have a theory of mind when they are able to 
understand other people's mind and mental states (Premack and Woodruff. 1978). 
The false belief task has been described in depth in the first chapter. In order to 
pass the false belief task children need to acknowledge that another character did 
not witness the change of state of affairs they themselves witnessed. They also 
need to recognise that people will act according to their own beliefs even though 
they are false. 
57 
The components of the false belief task have been investigated, especially 
regarding a possible embedded counterfactual element. Riggs et al. (1998) tested 
the hypothesis that performances on counterfactual tasks and false belief tasks 
are correlated. They ran a series of experiments and found a consistent correlation 
between these two types of tasks. More details regarding these tasks were given 
in chapter one. The correlation they found was independent of verbal ability, 
chronological age, mental age and narrative aspect of the tasks. They therefore 
argued that there is an implicit counterfactual element embedded in the false belief 
task, and that children need to be able to reason counterfactually in order to pass 
the false belief task. They claimed that passing the false belief task requires 
reporting a situation that is counter to the current reality, as in a counterfactual 
task. The main difference between both types of tasks is that in the false belief 
task the counterfactual situation is held as a belief but not in the strictly 
counterfactual scenario where no mental states are involved. 
Peterson and Riggs (1999) investigated the underlying mental simulations of 
counterfactual thinking and the false belief task. They described very similar 
processes both requiring children to ignore instructions. For example in the false 
belief task, in this case the 'Maxi task', the children had to ignore the fact that the 
chocolate had been moved. However, It can be questioned whether this 
correlation found between performance on counterfactual tasks and performance 
on false belief tasks is due to the counterfactual element of the counterfactual task 
itself (i.e.: changing something that had already happened) or to the hypothetical 
nature of this task. Is there something special about counterfactual thinking? Riggs 
et al. (1998) continued their work by investigating the difference between 
counterfactual and future hypothetical thinking to ensure that the correlation 
between performance on counterfactual tasks and false belief tasks was due to 
the counterfactual element rather than just the conditional element included in the 
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counterfactual tasks. Both counterfactual and future hypothetical thinking involve 
reasoning conditionally but they are not completely identical. Counterfactual 
thinking requires children to suppress their knowledge of current reality and leads 
to a situation, different from reality, and meant to stand In for reality, whereas 
future hypothetical thinking requires children to imagine the worid in the future and 
leads to a situation different from reality but not meant to stand in for reality (Riggs 
et al., 1998). 
Riggs et al. (1998) designed an experiment to investigate whether children 
make the same number of realist errors in both of these tasks. They designed two 
tasks, the modelling clay and the drawing tasks. Both were followed by either a 
counterfactual question or a future hypothetical question. The children were 
presented successively with both scenarios and were asked to answer one 
counterfactual question and one future hypothetical question. In the drawing task, 
for example, the experimenter showed the children a first box containing items 
with a picture on and a second box containing items with no picture on. Tidy Teddy 
was introduced to the children, and then he put a blank piece of paper in the 
second box before going to sleep in the experimenter's bag. In the counterfactual 
version, the experimenter took the piece of paper out of the second box and drew 
a picture on it. The children were then asked to classify the piece of paper by 
physically putting it in the correct box. After the children had put the piece of paper 
in the correct box they were asked the following counterfactual test question: 'If I 
had not drawn on this piece of paper, which box would It be in now?' In the future 
hypothetical version the experimenter still removed the blank piece of paper from 
the second box, but then asked the following future hypothetical test question 
straight away: 'If I draw on this piece of paper, which box will it go into?' The 
modelling clay involved changing the shape of the clay and was very similar. The 
modelling clay could be rolled into a ball shape or a sausage shape and was 
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classified Into boxes according to that shape. The counterfactual test question 
was: 'If I had not played with the dough which box would it be in?', and the future 
hypothetical test question: 'If I roll the dough into a sausage shape, which box will 
it go Into?' In both scenarios the test question was followed by a memory question 
asking the children to recall where the piece of paper or the piece of clay was at 
the beginning. 
When comparing these two types of reasoning Riggs et al. (1998) found that 
future hypothetical questions were easier than counterfactual questions, and they 
argued that children more easily avoid making realist errors when they are asked 
to reason conditionally and report a future situation than a counterfactual situation. 
These results suggested that these two types of tasks are intrinsically different. 
Evans and Over (2004) have claimed that although some counterfactuals can 
be very different to future hypothetical conditionals, most of them are very similar. 
They explained that, for example, the counterfactual 'if I had taken the pawn, then 
I would have won the game' is very similar to the equivalent future hypothetical 'If I 
take that pawn, then I will win the game.' They argued that people process those 
two conditionals in the same way and make the same judgement of probability. 
That is to say that they imagine the antecedent and evaluate the likelihood of the 
outcome In the context of this antecedent. They argued that modifying the past or 
modifying the future requires the same cognitive processes. This claim was 
supported by Over, Hadjichrlstidls. Evans, Handley and Sloman (unpublished). In 
their study Over et al. (unpublished) presented adults with four conditional 
statements including some negated ones (e.g.: The cost of petrol increases and 
traffic congestion does not improve). The participants were asked to rate the 
probability that the conditional statements were true or false. The results showed 
that counterfactuals were judged in a very similar way to hypotheticals. Following 
these claims from Evans and Over (2004) and Over et al. (unpublished) the 
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question as to why there was a difference between counterfactuals and future 
hypotheticals in Riggs and al.'s (1998) experiment arises. 
An alternative interpretation for Riggs et al's (1998) results can be suggested. 
In their experiment all the counterfactual questions asked were negative questions 
(e.g.: *lf I had not played with the dough which box would it be in?') and all the 
future hypothetical were affirmative questions (e.g.: 'If I roll the dough into a 
sausage shape, which box will it go into?'). This systematic confound could have 
influenced the results. 
The effect of negation has been studied in relation to language development. 
The literature on children's language development shows that children produce 
affirmative sentences before they can produce negative ones, and on the 
comprehension side negative forms are usually more difficult to understand than 
affirmative forms (Tager-Flusberg, 1985). Therefore it can be expected that the 
negative component of the counterfactual question will on its own increase the 
difficulty of this question. Children might find counterfactual questions in Riggs et 
al.'s (1998) experiment more difficult just because they are negated. 
The effect of negation on reasoning with adults has been studied 
experimentally. Oaksford and Stenning (1992) used the negation paradigm (if p 
then q, if p then not q, if not p then q, if not p then not q) to systematically study the 
effect of negation on reasoning. It appears that the use of negations changes the 
way participants reason. Three biases have been identified: the negative 
conclusion bias, the affirmative premise bias and the matching bias (Evans and 
Handley, 1999). The negative conclusion bias is the tendency to accept more 
conclusions that are formulated with a negative sentence rather than an affirmative 
one (Evans and Handley, 1999). Pollard and Evans (1980) explain this as the 
caution heuristic: accepting a negative answer leaves more options open than 
accepting an affirmative answer. The affirmative premise bias is the tendency to 
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accept more inferences when the minor premise is affirmative rather than negative 
(Evans and Handley, 1999). Finally the matching bias, the one that we are going 
to discuss in more depth, is the tendency to choose cases when the lexical content 
matches the initial conditional proposition; it seems that mismatching cases are 
seen as logically irrelevant by reasoners (Evans, 1998). In other words, the 
matching bias is the tendency to focus on the proposition that is denied. Matching 
bias is very robust. It has been shown with three different types of conditional 
sentence when applying the negation paradigms to them (if (not) p then (not) q; 
(not) p only if (not) q; (not) q if (not) p (See Evans 1998 for a review). Matching 
bias is robust with abstract materials but tends to disappear with realistic material 
(Evans, 1998). Evans, Clibbens and Rood (1996) studied the difference between 
implicit and explicit negations in relation to matching bias using three types of 
tasks: a truth table evaluation task, the Wason selection task and another 
selection task. They found that the matching bias was present when implicit 
negations were used and disappeared when explicit negations were used. 
The matching bias suggests, therefore, that when children are presented with 
a negative counterfactual question they are going to concentrate on the affirmative 
lexical content of the question. For example, in the questions 'what if I hadn't 
drawn on this piece of paper, where would it be' from Riggs' et al. (1998) the 
children are more likely to understand it as 'what if I had drawn on this piece of 
paper, where would it be.* This second question is not a counterfactual question as 
in this scenario the experimenter did draw on the piece of paper just before asking 
the question. 
These biases demonstrate that negative forms influence reasoning 
performance. Introducing a negation in a premise or in a conclusion is not without 
consequences. When presented with negated premises reasoners tend to make 
more mistakes than when presented with affirmative premises. 
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All of these findings show that processing negated premises is more difficult 
than processing affirmative premises. This suggests that the difference Riggs et al. 
(1998) found between counterfactual and future hypothetical questions could be 
due to the language used in the question rather than the different requirements of 
these two types of reasoning. 
The first aim of the present experiment was to test this hypothesis by 
assessing whether counterfactual and future hypothetical questions are of the 
same difficulty. This was done by running experiments similar to the ones run by 
Riggs et al. (1998) but controlling for the form of the question, i.e. controlling for 
positive and negative questions. 
Riggs et al. (1998) also explained the correlation between the false belief task 
and counterfactual thinking by saying that children make realist errors because 
they cannot detach themselves from the current reality in front of them. Answering 
a counterfactual question correctly and passing the false belief task implies that 
children are able to suspend their knowledge of current reality. A realist error, in a 
false belief task or in a counterfactual scenario, occurs when the child chooses the 
answer that is consistent with reality rather than the correct answer. For example 
in the Post Office story (as described in chapter one) in the counterfactual and the 
false belief version the child should point to the house when in reality Peter is at 
the post office. Riggs et al. (1998) claimed that children made realist errors when 
they pointed to the post office because Peter really was at the post office. 
However, the children were offered only two possible locations, therefore two 
possible answers, by the scenario: Peter could be either In the house or at the 
post office. The correct answer being 'at home', 'at the post office' is the wrong 
answer but also a realist error. It is impossible to judge whether an error occurred 
because children were unable to dissociate from reality or for some other reason. 
It does not seem appropriate to say that children made realist errors because they 
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could not ignore reality when no other alternative was offered in the scenario.The 
second aim of the present experiment was therefore to analyse the mistakes 
children make and assess whether these mistakes are always realist mistakes or 
not. In the present experiment the children were presented with three locations to 
point to. the correct one and two incorrect ones, one being the reality location and 
the other one an irrelevant location. This design should allow us to understand 
whether the difficulty is due to a difficulty with suppressing reality or other factors 
such as lack of attention, or lack of understanding for example. 
2 Method 
2.1 Participants 
Seventy-nine children were tested for this experiment. The sample Included 
40 girls and 39 boys. The children were aged between 3;4 and 5;5 (Mean = 4;6; 
Standard Deviation = 7 months). 
The participants were recruited in two different schools in Plymouth UK, with 
each school having a nursery class and two reception classes. Thirty two children 
were from the nursery classes and 47 from reception classes. 
2.2 Material 
The experiment consisted In classifying objects according to their particular 
properties and answering a variety of conditional questions. The children were 
given three similar boxes to classify the objects. The objects to classify were some 
play dough with different shapes (ball, sausage, squashed), sheets of paper with 
either a square, a circle or nothing drawn on them, cards with either an orange 
patch, a green patch or nothing drawn on them, and toy cars with either a round 
sticker, a square sticker or no sticker on the roof. 
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Reminder cards were placed in front of each box so the children could see 
how the objects were classified without having to remember the classification rule. 
A recording sheet was used to note the responses given by the children and 
to give a set procedure to the experimenter (Appendix A). 
As an example of one of the scenarios the 'Cars and stickers' scenario was as 
follows. Toy cars had either a round sticker, a square sticker or did not have a 
sticker stuck on the roof. Three empty identical boxes were placed in front of the 
child. The child was then told that all the cars with a round sticker would go in the 
first box, cars with a square sticker in the second box and cars with no sticker in 
the third box. Reminder cards were placed in front of each box so the child could 
see how to sort out the cars rather than remember the rule. 
The child was asked to classify cars in the correct boxes according to the 
stickers, and was asked test questions such as ' What is on this car?' (a round 
sticker) to check the required vocabulary. 
In the counterfactual version, the experimenter took a car with no sticker on, 
put a round sticker on it and asked the child: 'What's on this car now?' followed by 
'Where shall we put it now?' The child then put the toy car in the correct box and 
the experimenter asked one of the following critical questions; either the 
affirmative counterfactual question: 'If I had put a square sticker on this car, which 
box would it be in now?" or the negative counterfactual question:' If I had not put a 
sticker on this car, which box would it be in now?' 
In the future hypothetical version, the experiment took a car with no sticker, 
did not change the properties of the car and asked the child to put the car in the 
correct box. The child was then asked one of the following critical questions; either 
the affirmative future hypothetical question 'If I put a round sticker on this car, 
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which box will it go into?" or the negative hypothetical question 'If I do not put a 
sticker on this car which box will it go into?" 
The other scenarios are reported in more details in Appendix B. 
The experimenter recorded which box the child pointed to, and coded it as a 
right or wrong answer. 
2.3 Design 
Each child was presented with four scenarios: one involving toy cars and 
stickers, one cards and colours, another one playdough and finally one including 
drawings. Each scenario was followed by an affirmative counterfactual question, a 
negative counterfactual question, an affirmative future hypothetical question or a 
negative future hypothetical question. It was a within participant design. The 
children had to answer one of each of the four different types of questions. 
The order of the scenarios and the questions was counterbalanced between 
children using a Latin-square. 
2.4 Procedure 
The experiment was run individually over one session lasting about 10 
minutes. The experiment took place in the children's school during school hours. 
A pilot study was run early on to evaluate the feasibility of the task and the 
time required to run the task. A giri, age 4; 1, took part in the pilot study. She was 
presented with the four scenarios, and she was asked the four test questions and 
the control questions. The participant answered all the control questions correctly 
and always classified the object in the appropriate box. She correctly answered 
three of the control questions and incorrectly only one of them. The tasks took less 
than 10 minutes to run. The participant engaged in the task and seemed to enjoy 
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it. Following the pilot study it was decided that the difficulty level and the length of 
time of the tasks were suitable, therefore no modification was made to the task. 
3 Results 
Altogether 18 children failed to cope with the task demands: they could not do 
the pre-requested classifications, answer at least one control question, or 
understand the questions. These children were excluded from the sample. As a 
consequence the final sample consisted of 61 children (29 boys and 32 girls) aged 
between 3;7 and 5;5 (M = 4;8. SD = 6.2 m). It is also worth noting that all the 
children who were less than 3 years and 6 months in age were excluded from the 
study because they could not cope with its requirements. 
Out of the 61 participants 25 answered four questions correctly, 21 three 
questions, 10 two questions and 5 only one question. No participant answered all 
the four questions incorrectly. 
3.1 Comparison of the different types of questions 
Tab le 1 : N u m b e r of r ight answers for each type of quest ion (n=61). 
Affinnative Negative 
Counterfactual 48 36 
Future Hypothetical 48 57 
The overall effects of negation/affirmation, types of reasoning and the 
interaction between those two factors were analysed. In order to study the overall 
effect of negation/affirmation the total of correct answers for affirmative 
counterfactual questions and for affirmative future hypothetical questions was 
computed as well as the total of correct answers for negative counterfactual 
questions and negative future hypothetical questions. The results are shown in the 
following table. 
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Tab le 2 : Tota l number and percentage of correct answers (n=122). 
Affirmative Negative CF FH 
Total Total Total Total 
Number of 96 93 84 105 
correct answers 
Percentage of 78.69 76.23 68.85 86.05 
correct answers 
A series of sign tests were run and the first one showed that the difference 
between the total number of correct answers to the affirmative questions and the 
negative questions was not statistically significant (z=-0.4, p>.05. two tailed). 
The second one showed that the difference between the total number of 
correct answers to the counterfactual questions and the future hypothetical 
questions was statistically significant (z= -2.97. p<.05. two tailed). 
Finally the third sign test showed that the interaction between 
affirmative/negative and the type of reasoning (counterfactual/future hypothetical) 
was significant (z=-2.91, p<.05, two tailed). 
In their experiment Riggs et al. (1998) compared a negative counterfactual 
question and an affirmative future hypothetical question. The same comparison In 
this experiment showed that children's performance on the affirmative future 
hypothetical was better than their performance on the negative counterfactual. A 
sign test showed this difference to be statistically significant (z = -3.13, p<.05). 
In order to control for the effect of negation on the different types of questions 
affirmative counterfactuals and affirmative future hypotheticals should be 
compared, as well as negative counterfactuals and negative future hypotheticals. 
The results showed no difference in performance between the affirmative 
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counterfactual and the affirmative future hypothetical as the total of correct 
answers was identical. 
The negative future hypothetical showed a ceiling effect as it was answered 
correctly by most participants. It appeared that this question was actually 
confounded. This question was, for example in the car scenario, *lf I do not put a 
sticker on this car which box will it go into?' The child was asked not to change 
anything of the properties so the car should go in the same box as it would go into 
if it was just classified. Children can answer this question correctly even if they do 
not process the question and just classify the car. 
3.2 Analysis of mistakes 
Having three boxes allows the analysis of the mistakes the children make as 
they can either point to the correct box, or one of the two incorrect boxes. One of 
these boxes will relate to a realist error (the child points to the box where the 
object is in reality) the other is classified as 'other type of errors.' 
Tab le 3: N u m b e r and percentage of types of errors for each type of 
quest ion . 




























Overall about one third of the mistakes made by the children are not realist 
errors. When children made an error, it was not systematically a realist error. The 
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pattern of errors was similar for the affirmative counterfactual questions and the 
affirmative future hypothetical questions. 
For the affirmative counterfactual question, out of the four children who made 
'other errors' two pointed to the wrong box, but not the reality box, one gave an 
irrelevant verbal answer, and one said he did not know the answer. 
For the negative counterfactual nine children made *other errors'. Five of them 
pointed to the wrong box (but not the reality box), the other four gave a wrong 
verbal answer: 'yes', 'I don't know', 'on the table', 'out of the box'. 
For the affirmative future hypothetical the four children giving an incorrect 
answer pointed to the wrong box. but did not make any other sort of errors. 
For the negative future hypothetical all the mistakes made were 'other errors'; 
three pointed to the wrong box and one to the playdough box. It should be noted 
that it Is not possible to make a realist error as the 'reality box' is the right answer. 
The overall results show that most of the errors, but not all of them, are realist 
errors. Children make the same sort of errors with future hypotheticals and 
counterfactual suggesting the two types of questions Involve similar mental 
processes. 
4 Discussion 
This experiment had two main alms. The first aim was to assess whether 
counterfactual questions and future hypothetical questions are of the same 
difficulty, and the second aim was to analyse the mistakes children make when 
answering those types of questions. 
Following their experimental work Riggs et al. (1998) suggested that 
difficulties with counterfactuals were not just a general difficulty with conditionals, 
but that there was something special about counterfactuals. They suggested that 
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counterfactual questions were more difficult to answer than future hypothetical 
questions as children's performance was higher on the latter one. When analysing 
Riggs et al.'s (1998) questions in more depth it can be identified that their 
counterfactual questions, in that particular paper, were systematically negative and 
their future hypothetical questions affirmative. In effect their experiment showed 
that negative counterfactual questions are more difficult for children than 
affirmative future hypothetical questions. The results of the present experiment 
confirmed that f inding: children made more mistakes when answering negative 
counterfactual questions than when answering affirmative future hypothetical 
questions. However, these results do not allow us to compare counterfactual 
thinking and future hypothetical thinking as such. In order to do that, more control 
is necessary. 
When controll ing for negation the children's performance followed a different 
pattern. This experiment showed no difference between performance on the 
affirmative counterfactual tasks and the affirmative future hypothetical tasks, but it 
showed that negative counterfactual tasks seem more difficult than affirmative 
counterfactual tasks. It therefore seems that there is no difference between 
counterfactual and future hypothetical thinking, and that negation increases the 
difficulty of the question. Consequently this suggests that the difference found by 
Riggs et al. (1998) was probably due to the formulation of the question, the 
negative question being more difficult to answer for the children. This first result is 
confirmed by the fact that, when looking only at the counterfactual questions, the 
children performed better on the affimiative counterfactual questions than the 
negative counterfactual questions. This result tends to confirm the reasoning 
research conducted with adults which states that introducing a negation in a 
reasoning problem influences the performance (eg: Evans and Handley, 1999). 
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Riggs et al. (1998) argued that the main difference between counterfactual 
and future hypothetical reasoning is that in the first case the new world children 
need to imagine stands for reality but not in the second case, and for that reason 
counterfactual thinking is more difficult than future hypothetical thinking. In a 
counterfactual situation the children are required to imagine that a past event was 
altered and as a consequence the present situation would be different. With a 
future hypothetical situation children just need to imagine that a future situation 
could be different, the present reality in front of them does not need to be altered. 
Whether this new world is meant, or not, to stand in for reality does not make a 
difference to the children's performance. This probably means that there is a 
general difficulty intrinsic to reasoning conditionally. 
Looking more closely at the difference between the affirmative and the 
negative question fundamental differences can be identified. The two following 
questions can be compared: 'If I had put a square sticker on this car, which box 
would it be in now?' vs 'If I had not put a sticker on this car, which box would it be 
in now?' The first proposition (affirmative) asserts an action: putting a square 
sticker on the toy car. The situation is made clear to the children: they know 
exactly what could have been done. The negative proposition on the other hand 
eliminates only one of the actions the experimenter could have carried out. The 
experimenter did not put a sticker on the car, but he, or she, could have carried out 
another action on that car. He, or she, could have put no sticker at all, or put a 
round one Instead, or maybe done something else. The negated questions can be 
more confusing for the children as they make several alternative possibilities 
available. 
One Interesting effect to emerge was that the polarity (i.e.: affirmative versus 
negative) variable influenced future and counterfactual problems in different ways. 
Let's consider why that might be the case. The negative future hypothetical 
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question presents some interesting features as the children performed close to 
ceiling effect on that question, with 57 out of 61 giving the con-ect answer. Its 
validity can be questioned as it seems that children do not need to process the 
question completely to give the right answer. For example, in the car situation, the 
experimenter took a car with no sticker, did not change the properties of this car 
and asked the child: 'If I don't put a sticker on this car which box will it go into?' 
The child could give the right answer just by classifying the car in the box, without 
processing the question. This question does not seem to fit with the definition of a 
future hypothetical given by Riggs et al. (1998) where they say that future 
hypothetical thinking requires children to imagine a worid in the future that leads to 
a different situation from reality. Therefore this question cannot discriminate 
between children who answer correctly for the right reasons (i.e.: process the 
conditional) and those who base their response on current reality. It seems 
extremely difficult in the present experimental condition to design a negative future 
hypothetical question that in effect says that something will not be done to this car 
but would still change the future. 
Another part of this experiment aimed to study the type of mistakes children 
made when incorrectly answering the questions. Overall 6 1 % of children who 
made a mistake made a realist mistake, i.e. they pointed to the location where the 
target object really was. This result was quite constant across tasks (excluding the 
future hypothetical questions for the reasons explained above). This tends to 
confirm Riggs et al.'s (1998) findings that children make mistakes regarding 
counterfactuals because they have difficulties suppressing their current knowledge 
of reality but not completely. Riggs et al. (1998) explained that children made 
mistakes because they could not suppress current reality but the present study 
showed this was not the only reason why children make mistakes. Nearly 40% of 
the children made other types of errors. The results do not allow us to analyse 
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precisely what these errors were but It can be hypothesised that they could be due 
to a lack of understanding of the questions or a lack of attention for example. 
In conclusion, it appears that when controlling for polarity there seems to be 
no difference In performance between counterfactual and future hypothetical 
tasks, but introducing a negation increases the task difficulty. There does not 
seem to be something special about counterfactual thinking in comparison to 
future hypothetical. The difficulty children have when answering counterfactual or 
future hypothetical questions seems to be partly due to the fact that children need 
to suppress their current knowledge of reality, but not only this. Other factors 
influence the children's responses. The conditional element itself is probably a 
source of difficulty. 
The next experiment described in chapter 3 aimed to replicate these results to 
verify their reliability. Affirmative counterfactual questions, negative counterfactual 
questions and affirmative future hypothetical questions were studied. The aim of 
studying counterfactual reasoning in isolation was to get a better understanding of 
how children manipulate their representations of the world and then link it with the 
false belief task. The following experiment studied the relationship between 
counterfactual thinking and false belief task. 
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CHAPTER 3 
EXPERIMENT 2: AFFIRMATIVE AND NEGATIVE 
COUNTERFACTUAL QUESTIONS AND THE F A L S E 
B E L I E F T A S K 
1 Introduction 
The previous chapter looked at the difference between counterfactual thinking 
and future hypothetical thinking, and at the influence of negation on these two 
types of reasoning. The results showed that when controlling for negation 
counterfactual thinking was not more difficult than future hypothetical reasoning. It 
seems that the difference between counterfactual and future hypothetical 
reasoning described by Riggs et al. (1998) was probably due to the presence of 
the negation in the counterfactual questions, and the general difficulty that children 
have with counterfactuals may be a general problem linked to hypothetical 
thinking. This distinction between affirmative and negative counterfactual 
questions has not been studied in depth in previous literature. Therefore to 
strengthen the findings of the previous experiment the difference between 
negative and affirmative counterfactual questions will be investigated further. If the 
findings can be replicated it will give more reliability to the previous experiment. 
Counterfactual thinking has been studied in relation to theory of mind, and to 
the false belief task in particular (e.g.: Grant et al., 2004; Riggs et al, 1998; 
Guajardo and Turiey-Ames, 2004). Having a theory of mind allows us to 
understand other people's minds and mental states, and predict their behaviour 
accordingly. The false belief task, as described in chapter 1, is used to assess 
whether a child has a theory of mind or not. This task is usually presented to 
children using toys and props. It requires children to understand that a protagonist 
did not witness a change in the state of affairs, and to ascribe mental states to this 
protagonist. When asked the false belief question (eg: Where will Sally look for her 
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marble? - See chapter 1 for a description of the Sally and Ann task) they have to 
understand that their knowledge of the world is different from Sally's, they need to 
be able to hold those two conflicting representations and decide which one is right 
for them and which one is right for Sally, but children tend to find coping with 
multiple conflicting representations difficult (Scholl and Leslie, 2001).They also 
need to have the knowledge that a person is going to act according to their own 
personal beliefs, even if their beliefs are wrong. Children tend to overestimate 
others' knowledge according to what they themselves know. Birch and Bloom 
(2004) argued that the 'curse of knowledge', i.e. the tendency to overestimate 
other's knowledge to match our own beliefs, can explain children's difficulties in 
passing the false belief task. 
The false belief task is one of the most used tasks to assess theory of mind in 
young children. Through their meta-analysis Wellman et al. (2001) confirmed that 
there is a shift in ability around the age of 4, which is when children can pass the 
false belief task, although they show signs of having a theory of mind well before 
that age. This shift in ability has been studied in depth in the past few years. Many 
research projects have studied the components of the false belief task and seem 
to attribute this shift to a component other than theory of mind itself. Peterson and 
Riggs (1999) suggested that this component is the ability to deal with conflictive 
cases. 
Bloom and German (2000) argued that children need more than just a theory 
of mind to pass the false belief task and also that having a theory of mind is more 
complex than just passing the false belief task. To them the false belief task 
should be used to investigate how children reason about representations: how 
they cope with two different representations, one corresponding to the real 
situation and one corresponding to a character's false belief. 
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Riggs et al. (1998) ran a series of experiments exploring the relationship 
between counterfactual tasks and false belief tasks. They found a consistent 
correlation between these two types of task, even when partialling out language 
skills and narrative factors. They therefore argued that In order to pass the false 
belief task children need to be able to reason counterfactually. This finding seems 
to be robust as it has been confirmed by other researchers (see chapter 1 for more 
details). However, when looking at Riggs et al.'s (1998) experiment in more depth 
it appears that they more precisely found a link between negative counterfactual 
questions and the false belief task as they only included negative counterfactual 
questions in their tasks. Therefore the issue that this experiment will address is the 
extent to which the relation between counterfactual thinking and the false belief 
task is the result of a difficulty with processing negatives. 
Grant et al. (2004) also investigated the relationship between theory of mind 
and counterfactual reasoning with children with autism as they tend to have a 
delayed acquisition of theory of mind (Baron-Cohen, 2000). They used a variety of 
tasks Including some standard false belief tasks, non-standard false belief tasks 
and some counterfactual tasks. The eight standard false belief tasks they ran were 
based on Riggs et al.'s (1998) study and included four narrative tasks (e.g.: the 
Post Office story) and four non-narrative stories (e.g.: The Shape Task). They 
explained that these tasks require children to engage in some conditional 
counterfactual reasoning, to have an understanding of belief, and to have an ability 
to inform counterfactual states of affairs from Implicit Information. The same 
scenarios were also presented with a counterfactual question. The non-standard 
counterfactual tasks' requirements were different from the previous tasks as the 
false belief was explicitly stated in the scenario, or the event underpinning this 
event was explicitly described, and they did not require any conditional 
counterfactual reasoning. Grant et al. (2004) used the task designed by Wellman 
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and Bartsch (1988). Each scenario was illustrated by a comic strip. In the Explicit 
False-Belief task, for example, the children were told that Mary wanted to find her 
kitten. Mary's kitten was really in the bedroom but Mary thought that It was in the 
kitchen. They were then asked the test question: 'Where will Mary look for her 
kitten?' For their study Grant et al. (2004) recruited children with autism and for the 
two control groups children with moderate intellectual disability and typically 
developing children. They found that the children with autism performed worse 
than the control groups on the false belief tasks and the counlerfactual tasks, and 
they found a significant correlation between these tasks which was due neither to 
narration nor memory. They found that the children with autism performed as well 
as controls on the non standard false belief tasks, and that they performed worse 
on standard false belief tasks than counterfactual tasks. They concluded that 
children with autism did not pass the standard false belief task not because of a 
difficulty to understand false beliefs but because of the cognitive requirements of 
the task. When the false beliefs were explicit children with autism performed 
better. This suggests that children with autism have a difficulty with implicit false 
belief maybe because of their impairment In Imagination as mentioned In Wing's 
triad (Happe. 1994a). 
Peterson and Bowler (2000) asked whether children with autism fall the false 
belief task for the same reason as typically developing children, i.e. because of the 
implicit counterfactual element embedded in the tasks. They tested children with 
autism and two other groups as a control: children with severe learning disability 
and typically developing children. Both groups of children with special needs were 
matched on chronological age and verbal mental age. The children were 
presented with tasks previously used by Riggs et al. (1998), the cake scenario and 
the fire scenario. Each scenario was followed either by a counterfactual question 
(note: all the counterfactual questions were negative questions) or a false belief 
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question. They found no significant difference in performance on the 
counterfactual task between the three groups. They found a strong correlation 
between counterfactual tasks and false belief tasks for the typically developing 
children. Children with autism, but not children with severe learning disability, 
performed worse than typically developing children on false belief tasks 
All these research papers looked at the relationship between passing the false 
belief task and solving a counterfactual problem. Guajardo and Turley-Ames 
(2004) studied the relationship between theory of mind and the ability to generate 
counterfactuals. They identified two types of counterfactuals: the 'consequent 
tasks' where the children are asked to alter a consequent and the 'antecedent 
tasks 'where children are asked to alter the antecedent. Examples of their 
scenarios were described in chapter 1. They found a relationship between the 
performance on each type of counterfactual task and theory of mind tasks. Theory 
of mind correlated highly with antecedent counterfactual thinking and consequent 
counterfactual thinking, and all these tasks also showed some similar patterns of 
development. 
It seems that a recurrent link between the false belief task and counterfactual 
thinking has been found in the literature, however, Perner et al. (2004) argued for 
a developmental dissociation between the false belief task and counterfactual 
reasoning. In their study, they presented children with false belief questions and 
counterfactuai questions embedded in simple and complex scenarios. The tasks 
they used were the 'travel scenarios*. The complex (Feichtinger 1999 as cited in 
Perner et al. 2004) and the simple (Sprung 1999 as cited in Perner et al. 2004) 
scenarios both involved Peter who wanted to travel; different points of departure 
and arrival were available as well as different means of transport. In the simple 
scenario Peter could go to the boat house, the barn or the school. At the boat 
house he could take the boat to go to the lake, at the barn the coach to go to the 
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pasture and at the school the tricycle to go to the playground. In this scenario each 
departure was linked to only one means of transport and one destination. In the 
complex scenario Peter could go to the green station or the blue station. At the 
green station he could take the bus to go to the lake or the train to go to the 
mountain. At the blue station he could take the train to go to the lake or the bus to 
go to the mountain. In this scenario the correspondence departure/means of 
transport/destination was not simple. Taking all these variables into account 
increases the complexity of the task and requires a greater processing and 
memory capacity. The results showed that children found counterfactual tasks a 
lot easier to answer than false belief tasks, especially with the simple task. Perner 
et al. (2004) did not find any difference between the simple false belief tasks and 
the complex false belief tasks, but children performed better on simple 
counterfactual tasks and the complex false belief tasks. They explained that this 
dissociation was an argument against Peterson and Riggs' (1999) modified 
derivation argument described in chapter 1. Perner et al. (2004) claimed that if the 
common ability shared by the two tasks was the ability for modified derivation, as 
argued by Peterson and Riggs (1999). children should be able to solve the false 
belief task eariier. 
Cleariy the relationship between counterfactual reasoning and false belief 
tasks needs to be investigated further to better understand its nature. Riggs et al. 
(1998). Peterson and Bowler (2000) and Grant et al. (2004) studied the relation 
between theory of mind and false belief tasks using only negative counterfactual 
questions. None of these experiments included any affirmative counterfactual 
questions. Following the results of the previous experiment showing that 
counterfactual affirmatives were easier than counterfactual negatives for children, 
and the evidence from the literature studying how adults process negative 
premises it is necessary to investigate the relationship between counterfactual 
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thinking and the false belief task controlling for affirmative and negative questions. 
The power of the studies conducted by Riggs et al. (1998) and Peterson and 
Bowler (2000) was also not very high as they collected only between two and four 
data points per type of question for each participant. Grant et al.'s (2004) study 
was more powerful as they collected eight data points per question per participant. 
Pemer el al. (2004) argued for a developmental dissociation while studying this 
relationship in the context of simple versus complex scenarios but in their paper 
they did not give the full detail of all the experiments they conducted. They gave 
two examples out of the four counterfactual questions used, and both those 
examples were affirmative counterfactual questions. It was the first time that this 
relationship between counterfactuals and the false belief task had been 
investigated in the context of affirmative counterfactual question. However, Perner 
et al. (2004) did not seem to counterbalance the affirmative counterfactual 
questions with some negative counterfactual questions. Nor did they highlight this 
difference in their study when relating it to other research papers in the area. It is 
therefore difficult to decide whether his difference is due to the polarity of the 
counterfactual questions. 
Another explanation regarding the correlation between counterfactual thinking 
and the false belief task found in the literature could be suggested. This correlation 
has mainly been studied with negative counterfactual questions, and in these 
questions the change of state of affairs is implicit. For example, in the question 'If 
there had been no fire where would Peter be now?', the change is implicit and 
leaves many possibilities available. In the Post Office scenario Peter got out of bed 
to help the man from the post office put out a fire. If there had not been a fire a 
wide variety of events could have happened. It is not definite whether these events 
would have led to Peter staying in bed or not. On the other hand with an 
affirmative counterfactual question such as 'If I had drawn a circle on this piece of 
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paper, where would this piece of paper be now?' the change is explicit, It does not 
leave any other possibilities open. If a circle had been drawn on the piece of 
paper, the piece of paper would be in the correct box. In the standard false belief 
task the false belief the character holds is implicit. The children need to 
understand and Imagine this false belief. Grant et al. (2004) used some non-
standard false belief tasks where the false beliefs were explicit but they did not 
report any correlation between these tasks and counterfactual thinking. It could be 
argued that the correlation between negative counterfactual questions and 
standard false belief task could be related to the ability to comprehend an implicit 
concept. 
The two aims of the present study were as follows. The first was to replicate 
the finding that including a negation in a counterfactual question increases the 
difficulty for the children. The second was to investigate the relationship between 
counterfactual thinking and the false belief task and study whether the wording of 
the counterfactual questions (affirmative versus negative) influences the results. 
The false belief questions were presented either using the word 'think' or 'look'. 
The literature does not report any difference between these two types of question 
(Wellman et al., 2000) but they have not been studied in combination in relation to 
counterfactual thinking. The experimenter wanted to investigate whether those two 
types of questions would correlate differently with the counterfactual scenarios. 
Using different types of false belief questions would Increase the sensitivity of the 
study. 
As the previous study showed that children under the age of 3;6 could not 
cope with the task requirements it was decided to test children who were older 
than that age. 
82 
2 Method 
2 . 1 Participants 
Forty one children (18 boys and 23 girls) between the age of 3; 6 (years; 
months) and 5; 8 took part in this experiment. The mean age of the sample was of 
4; 8 years (s.d. = 9 months). 
The children were recruited from two reception classes (24 children including 
12 boys and 12 girls) and a nursery (17 children including 6 boys and 11 girls) in 
mainstream schools in Plymouth, UK. 
All the children were typically developing children. 
2.2 Material 
A recording sheet was used throughout the experiment to note the responses 
given by the children and to provide strict guidelines to the experimenter 
(Appendix C) 
Each child was presented with eight scenarios using toys, pens and papers. 
All the scenarios were told from the perspective of a teddy bear called Tidy Teddy. 
Each child was asked to answer two affirmative counterfactual questions, two 
negative counterfactual questions, and four theory of mind questions. In order to 
investigate different possible associations between counterfactual thinking and 
false belief tasks two types of false belief questions were included: the 'think' 
questions (e.g.: Where does Tidy Teddy think his piece of paper is?') and the 'look' 
questions (e.g.: Where will Tidy Teddy look for his piece of paper?). 
The scenarios were very similar to the ones used in the first experiment. The 
first part of the scenario required the children to classify some objects (play dough 
with different shapes, pieces of paper, cards, bricks and a variety of pictures) in 
the correct box out of the three in front of them. Reminder cards were placed in 
front of each box so the children could see how the objects were to be classified 
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without having to remember the classification rule. This classification was then 
either followed by a counterfactual question or two theory of mind questions. The 
false belief tasks were systematically followed by a control question: the memory 
question (e.g.: Where was the brick at the beginning?) 
Example of a scenario: Pieces of paper and shapes 
The child was presented with 3 boxes, and some pieces of paper with either a 
circle, a square or no shape drawn on them. The child was asked to classify the 
pieces of paper into the correct box according to the shape on them. All the pieces 
of paper with a circle on went in the first box, those with a square in the second 
one and the blank pieces of paper in the third one. The experimenter was helped 
by Tidy Teddy. Tidy Teddy added a blank piece of paper in the third box and then 
went to sleep in the experimenter's bag. The experimenter removed Tidy Teddy's 
piece of paper, drew a circle on it and then asked the following questions to the 
child: 'What is on this piece of paper now?', 'Where shall we put this piece of 
paper now?' In the counterfactual situation the children were then asked either an 
affirmative question; 'What if I had drawn a square on this piece of paper, which 
box would it be in now?', or a negative question: 'What if I hadn't drawn a shape 
on this piece of paper, which box would it be in now?' In the theory of mind 
condition the experimenter still removed Tidy Teddy's piece of paper, drew a 
shape on it and asked the child to classify it in the correct box. At this stage Tidy 
Teddy woke up and wanted to play with his piece of paper. The child was then 
asked the two following questions, the order being counterbalanced across 
scenarios: 'Where will Tidy Teddy look for his piece of paper?'. 'Where does Tidy 
Teddy think his piece of paper is?' In every condition the child was then asked a 
memory control question: 'Which box was Tiddy Teddy's piece of paper in at the 
beginning?' 
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The other scenarios involved cards and colours, playdough rolled in different 
shapes, bricks and stickers, faces and glasses, cartoon characters and balls, 
teddies and bow ties and cartoon characters and hats (Appendix D). 
2.3 Design 
This task has a within participant design. Each child was presented with eight 
scenarios and had to answer eight questions: two affirmative counterfactual 
questions, two negative counterfactual questions, and four theory of mind 
questions (two including the verb 'think' and two 'look*). 
2.4 Procedure 
The children were tested at school, during school time. The scenarios were 
presented over two sessions lasting between 10 and 15 minutes each, one week 
apart. In each session the children were presented with four scenarios and had to 
answer one affirmative counterfactual question, one negative counterfactual 
question, two pairs of false belief questions once with *think* first followed by 'look', 
and once with 'look' first then followed by 'think'. The order of task was 
randomised within each session using a graeco-latin square. 
3 Results 
The data collected were the numbers of correct answers per participant for 
each type of question. 
3 . 1 Counterfactual Questions 
Firstly, the overall results for the counterfactual questions were analysed. The 
total number of correct answers for each participant was computed. Very few 
children answered none or only one question correctly. The vast majority of 
children (75.6%) answered at least three out of four questions correctly. 
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The performances between affirmative counterfactual questions and negative 
counterfactual questions were compared. The total number of correct answers for 
each type of question was computed and the mean and the standard deviation 
calculated. The results are presented in Table 4. 
Table 4: Means and standard deviations for affirmative counterfactual 
Type of question Mean Standard Deviation 
Affirmative CF 1.63 .58 
Negative CF 1.39 .83 
The results showed that the children's performance on the affirmative 
counterfactual questions was better than on the negative counterfactual questions. 
A t4est showed that this difference was significant on a one tailed test, t(40)= 
1.919, p<.05. 
3.2 Analysis of mistakes for the counterfactual tasks: 
When asked a counterfactual question, children had a choice of three possible 
answers: the correct answer (the correct box), the realistic answer (the box where 
the object really was), and the other mistakes (third box). 
The data showed that children made three types of mistakes: the 'realist 
mistakes* when they chose the box where the target object really was, the 
'irrelevant box mistakes' when they pointed to the irrelevant box. and 'other 
mistakes' such as a lack of answer, or saying 'I don't know'. The total number of 
mistakes was computed for each of those categories and percentages were 
calculated. The interesting aspect of these data is the difference between Realist 
Errors and any other type of error, so the 'irrelevant box' mistakes and the "other 
mistakes' were computed together and labelled 'Non Realist Errors'. The results 
are presented in Table 5. 
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Table 5: Total number and percentages of each type of errors for 
counterfactual affirmative and counterfactual negative questions (n=41). 
Realist Errors Non Realist Errors Total 
C.F. Aff. 8 (57%) 6 (43%) 14 
CP. Neg. 14 (58%) 10 (42%) 24 
Total 22 (58%) 16 (42%) 38 
In both cases, affirmative counterfactuals and negative counterfactuals. 
children tended to make more realist errors than non realist errors, and the 
percentage of realist and non-realist errors are very similar. 
3.3 False belief tasksfor the whole sample 
All the false belief tasks included a control question: the memory question. 
The data were analysed in two different ways. Firstly the whole data set was 
analysed, ignoring the answers to the control questions. Secondly the data were 
analysed taking into account the responses to the memory question. When 
children did not correctly answer the memory questions their data on the test 
question were not included in the data analysis. The results of the second analysis 
did not different significantly from the first so they are presented in Appendix E. 
The percentage of correct answers for 'look total' and 'think total' was 
calculated. Fifty percent of all the 'think' questions and 50.6 percent of the 'look' 
questions were answered correctly. A t-test showed that this difference was not 
significant, t(40)= -.121, p=.905. 
The influence of using 'think' or 'look' in the false belief questions as well as 
the order to presentation was explored The percentage of correct answers was 
calculated for each type of questions in relation to the verb used and their order. 
The results are presented in the graph below. 
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Figure 1 ;Percentage of correct answers for each type of questions. 
Percentage of Correct Answers for Each Type of 
Questions 
Percentage 
5 6 . 0 0 
5 4 . 0 0 
5 2 . 0 0 
5 0 . 0 0 
4 8 . 0 0 
4 6 . 0 0 
4 4 . 0 0 
4 2 . 0 0 
54 
46 
Thinki Look2 Lookl 
Questions 
Think2 
Differences between all the false belief questions can be identified in 
but an ANOVA showed that there was no significant difference in performance 
between the four questions, F(3. 120) = .59, p=.62. Therefore, there was no 
difference in performance between 'think' and *look', and there was no order effect. 
3.4 Analysis of mistakes for the false belief task 
As for the counterfactual questions, when asked the theory of mind questions 
the children had a choice of three possible answers: the correct answer (the 
correct box), the realistic answer (the box where the object really was), and the 
other mistakes (the third box, or other types of mistakes such as irrelevant verbal 
answer or lack of answer altogether). The total number of realist errors and the 
total number of non-realist mistakes were computed and are reported in Table 6. 
Table 6: Total number of each type of errors for theory of mind questions 
(n=41). 
Realist Errors Non-Realist Total 
Errors 
Number of Errors 107 (66%) 56 (34%) 163 
8 8 
The results showed that children made more realist errors than non-realist 
errors but the proportion of the latter is still important. 
3.5 Comparison between performance on counterfactual tasks and false 
belief tasks 
The performances on counterfactual tasks and false belief tasks were 
compared. The total number of correct answers on counterfactual tasks was 
computed and the total number of correct answers on false belief questions was 
calculated and then divided by two to obtain a score out of four for each set of 
data. The means and the standard deviations were calculated for each type of 
question. The results are presented in Table 7. 
Table 7: Means and standard deviations for the total number of correct 
Type of Question Mean Standard Deviation 
Counterfactual 3.04 1.11 
questions 
False Belief Questions 2.01 1.23 
The results showed that children's performance on counterfactual questions 
was higher than on the false belief questions and a t-test showed that this 
difference was highly significant, t(40)=4.38, p<.001. 
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3.6 Correlations between counterfactual thinking and false belief task for the 
whole sample 
The link between counterfactual thinking and false belief task was 
investigated by running correlations. The results are presented in Table 8. 















C.F. Total .172 1 
T.o.M 
Think 
.883** .146 1 
T.o.M. 
Look 
.888** .159 .568** 1 
C.F. Aff .059 .688** .095 .011 1 
C.F. Neg .190 .866** .131 .205 .233 1 
— - - . _ _ _, ^— 1-
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
The correlation matrix showed that there was no significant correlation 
between any of the counterfactual tasks and any of the theory of mind questions. 
There were some positive, but not significant, correlations between false belief 
tasks and counterfactual tasks, and in particular between false belief task tasks 
and negative counterfactual tasks. 
As Riggs et al. (1998) argued that the children make mistakes on 
counterfactual and false belief task tasks because they cannot suppress their 
knowledge of current reality the relationship between the number of realist errors 
and counterfactual thinking was investigated. The correlations are presented in 
Table 9. 
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Table 9: Correlations between the number of realist errors and 
performance of false belief questions (n=41). 
Realist errors on 
counterfactual Think 1 Look 2 Look 1 Think 2 
Realist e rrors on 
counterfactual 1 
Think 1 .116 1 
Look 2 -.174 .508(**) 1 
Look 1 -.115 .338(*) .616(**) 1 
Think 2 -.010 .535(**) .401(**) .538(**) 1 
Think total .057 .865(**) .516(**) .505(**) .887(**) 
Look total -.160 .470(**) .897(**) .901(**) .523(**) 
a « • - w — \ -
• Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
These results showed that none of the correlations between realist errors 
on counterfactuals and false belief questions were significant. 
The correlations between the number of realist errors (on counterfactual 
and theory of mind task) and performance on counterfactual and theory of mind 
tasks have also been studied. The results are presented in Table 10. 
Table 10: Correlations between the number of realist errors and 
performance on counterfactual and theory of mind tasks. 
Realist errors Realist errors Theory of Counterfactual 








Theory of mind -.059 -.699** 1 
Counterfactual -.757** -.014 .172 1 
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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The results did not show any corelation between the number of realist 
errors and performance on theory of mind and counterfactual tasks. 
As mentioned earlier the results were also analysed in a different way. The 
data of the participants who failed a control question on the false belief task were 
discarded from the analysis. The results were extremely similar to the ones 
presented in the present results section. This second analysis is available in 
Appendix F. 
4 Discussion 
This experiment aimed to study the influence of negative versus affirmative 
questions on counterfactual thinking and the link between counterfactual thinking 
and the false belief task. 
The children were asked to answer four counterfactual questions, two of which 
were affirmative and the other two negative. The majority of the children (75%) 
could answer at least three out of four counterfactual questions correctly. These 
results are very similar to the o n ^ reported by Harris et al. (1998) who found that 
76.92% of their participants, aged between 3 and 5, correctly answered three or 
four test questions out of four. Harris et al. (1998) also included two affirmative and 
two negative questions in their design. It seems that these children were able to 
suppress their current knowledge of reality and imagine how the worid would be if 
an event had not happened or a different event had happened. The present tasks 
were different from Harris et al.'s (1998) tasks as they involved less narration. 
Harris et al. (1998) acted out narrative scenarios and then asked counterfactual 
questions. In the present study children only needed to be able to classify objects 
in different boxes according to one of their properties and then process a 
counterfactual question, they did not have to listen to a narrative story. This study 
required less language but the results were still very similar. 
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In order to study the influence of negation on counterfactual thinking half of 
the questions included in the present experiment were negative and the other half 
affirmative. The results showed that the language used to ask counterfactual 
questions to children was important: the negative questions were more difficult to 
answer than the affirmative questions. This confirmed the findings reported in the 
previous chapter of this thesis. Although Harris et al. (1998) counterbalanced the 
affirmative and the negative counterfactual questions in their study, they did not 
analyse the results accordingly, so we cannot be sure that their results were 
similar to the present ones. 
Some explanations can be suggested regarding the difficulty Introduced by the 
negation of the question. Firstly, it could be argued that negative questions are 
more ambiguous than affirmative questions, especially in the present context. An 
affirmative counterfactual premise such as 'What if I had drawn a square on this 
piece of paper, which box would it be in now' requires the children to imagine only 
one situation 'drawing a square'. The change is explicit. However, the negative 
premise 'What if I hadn't drawn a shape on this piece of paper, which box would it 
be in now?' requires the children to imagine that one thing did not happen, i.e. the 
experimenter did not draw a shape, but it could be any type of shape. The 
question does not explicitly state that nothing else was drawn, therefore the 
children might be more confused by the negative than the positive premise. The 
change is in this case implicit. 
The negative question in the experiment included the word 'shape' on which 
the children might focus, and they might therefore point to one of the boxes where 
pieces of paper with shapes on are classified. If they do so, they then point to one 
of the incorrect boxes. This effect is described as the 'matching bias' (Evans, 
1998), which is the tendency to choose as correct a conclusion that matches the 
lexical content of the premise. The matching bias could be a second explanation 
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for this difficulty with negation. Children concentrate on the semantics of the key 
words in the sentence but ignore the negation itself. 
Riggs et al. (1998) found that counterfactual reasoning was more difficult than 
future hypothetical reasoning, but as explained in the previous chapter, they 
compared negative counterfactual questions and affirmative future hypothetical 
questions. The results from the present experiment tend to support their findings, 
as it appeared that negation makes a question more difficult to answer. However, 
in their paper, Riggs et al. (1998) offered a different explanation for their findings 
based on the nature itself of those two types of reasoning. They argued that 
children find counterfactual reasoning more difficult than future hypothetical 
reasoning because it requires them to suppress their current knowledge of reality 
and imagine a different world which is meant to stand in for reality. According to 
Riggs et al. (1998) this difficulty leads the children to make realist errors. This 
argument regarding realist errors cannot be fully supported by their data as the 
children were only offered two choices for their answer: the correct location or the 
realist location. Children could therefore either give the correct answer or make a 
realist error. It is then not possible to argue that children make errors because they 
cannot suppress reality. In order to distinguish realist errors and other types of 
errors in the present study the children were offered a third choice being an 
'irrelevant location'. When they were asked a counterfactual question such as 'If I 
had drawn a square on that piece of paper which box would it be in now?' they 
had a choice of three boxes: the correct box, the reality box. which is where the 
piece of paper is at the fime the question is asked, and another box which is not 
relevant. The errors children made in this study were analysed as being either 
'realist errors' or 'non realist errors'. The results showed that children both made 
realist and non realist errors. Children tended to make more realist errors, which 
tends to support Riggs et al.'s (1998) claim that children find counterfactual 
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reasoning difficult because they cannot suppress their current knowledge of realist 
but an important proportion of errors children make are still non-realist. There 
seem to be several factors leading children to make mistakes. Some make 
mistakes because they cannot suppress current reality but others make mistakes 
because of other difficulties of the tasks such as cognitive or linguistic difficulties. 
This study also investigated the false belief task and its relationship to 
counterfactual tasks. The children were asked to answer eight false belief 
questions that included two types of test questions: the 'think' questions and the 
'look' questions. Using the word 'think' in the test question, such as 'Where does 
Tidy Teddy think his piece of paper is?' is asking the children whether they know 
what Tidy Teddy's mental state is. On the other hand in order to pass the 'look' 
question, 'Where will Tidy Teddy look for his piece of paper?', children need to 
acknowledge Tidy Teddy's mental state, especially his false belief, then they have 
to understand that Tidy Teddy will act according to his own beliefs, even though 
they are false. The results of the experiment did not show any significant 
difference between both types of questions, which is consistent with previous 
research (see Wellman et al., 2001. for a review). It does not seem that just 
acknowledging a mental state is easier than predicting the protagonist's action 
according to the mental state. The order of presentation had no effect either. 
Asking one before the other neither improves, nor worsens, the children's 
performance on the second question. 
A number of studies have shown a link between counterfactual thinking and 
the false belief task (eg: Riggs et al. 1998; Grant et al., 2004; Peterson and 
Bowler. 2000) so this relation was investigated in the present experiment. When 
comparing performance on the counterfactual tasks and the false belief tasks it 
appeared that children found counterfactual tasks easier than false belief tasks. 
This same difference was reported by Riggs et al. (1998) and Peterson and 
95 
Bowler (2000), but only for clinical samples (children with autism and children with 
severe learning disability) in that latter publication. These findings confirm Riggs et 
al.'s (1998) suggesfion that counterfactual thinking may be necessary but not 
sufficient to pass the false belief task. Riggs et al. (1998) and Peterson and Bowler 
(2000) explained that difference by saying that the counterfactual questions 
include an explicit counterfactual proposition and that the counterfactual 
proposifion embedded in the false belief task is implicit and needs to be inferred 
making that task more difficult 
In order to investigate this relationship between those two types of tasks we 
examined the correlafions between them. Having established that affirmative and 
negative counterfactual questions were not of the same difficulty it is interesting to 
investigate how they independently correlated with the false belief task. 
The first important result is that the false belief task questions positively 
correlated with each other very strongly indicating that they share a high degree of 
common variance. However, this experiment failed to show any significant 
correlation between any of the false belief task questions and any of the 
counterfactual questions. There are slight positive correlations between the overall 
score for the counterfactual questions and the overall false belief tasks, the 'think' 
quesfions and the 'look' question but they are not significant. If we look at the 
affirmative and the negative counterfactual questions separately it appears that the 
counterfactual affirmafive did not correlate with any of the false belief task 
measures, whereas the counterfactual negatives correlate slightly positively with 
them, although this correlation is not significant. These results, although not 
significant, tend to confirm the finding reported in the literature on this topic. The 
studies which found a significant systematic positive correlation between the false 
belief task and counterfactuals used negative counterfactual quesfions (e.g.: Grant 
et al., 2004; Peterson and Bowler, 2000; Riggs et al., 1998). This pattern of 
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findings needs to be investigated further. The non-significant correlations in this 
study could be due to a lack of statistical power because only two data points were 
collected respectively for negative and affirmative counterfactual questions. 
On the other hand. Pemer et al. (2004), who did not find a systematic 
correlation, used some affirmative counterfactual questions in their experimental 
design. This dissociation again suggests that affirmative and negative 
counterfactual questions may differ. The false belief task might share a common 
ability with the negative counterfactual questions but not with the affirmative 
counterfactual question. The fact that the negative counterfactual is more difficult 
might be one of the reasons. 
Riggs et al. (1998) suggested that the correlation between counterfactual 
thinking and the false belief task could be due to the fact that children cannot 
suppress their knowledge of current reality leading them to make realist mistakes. 
However, the correlation matrix did not show any correlation between the number 
of realist errors made in the counterfactual tasks and performance on the false 
belief task. The number of realist errors between the counterfactual and the false 
belief tasks do not seem to correlate either. The findings of this experiment seem 
to show a divide between these two types of tasks. 
The positive correlation found in the literature and here (although not 
significant) between negative counterfactual questions and false belief tasks could 
be due the fact that they both include an implicit component. As mentioned before, 
in a negative counterfactual question the change is implicit and in traditional false 
belief tasks the false belief is implicit. When the change becomes explicit (in the 
affirmative counterfactual question) the correlation decreases. This relationship 
needs to be explored further. 
97 
A last interesting point to discuss is the usefulness of the control questions in 
the false belief task. The present false belief tasks included one control question: 
the 'memory question' (e.g.: Where was this piece of paper at the beginning?) that 
checks that the child can remember where the target object was at the beginning 
of the task. It is argued (Wellman et al., 2001) that the results of the test questions 
need to be validated by correct answers on the control questions. The other side 
of the argument would be to say that by the time children answer a control 
question, they have had to listen to a rather complex scenario, and to answer at 
least one test question. The child could be confused by the number of questions 
asked. In this study when comparing the data for the whole sample (including the 
data of all the children who took part in the experiment) and the reduced sample 
(excluding the children who failed the control question) it can be seen that the 
results are very similar. The comparison of the 'think' and 'look' questions leads to 
the same conclusion in both cases, and the correlation matrices are very similar. 
Removing the children who fail the control question can be seen as increasing the 
internal validity of the study, but then the number of participants diminishes, from 
41 to 25 in the present case, therefore decreasing the power of the statistical 
analysis. It does not seem that these control questions are particularly necessary, 
at least with typically developing children. They might still be necessary when 
testing children from clinical populations as their cognitive skills and language 
skills tend to vary a lot. 
In conclusion, this study confirms that affirmative and negative 
counterfactual questions are not equivalent, they are not of the same difficulty and 
they probably require different abilities. This experiment helped us understand 
better the relation between false belief tasks and counterfactual reasoning, 
especially showing that the wording of the counterfactual questions is important. It 
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confirmed that introducing a negation in a counterfactual question increases its 
difficulty. 
This experiment also showed that only a proportion of the mistakes children 
make when solving counterfactual questions are realist mistakes, so suppressing 
reality is probably not the only difficulty children have. The results also showed 
that counterfactual tasks were easier than false belief tasks but the correlations 
between those tasks were not conclusive and need to be further investigated. 
This experiment finally suggested that the relevance of the control questions is 
very limited, at least with typically developing children. The next chapter will 
investigate the relationship between the false belief task and counterfactual 
thinking, as well as contrary-to-fact reasoning. 
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CHAPTER 4 
EXPERIMENT 3: F A L S E B E L I E F T A S K S , 
COUNTERFACTUAL THINKING AND CONTRARY 
TO FACT SYLLOGISMS 
1 Introduction 
The previous chapter of this thesis replicated the findings from experiment 1 
that strongly suggested that using a negation in a counterfactual question makes 
that question more difficult. It also investigated the relationship between 
counterfactual thinking and the false belief task but contrary to previous research 
failed to show a significant association. The present chapter will study this link 
using a different set of tasks, including false belief to self tasks, as well as a 
potential link between false belief and contrary-to-fact syllogisms. 
The relationship between counterfactual thinking and the false belief task as 
reported in the literature has been discussed in depth in chapter 1 and chapter 3. 
Riggs et al. (1998) initiated the work on the relation between counterfactual 
reasoning and the false belief task. They found a correlation between 
performances on these tasks and explained that in order to pass the false belief 
task children need to acknowledge a counterfactual physical state, they need to 
acknowledge how the state of affairs would be if a previous event had not 
happened. In the Sally and Anne task for example the children need to think about 
what the situation would be like now if Anne had not transferred the marble to the 
box. These findings were replicated by Peterson & Bowler (2000) and Grant et al. 
(2004) with children with autism and Guajardo & Turley-Ames (2004) with typically 
developing children. 
This work on counterfactual thinking and the false belief task has always been 
conducted with traditional false belief tasks to others such as the 'Sally and Anne 
task' or the 'Maxi task' (described in Chapter 1) that require the children to 
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attribute a false belief to another person or character. In the example mentioned 
above the children need to attribute the false belief to Sally, or Maxi. In the 
previous chapter of this thesis no link was found between counterfactual and false 
belief tasks, but different types of tasks were used. In the present experiment more 
traditional tasks will be used, and the power of the experiment will be increased by 
using more tasks and testing more children. 
A different type of false belief task, the false belief to self task, sometimes 
referred to as 'the unexpected content task' or 'the representational change task', 
has been reported in the literature. The main difference between this task and the 
traditional false belief to others task is that children need to attribute a false belief 
to themselves rather than somebody else. Perner et al. (1987) tried to help 
children understand another's person mistaken belief by giving them the 
opportunity to experience false beliefs themselves first, and to that end designed 
the Smartie task. In their experiment the participant came with a friend and both 
were told that the experimenter would show them what was in her box. The friend 
was told to wait outside. Inside the room the participant was shown a Smartie box 
and was asked what they thought was inside. Perner et al. (1987) reported that 
they all said 'Smarties'. The participant was then shown that he, or she, was wrong 
and that the box did not contain Smarties but a pencil. The pencil was put back 
inside and the box closed. The participant was then asked a control question 
about the actual content of the box ('Can you remember what's inside here?') and 
the first test question about their previous false belief regarding the content of the 
box ('But what did you think was in here?'). The participant was then told that it 
was their friend's turn and that their friend would be shown the closed box and 
asked what was in the box. The participant was finally asked the second test 
question ('What will [name of the friend) think is in here?').The first part of the 
Smartie task required children to attribute false belief to themselves and the 
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second part to somebody else, their friend. The aim of the present experiment was 
to investigate false belief to self only so just the first part of this experiment was 
run. No friend or other character was involved in the running of this task. Perner et 
al. (1987) found that children could pass this task from the age of 4. Regarding the 
results of the test questions requiring the participants to attribute false belief to 
their friend, Perner et al. (1987) found that having experienced false belief 
themselves first did not help the children attribute false beliefs to their friend but 
their results also showed that children found the first task easier than the second 
one. They suggested that the false belief to self question was easier because 
children could only remember their previous wrong answer without having to 
understand the conflicting values represented by the reality and the false belief 
Lewis and Osborne (1990) replicated this study and found the same discrepancy. 
Gopnik and Astington (1988) ran an experiment looking at the difference 
between false belief to self, false belief to others and the appearance-reality 
distinction using the Smartie task. Their results contradicted the ones previously 
cited and they found that children performed better on the false belief to others 
task than the false belief to self task. Two explanations for these results could be 
suggested. First of all Gopnik and Astington (1988) did not ask the children what 
they thought was inside the box when it was first presented to them to avoid the 
children just reporting their previous answer when asked the control question. 
Secondly Gopnik and Astington (1988) argued that this result could mean that 
there is a need for children to understand the difference between their own beliefs 
and others' beliefs before they can learn to understand changes in their own 
mental states. 
In their meta-analysis Wellman et al. (2001) included 117 self-conditions and 
compared them to 118 other-conditions. They found no significant difference in 
difficulty between the two types of tasks. Their analysis also showed that both 
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tasks developed similarly across ages. It seems that the difference between 
performances on these tasks in the studies cited above disappeared when a large 
number of papers were compared. 
False belief to self can also be tested with a slightly different type of task. The 
first part of the Band Aid task designed by Bartsch and Wdlman (1989) can be 
used for this purpose. In order to run that task the contents of a plaster box was 
moved to a plain box before the experiment started. The participants were shown 
both boxes and were asked to pick up the box they thought had plasters in. The 
participants tended to always pick the plaster box which was clearly marked. They 
were then asked to check the contents of the box and discovered that the plaster 
box was empty and that the plasters were in the plain box. At this stage of the 
scenario Bartsch and Wellman (1989) introduced a hand puppet and the scenario 
was presented either in prediction condition or in explanation condition. In the 
prediction condition the participants were required to predict the hand puppet's 
behaviour and were asked the following questions: 'Look, here's Sam. Sam has a 
cut. see? And she wants a band-aid. Where do you think she'll look for band aids?' 
In the explanation condition the participants were asked to explain the hand 
puppet's behaviours. The participants watched the puppet starting looking in the 
empty plaster box without revealing the content and they were asked the following 
question: 'Look, here's Bill. Bill has a cut, see? And he wants a Band Aid. Why do 
you think he's looking in there?' 
The Band Aid task can be used to test false belief to self attribution if just 
before the point where the hand puppet is introduced both boxes are closed and 
the participants are asked the following test question: 'Where did you think the 
plasters were before you opened the boxes?' and a control question: 'Where are 
the plasters really?'. 
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Riggs et al. (1998) suggested that, in the false belief to self task, children do 
not need to reason counterfactually but need to report a counterfactual situation. 
The false belief to self task will be included in the present experiment but 
according to Riggs et al.'s (1998) study no correlation should be expected with the 
counterfactual task. However, it could be argued that there is a counterfactual 
element embedded in this task. In the example of the Smartie task (as described 
above) the implicit counterfactual question could be: 'What if I hadn't swapped the 
content of the box. what would be In it now?' Riggs et al. (1998) made the previous 
claim regarding the false belief to self task but without precise supporting 
evidence. Therefore this potential link between the false belief to self task and 
counterfactual reasoning needs to be investigated further. 
A study conducted by Peskin and Ardino (2003) included these two types of 
theory of mind tasks. This study aimed at exploring the relationship between the 
development of theory of mind and the ability to engage In two social behaviours 
that are hide-and-seek games and keeping a secret. The participants who took 
part in this study were children from the age of 3 to 5. Peskin and Ardino (2003) 
included three types of theory of mind questions in their design: a traditional false 
belief to others tasks (that they called a location task) and a traditional Smartie 
type tasks that included the false belief to self question and the second false belief 
to others question. They found a strong relationship between all these measures 
indicating that they evaluated the same type of general abilities; however, the 
details of the results showed some differences. They found that the false belief to 
others task significantly positively correlated with hide-and-seek but not with 
keeping a secret and that the false belief to self task did not correlate to either of 
these social measures. These results suggested that the theory of mind to self 
task and the theory of mind to others task, although both being theory of mind 
tasks, do not exactly tap into exactly the same ability. These findings suggested 
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that included these two types of theory of mind tasks in the present study would 
enrich the variety of tasks and would allows to study the relationship between 
counterfactual reasoning and contrary-to-fact syllogisms with theory of mind in 
more depth. 
The strong link found in the literature between counterfactual thinking and the 
false belief task has mainly been attributed to the counterfactual element itself. 
However, it could be argued that the correlation could be linked to more general 
reasoning abilities. In order to test this hypothesis the present experiment will 
examine the relationship between the false belief task and another type of 
reasoning task: contrary-to-fact syllogisms. 
Developmental work on syllogisms has mainly been conducted using contrary-
to-fact syllogisms (Dias & Harris, 1990; Leevers & Harris, 2000; Leevers & Harris, 
1999; Scott et al., 1999), The principal focus of this work was to study the impact 
of content on reasoning (see chapter 1 for more details). In all these experiments 
the quantifier was always 'all' which is defined as universal as it refers to all the 
members of a set (Evans et al., 1993) and all the syllogisms were valid and 
followed by a strong conclusion as there was only one possible correct answer. 
The structure of the contrary-to-fact syllogisms was as follows. The first premise 
was contrary-to-fact, i.e. the statement was contrary to the real worid, could not 
happen in the real world (e.g.: all cows quack, from Leevers and Harris, 2000). 
This premise could take the form of All X are/feel/have/do Y. In order to check that 
the first premise was contrary-to-fact for the children, participants were asked a 
factual question (e.g.: What noise do cows make?). The children performed 
extremely well on the factual questions consistently across experiments (e.g.: 
Scott et al., 1999; Dias and Harris, 1990). The second premise gave more 
information about the middle term 'cows'. It defined a particular member of set X 
(e.g.: Suzie is a cow). The final statement was a question summarising the first 
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two premises. The questions required either a yes-answer (Does Suzie quack?) or 
a no-answer (Does Suzie moo?). In both cases children need to draw a conclusion 
that contradicts their knowledge of the world. These tasks were deductive and 
could be solved without any knowledge of the world. 
Although the validity of these arguments is a function of the logical structure 
rather than the empirical content children seem to have difficulties giyng an 
answer that contradicts their knowledge of the world (Dias and Harris, 1988). 
Contrary-to-fact syllogisms require children to suppress their knowledge of the real 
world in order to reason with the new piece of information. They need to set reality 
aside to avoid empirical bias (Harris, 2001). Contrary-to-fact syllogisms require 
children to represent a counterfactual situation so to some extent they share some 
similarities with counterfactual thinking tasks. 
Ways of facilitating contrary4o-fact reasoning have been studied and the 
literature has shown that some particular contexts helped children solve contrary-
to-fact syllogisms, in particular a fantasy context where children are asked to 
imagine a fantasy world that follows different rules than the real world (Scott et al., 
1999; Leevers et al., 2000; Leevers et al., 1999). Markovits (1985) argued that a 
fantasy context acts as a cognitive filter preventing children from accessing long 
term memory. This cognitive filter helps inhibition of real world knowledge then the 
children find reasoning about with contrary-to-fact proposition easier. 
Even if we accept that counterfactual thinking is a pre-requisite to passing the 
false belief task, it does not explain the full variance of the latter (Guajardo et al.. 
2004), therefore some other variables have to be taken into account. Other 
cognitive abilities such as the central executive have been studied in relation to the 
false belief task. Carlson and Moses (2001) reported a strong correlation between 
theory of mind and inhibition even after controlling for age. gender, verbal ability. 
motor sequencing, family size, and performance on pretend-action and mental 
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state control tasks. To pass the test children need to inhibit response to the wrong 
answer which represents reality. Therefore a correlation between false belief to 
others tasks and contrary-to*fact syllogisms could be expected. 
In order to pass the false belief task children need to listen to a narrative and 
reason about the main elements of the story, before they could do that they need 
to hold these main elements in their memory. It can then be hypothesised that 
verbal memory could play an important part in solving the task, therefore a 
measure of verbal memory was included in the experiment. The measure used 
was the CNRep (Gathercole, Willis, Baddeley. & Emslie, 1994a). In this test 
children are asked to repeat non-words presented orally to them. 
The aim of this study was to study the relationship between contrary-to-fact 
and counterfactual reasoning and performance on the false belief task. The 
present study will further investigate the link between counterfactual thinking and 
the false belief to others task. In order to test whether this potential link is only due 
to the counterfactual element rather than general reasoning abilities we will 
compare false belief to others task with contrary-to-fact syllogisms. If a link is then 
found it would mean that the link between counterfactual and false belief tasks 
previously found in the literature was mainly due to general abilities. The false 
belief to self task will also be included in this study to investigate its relationship, or 
lack of it, with counterfactual thinking. 
2 Method 
2.1 Participants 
Seventy one participants, including 27 boys and 44 girls, were recruited in two 
schools and one playgroup in Plymouth, UK. 
Forty three children attended nursery classes and 28 reception classes. 
107 
The mean age of the participants was 4 years 5 months and the standard 
deviation 6 months (range 3;3 to 5;2). 
2.2 Materials 
The children were presented with four counterfactual tasks, four false belief to 
others tasks, four false belief to self tasks, eight contrary-to-fact syllogisms and the 
CNRep. 
The CNRep test was administered using the recording sheet and the tape 
provided with the test. Toys were used to act out all the theory of mind and 
counterfactual scenarios. 
2.2.1 Counterfactual tasks 
The four counterfactual tasks were the same as the ones designed by Harris 
et al. 1996, (experiment 1), except some minor variations due to physical 
constraints when the specific materials were not available. Each of the scenarios 
was acted out in front of the children with the help of props. 
The first scenario was as follows: 
'One day the floor was nice and clean like this (experimenter points to a 
white sheet of paper). But guess what? Carol comes home (a doll is put 
on the table next to the sheet of paper) and she doesn't take her shoes 
off. She comes inside and makes the floor all dirty with her shoes (the doll 
walks across the floor leaving dirty footprints made of paint).' 
At this stage the children were asked two control questions: the Now Control 
Question (e.g.: 'Is the floor clean now?') in relation to the final situation and the 
Before Control Question ('Was the clean before?') in relation to the initial situation. 
Finally the children were asked the test question. For example: 'What If Carol 
had taken her shoes off - would the floor be dirty?' 
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Three other similar scenarios using different props were used. The first two 
episodes requested a yes/no answers and the last two a selective pointing 
answer. 
One test question required a no answer and the next one a yes answer in 
order to avoid any bias. For the same reason, the control questions required either 
a yes or a no answer. Each scenario required a mixture of yes and no answers. 
Two of the final test questions were formulated in the positive ('What if...?) 
whereas the other two were formulated in the negative ('What if...not...?). 
The other scenarios are included in Appendix F. 
2.2.2 False belief to others tasks 
The scenarios used were similar to the classical tasks such as the Sally and 
Anne task ((Baron-Cohen et al., 1985) and the Maxi scenario (Wimmer & Perner. 
1983). 
One of the scenarios was as follows: 
The Sally and Anne task was acted out with two dolls. The children were first 
introduced to each of the doll and the experimenter checked that they knew which 
one was which. Sally placed a marble in her basket covered with a handkerchief, 
and then left the scene (Sally was placed in the experimenter's bag). While she 
was away Anne moved the marble from the basket to her box closed with a lid. 
Sally then returned to the scene and the children were asked the critical question: 
'Where will Sally look for her marble?' If the children pointed to the basket, then 
they passed the false belief task because they showed they could acknowledge 
Sally's false belief. 
They were then asked two control questions: the Reality question ('Where is 
the marble really?') to check that the children knew what the situation was, and the 
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Memory question ('Where was the marble in the beginning?') to check that the 
children remembered the first state of affairs. 
The Pooh Bear task was the same as the Sally Anne tasks. The characters, 
the containers and the objects to be moved were slightly different. 
The Maxi task was inspired from Wimmer and Pemer (1983), but very close to 
the Sally and Anne tasks described above. 
The last false belief task was the 'Post office story*, inspired from (Riggs et al., 
1998). This story was told as follows while being acted out with toys: 
'One day Sa//y and Peter were in their house but Peter wasn't feeling very 
well, so he went to bed. Sally then went to the shops to get some 
medicine (Sally was put in the experimenter's bag). Whilst Sally was at 
the shops the phone rang and the man from the Post Office asked Peter 
to come to help to put out a fire. Peter got out of bed and went to the Post 
Office. Sally had finished shopping (Sally was brought back to the 
scene).' 
The children were then asked the false belief question: 'Where does Sally 
think Peter is?' As in the other scenario they were then asked the Reality question: 
'Where is Peter really?' and the Memory question: 'Where was Peter before Sally 
left?' 
For the four scenarios the children could either give a verbal answer or point 
to the location. The other scenarios are included in Appendix G. 
2.2.3 False belief to self task 
The Smartie task was similar to the first part of the one designed by Perner, 
Leekham and Wimmer (1987). The children were shown a Smartie box and asked: 
'What's inside the box?' The children should say Smarties, sweets or chocolate. 
They were then asked to open the box to check the content. When they did so, 
they found a pencil, instead of Smarties, in the container. After the lid was then put 
back on the box the children were asked the critical question: 'What did you think 
was inside the box before you opened It?' Finally they were asked the Reality 
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control question: 'What is really inside the box?' to check that they knew what the 
real situation was. 
The Crayon task was similar to the Smartie task, but it used a crayon box 
which content was replaced by a rubber. 
The Band Aid task was similar to the one designed by (Bartsch & Wellman, 
1989) but used to test the children's own beliefs. For this task the children were 
shown two boxes: one marked with a familiar and obvious picture (i.e.: a plaster 
box) and another plain unmarked one of similar size. The children were asked a 
question to set their belief, such as 'Where are the plasters?' They should then 
point to the plaster box. They were then asked to open both boxes and check their 
content. At this point they could note that the content of the boxes had been 
switched, for example the plasters were in the unmarked box and the plaster box 
was empty. Both boxes were then closed and the children asked the critical 
questions: 'Where did you think the plasters were before you opened the boxes?' 
They were finally asked a Reality control question: 'Where are the plasters really?' 
The Cereal task was exactly the same as the Band Aid task, only the boxes 
and their content differed. A small breakfast cereal box and a plain green box were 
used. The content of the breakfast cereal box was move to the other box before 
the beginning of the experiment. 
The Crayon task and the Cereal task are included in Appendix H. 
2.2.4 Contrary to Fact syllogisms 
The contrary to fact syllogisms used in the experiment were similar to the 
ones designed by Leevers and Harris (2000). As Leevers and Harris (2000) found 
that children answer extremely well the factual questions testing their knowledge 
of the real worid it was decided not to include them in the present experiment. 
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The children were asked to solve eight contrary to fact syllogisms. Four of 
them required a 'yes' answer and four a 'no' answer. The order of presentation of 
the syllogisms was randomised (www.randomizer.org). The children were tested 
individually with the syllogisms read aloud to them. 
The following instructions were first read to the children: 
'Let's try this one together. Now, I'm going to tell you something that may 
sound funny, but I want you to think about it. I want you to imagine a 
picture in your head. It could be; All fish live in trees. So, the fish you are 
thinking about, in the picture in your head, do they live in trees? Yes? 
Good. So now I'm going to tell you some stories and every time I tell you 
a story I want you to think about it. I want you to make another picture 
inside your head of it.' 
And then the first syllogism was read, for example: 
'All cows quack 
Susie is a cow 
Does Susie quack?' 
The first two premises were read twice to the children before asking them the 
final question. The full set of syllogisms is presented in Appendix I. 
2.2.5 CNRep 
In order to test the children's verbal memory the Children's Test of Nonword 
Repetition (Gathercole, Willis, Baddeley, & Emslie, 1994b) was used. This test 
shows a close developmental links with vocabulary, reading and comprehension 
skills. The test was administered strictly according to the manual. The children 
were asked to repeat non-words recorded on a tape and their answers were 
recorded on another tape. The recordings were scored later. Each of word was 




A correlational design was used with each participant being asked to complete 
four counterfactual tasks, four theory of mind to others tasks, four theory of mind to 
self tasks, eight contrary-to-fact syllogisms and the CNRep test 
2.4 Procedure 
Children were tested individually at their school or playgroup over two 
sessions one week apart. Each session took 10 to 15 minutes per child. 
In the first week the children were presented with two counterfactual 
scenarios, two theory of mind tasks and all the eight contrary-to-facl syllogisms. In 
the second week they were presented with the remaining two counterfactual 
scenarios and two theory of mind tasks and the CNRep. The order of the tasks 
was randomised within each session. The tasks were randomised with the help of 
an online software (www.randomizer.com). 
3 Results 
3.1 Control questions and biases 
The counterfactual and the false belief scenarios included two control 
questions each. In the literature, researchers tend to eliminate the participants who 
fail at least one control question, as they believe that control questions are a check 
that the children understand the task. The present research included four types of 
tasks including a total of 12 counterfactual and false belief scenarios, each 
including 2 control questions; altogether a total of 24 control questions per child. In 
the present sample only 11 children answered all the control questions correctly 
and did not present a yes or no bias on the syllogisms. It therefore did not seem 
appropriate to run correlations on such a small sample. In the previous chapter of 
this thesis the data analysis on false belief task and counterfactual tasks was 
conducted first of all by including all the participants and secondly by including 
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only the participants who answered all the control questions correctly and the 
results did not show any difference between these two types of analysis. 
Therefore, It was decided to include all the data collected for the false belief tasks 
and the counterfactual tasks in the present analysis. 
On the other hand the contrary-to-fact syllogisms did not include any control 
questions but the participants showing a yes or a no bias (i.e.: when the children 
systematically answered yes or no to all the questions) were excluded from the 
data as we cannot be sure that they were processing the questions. These 
children could have replied automatically to the questions without processing 
them. Two participants showed a no-bias and 12 a yes-bias. Two other 
participants refused to do the task. The data from 55 participants was therefore 
finally analysed. 
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3.2 Counterfactual task, false belief to others tasks and false belief to self 
tasks 
First of all the internal reliability of each task was computed using a 
Cronbach's Alpha. The results are reported in Table 11. 
Table 11 . Crombach's alpha for each task. 
Task Cronbach's Alpha 
Counterfactual .6251 
False belief to others task .6891 
False belief to self task .3822 
Contrary-to-fact syllogism (all) .4263 
Contrary-to-fact syllogism (yes) .6834 
Contrary-to-fact syllogism (no) .31 
As a rule, it is usually accepted that a Cronbach's alpha higher than .7 
demonstrates a high degree of reliability (Kline, 2000). Therefore in the present 
study the results showed that counterfactual tasks and false belief to others task 
had a good Internal reliability as both Cronbach's alpha were close to .7 whereas 
false belief to self task had a poor internal reliability as they were less than .6. 
The results also showed (hat contrary-to-fact syllogisms requiring a yes 
answer had a good internal reliability as the Cronbach's alpha was higher than .6, 
but that the contrary-to-fact syllogisms requiring a no answer and the overall 
syllogisms had a poor internal reliability as it was lower than .6. 
The score for counterfactual tasks, false belief to others tasks and false belief 
to self tasks was the number of correct answers. The maximum score for each of 
these task was four. The mean and the standard deviation for these tasks were 
computed and are presented in Table 12. 
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Table 12. Mean and standard deviation for each task (n=71). 
Task Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Counterfactual thinking 1.83 1.35 
False belief to others 1.69 1.36 
task 
False belief to self task 1.32 1.27 
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to explore whether these 
differences were significant. First of all, the assumption of sphericity was checked. 
The Maulchy's test of sphericity was not signicant (w= .943. p=.134) therefore it 
was concluded that the variances of differences were not significantly different and 
that the F value of the ANOVA could be trusted. The main ANOVA suggested that 
there was a significant difference F(2) = 4.302, p<.05 between at least two of 
these tasks. A post hoc analysis showed that the only significant difference was 
between the false belief to self task and the counterfactual task. The children 
performed significantly better on counterfactual tasks than false belief to self tasks. 
There was no difference in performance between the two types of false belief 
tasks, or between false belief to others tasks and counterfactual tasks. 
The counterfactual tasks could be analysed further by comparing the 
affirmative and the negative counterfactual questions. The scores were computed 
for both these types of questions. The mean and standard deviation for the 
affirmative counterfactual questions (M = .93. S.D. = .78) and the negative 
counterfactual questions (M = .90 S.D. = 79) were very similar. A t-test showed 
that this difference was not significant, t(70) = .293. p = .770. 
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3.3 Contrary to Fact Syllogisms 
As mentioned above 55 participants were included in this analysis. The score 
on the contrary-to-fact syllogisms was computed. Altogether the mean score of 
correct answers for the children was 2.44 (maximum possible score = 8) with a 
standard deviation of 1.64, and no participant answered more than 5 syllogisms 
correctly. 
The performances on the two types of syllogisms (maximum score was four 
for each of them) were compared and the results showed that children performed 
better on the syllogisms requiring a yes answer (M = 1.47, SD = 1.39) than on 
those requiring a no answer (M= .93, SD= .97). Statistical analysis revealed that 
this difference was highly significant; t (57) = 8, p<.001, two-tailed. 
3.4CNRep 
The CNRep was presented to 71 participants. One participant could not 
complete it because of language difficulties and 8 children refused to do the task. 
The final sample therefore Included 62 children. 
As not all the children fell into the standardised age range for this test, only the 
raw score was computed, not the standard score or the percentile range. Each 
correct item counted for one point and all the points were added to give a raw 
score. The maximum possible raw score was 40. The range of performance varied 
from 3 to 40. The mean performance was 16.17 and the standard deviation 5.83. 
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3.5 Correlations 
Correlations were run to explore the relation between all the tasks. The 
correlation table is presented in Table 13. 



































F.B.T. .314** .181 .356** .239* 1 
Self (n=71 
) 
(n=71) (n=71) (n=71) 
C.to.F -.181 -.175 -.133 -.180 .143 1 
(n= 
55) 




C.to.F -.204 -.207 -.141 -.236 -.182 .804** 1 
(yes) (n= 
55) 





C.to.F -.011 .003 -.021 .035 .499** .529** -.080 1 
(no) (n= 
55) 
(n=55) (n=55) (n= 
55) 
(n=55) (n=55) (n=55) 
CNRep .376** .375** .280* .306* .129 -.078 -.080 -.024 
(n=62) (n=55) (n=55) (n=62) (n=62) (n=49) (n=49) (n=49) 
•* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
The two types of theory of mind tasks positively correlated with each other (r= 
.239, p<.05). Both these types of tasks also correlated with the overall 
counterfactual tasks. However, false belief to others tasks correlated more strongly 
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with the counterfactual (r=.527. p<.01) than the false belief to self task did (r=.314, 
p<.01). False belief to others task correlated with affirmative (r = .420, p<.01) and 
negative (r= .483, p<.01) counterfactuals, whereas false belief to self task 
correlated with negative counterfactuals (r= .356, p<.01) but was not affirmative 
counterfactuals (r=.181, n.s.). 
The false belief to others task also positively correlated with the CNRep {r= 
.306. p<.05) but did not correlate with any of the measures of contrary-to-fact 
reasoning. 
The yes syllogisms and the no syllogisms both correlated with the overall 
contrary-to-fact syllogisms (r=.804. p<.01 and r=.529, p<.01) but they did not 
correlate with each other (r=-.080. not significant). 
Finally the false belief to self task positively correlated with the contrary-to-fact 
syllogisms requiring a no answer (r=.499, p<.01) but not with contrary-to-fact 
syllogisms requiring a yes answer (r=-.183, n.s.) nor with the overall contrary-to-
fact syllogisms(r=.143, n.s.). 
The CNRep only correlated with two other measures; the counterfactual task 
(r=.376. p<.01), including affirmative (r=.375, p<.01) and negative (r=.280, p<.01) 
questions, and the false belief to others task (r=.306, p<.05). 
There was no significant correlation between counterfactual tasks and 
contrary-to-fact syllogisms. 
In order to determine whether counterfactuals predicted theory of mind 
independently of verbal abilities a series of multiple regression analysis were 
conducted. 
Firstly the potential predictors of false belief to others task were examined. A 
regression showed that counterfactual thinking predicted 27.3% of the 
performance on false belief to others independently of verbal memory (Beta= .522, 
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t=4.461, p<.05. =.273). When included contrary-to-fact in the model it showed 
that the two predictors combined only predicted 28.1% of the performance on false 
belief task to others showed that contrary-to-fact were a weak predictor (Beta= 
.507, t=<.05, R^  = .281. 
Secondly the predictors of false belief to self were studied. A first model 
showed that counterfactuals predicted 10.3% of the performance of false belief to 
self task independently of verbal memory (Beta= .317, t=2.382, p<.05. R^=.1Q3, A 
second model studying the impact of counterfactual thinking and no-syllogisms 
showed that counterfactuals predicted only 8.9% of the performance of false belief 
to self task (Beta= .304. t=2.706, p<.05. R^  =.089) and no-syllogisms 24.5% 
(Beta= .499. t=4.192, p<.001. R^  =.245). 
The pattern of correlations suggested that there might be two underlying 
factors, therefore an exploratory factor analysis was conducted to explore further 
the relationship between the different measures. As shown in 
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Table 14, the rotated component measure identified two factors. These results 
showed that the false belief to others task and false belief to self task have 
different predictors. The false belief to others, affirmative counterfactual and 
negative counterfactual measures loaded highly on factor 1, whereas the false 
belief to self and no-syllogisms measures loaded highly on factor 2. 
121 
Table 14:Rotated factor matrix in factor analysis 
Component 1 Component 2 
CtoF (yes) -.539 .124 
CtoF (no) .152 .874 
FBT Others .755 -.053 
FBT Self .531 .668 
CF aff .751 -.176 
CF neg .743 -.137 
CNRep .518 -.284 
outcomes. They all suggested a link between false belief to others and 
counterfactuals (affirmative and negative) on one side and a different link between 
false belief to self, counterfactuals (to lesser extent) and no-syllogisms on the 
other side. They also suggested a lack of link between counterfactuals and 
contrary-to-fact syllogisms. 
4 Discussion 
The aim of this experiment was to investigate the relationship between theory 
of mind to others tasks, theory of mind to self tasks, counterfactual tasks, contrary-
to-fact syllogisms and verbal memory. Correlations were run to investigate these 
links between the tasks, and regressions and a factor analysis were also 
computed to Investigate those links further. 
The results showed that counterfactual tasks correlated both with the false 
belief to others task and false belief to self task and that counterfactuals predicted 
the performance on both these tasks. The correlation found between the false 
belief to others tasks and counterfactual tasks Is consistent with findings 
previously reported in the literature (Grant et al., 2004; Guajardo and Turley-Ames, 
2004; Riggs et al., 1998; Peterson and Bowler, 2000). It supports the explanation 
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presented by Riggs et al. (1998) that there is a counterfactual element embedded 
in the false belief to others task. In the Sally and Anne task, for example, the 
counterfactual embedded element Is implicit and would be 'what if Anne had not 
transferred the marble, where would the marble be?' In both tasks children need to 
ignore the real situation in front of them and reason counterfactually to answer the 
test question correctly. The false belief to others task correlated similarly with 
affirmative and negative counterfactual questions. Most research papers (e.g. 
Grant et al. (2004), Peterson and Bowler (2000), Riggs et al (1998)) unintentionally 
only explored the link between theory of mind and negative counterfactuals. The 
present experiment seems to indicate that there is a link between the false belief 
to others task and both affirmative and negative counterfactual questions. When 
comparing both types of counterfactual questions it also appeared that there was 
no difference in performance between the two. This contradicts the results 
reported in the first two experiments of this thesis. This difference in results could 
be due to the fact that the tasks used were different. In experiments 1 and 2 the 
task involved very little language and relied on the children classifying objects and 
pictures according to one of their physical properties (e.g. colour, shape, 
pattern...) and then answering a counterfactual question regarding a change of 
property and therefore of classification. These tasks did not involve a lot of 
narrative. It should also be noted that the false belief tasks and the counterfactual 
tasks were very similar, only the test question varied. In the present experiment, 
the counterfactual tasks designed by Harris et al. (1998) were used. These tasks 
involved following a short narrative story and then answering some questions. A 
bias might have been introduced in this series of tasks. The children had to 
answer two affirmative and two negative counterfactual questions. One of the 
affirmative counterfactual questions and one of the negative counterfactual 
questions required the children to point to a particular location and had a very 
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similar structure; however, the other two questions differed slightly. The affirmative 
question required a no answer and the negative question a yes answer. This 
difference could have influenced the results by increasing the difficulty of the 
affirmative counlerfactual question, as usually children find giving a no answer 
more difficult than a yes answer. 
In the present experiment, it seems that children performed at the same level 
on false belief to others tasks and counterfactual tasks. A possible explanation 
could be that the ability to solve both these tasks develops at the same time in 
parallel. This contradicts the previous findings reported in the literature. Peterson 
and Bowler (2000) found that children with autism and children with severe 
learning disability performed better on the counterfactual task than the false belief 
task. Grant et al. (2004) reported the same finding for children with autism and 
typically developing children. 
The results also showed that counterfactuals correlated with the false belief to 
self task and that the former predicted 32% of the performance of the latter. This 
result does not support Riggs et al.'s (1998) claim that there is no counterfactual 
thinking involved in the false belief to self task. On the contrary, this result 
suggests that there might be a counterfactual element embedded in the false 
belief to self task. In the Smartie task, for example, the content of the box is 
swapped with a pencil before the start of the experiment. The children are asked 
what they think is in the box. They are then shown the actual content of the box 
and finally they are asked to recall their previous false belief. The children have to 
report a counterfactual situation: their false belief is different from the actual 
content of the box. It could be argued that a possible embedded counterfactual 
question could be: 'What if I had not swapped the content of the box. what would 
be inside?' The results also showed that children performed better on the 
counterfactual task than the false belief to self task. This could suggest that 
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counterfactual thinking might be a pre-requisite for the false belief to self task. A 
similar pattem was not found in the present experiment in relation to the false 
belief to others task. It is also interesting to note that when looking at the 
counterfactual task in more detail, it appears that false belief to self task correlated 
with the negative counterfactual questions and not the affirmative counterfactual 
questions. 
Both false belief tasks positively correlated with each other. This correlation is 
probably due to the theory of mind element of the task. The results did not show 
any difference in performance between the two. This is consistent with the meta-
analysis conducted by Wellman et al. 2001) that did not find any difference either. 
The correlation between the false belief to others task, false belief to self task 
and counterfactual task could be explained by the theory of modified derivation 
reported by Peterson and Riggs (1999). They described strategies allowing us to 
make predictions about inaccessible systems. Solving the three tasks mentioned 
above involves a system that we have no real knowledge of, as for example 
Sally's false beliefs, our previous false belief or what would happen if Carol had 
taken her shoes off. This information is not readily available to us, therefore we 
need to adapt and modify the system available to us (in this case current reality) to 
infer what could happen. Peterson and Riggs (1999) reported a system called 
modified derivation (MD) as a process requiring modifications of the process of 
answer-derivation. Through this system we can ignore or impose facts. This 
system usually requires overriding conflicting facts in the database. They 
described this system of modification for the false belief to others task, false belief 
to self task and counterfactual task and they found some similarities. The tables 
they presented could be adapted as follows for the present data. 
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Table 15 Subtractlve MD over the false belief to others task 
Instruction (Sally) Ignore (The marble was moved from the basket to 
the box at t2) 
Query Where does Sally think the marble Is? 
Base-fact The marble was placed in the basket at t1. 
Norm Things generally stay where they are put 
Defeating fact The marble was moved to the box at t2 
Answer (Sally) In the basket 
Table 16 Subtractive MD over the counterfactual task 
Instruction Ignore (Carol has her shoes on) 
Query Would the floor be dirty? 
Base-fact Carol took her shoes off. 
Norm When we keep our shoes on the floor generally 
gets dirty. 
Defeating fact Carol has her shoes on. 
Default answer Floor is not dirty 
Table 17 Subtractlve MD over false belief to self task. 
Instruction Ignore (the tube contains pencils) 
Query What is in the tube? 
Base -fact It's a Smarties tube 
Norm Containers generally contain the thing indicated 
on the outside 
Defeating fact The tube contains pencils 
Answer Smarties 
In these three cases the reasoning processes are very similar: the children are 
instructed to ignore a fact embedded in reality. Children need to deal with 
conflicting representations and ignore the defeating fact. Peterson and Riggs 
(1999) argued that in order to solve a false belief task children need to understand 
other people's mental states but they also need to be able to perform modified 
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derivation. They argued that children under four years of age are not able to 
perform modified derivation and that therefore the lack of success on the false 
belief task before this age is due to that fact. 
The false belief to others tasks in this experiment did not correlate with 
contrary-to-fact syllogisms. This strongly suggested that the correlation found 
between the false belief to others task and counterfactual tasks was probably due 
to the counterfactual element of the task rather than more general reasoning 
abilities. 
For the contrary-to-fact syllogisms the twelve participants who showed a yes 
bias and the two who showed a no bias were not included in the analysis. The 
experimenter believed that children presenting a bias should be removed from the 
data set as there was no evidence that they were actually processing the 
questions. It was also believed that children who did not understand what was 
asked from them tended to answer yes, usually by nodding, to every question they 
were asked. These children would therefore have presented a yes bias. It was 
thought that the participants who presented a no bias might have answered no to 
every syllogism as a rejection of the first contrary-to-fact premise. More children 
showed a yes bias than a no bias which is consistent with what previous studies 
have found (Leevers and Harris, 1999; Leevers and Harris, 2000). These papers 
also reported excluding the participants showing a yes or a no bias from the 
analysis. 
The correlation matrix showed a positive correlation between the no contrary-
to-fact syllogisms (No C.to.F) and the false belief to self task, and the regression 
showed that no C.to.F predicted 50% of the perfonnance of the false belief to self 
task. This was the only significant correlation for the contrary-to-fact syllogisms. 
The overall score for contrary-to-fact syllogisms, and for the yes syllogisms did not 
correlate with any of the other tasks. This suggests that this task is different from 
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the other tasks Included In this study. This lack of correlations could be explained 
by looking at what needs to be ignored by the children. The modified derivation 
process (Peterson and Riggs, 1999) described previously suggested that for both 
false belief tasks and counterfactual tasks children need to ignore only one 
particular fact. The children, however, need to hold their beliefs of the real world to 
solve these tasks. With the contrary4o-fact syllogisms the children need to ignore 
the real world altogether. The first contrary-to-fact premise requires children to 
Ignore what they know about the real world. This claim was supported by 
Markovits (1995) who explained that when the children were presented with 
contrary-to-fact premises in a fantasy context their performance increased, as the 
fantasy context acted as a cognitive filter preventing access to long term memory, 
i.e. knowledge of the real world. 
Other analyses have shown that yes and no syllogisms differed significantly. 
The analyses showed that the children performed better on the syllogisms 
requiring a yes answer than the ones requiring a no answer. Although Leevers and 
Harris (1999, 2000) used both types of contrary-to-fact syllogisms they did not 
report whether there was a difference between the two types so no comparison 
can be made with their findings. A detailed analysis of the syllogisms could give an 
explanation as to why the no-syllogisms were more difficult than the yes-
syllogisms. Here are the two examples that are going to be examined. A yes-
syllogism could be: 'All cows quack, Suzie is a cow. Does Suzle quack?' In this 
case the children need to accept the contrary-to-fact premise as a new rule for this 
fantasy worid for the time it takes to solve the syllogism. The question follows from 
the first two premises and Is still contrary-to-fact. The child could also just 
substitute 'cows' in the first premise with 'Suzie' to come to the correct answer. An 
example of a no-syllogism could be: 'All cats bark, George is a cat. Does George 
meow? In this case the first and the second premises have the same role as in the 
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yes-syllogisms but this time the question does not follow. This question is not 
contrary-to-fact; it refers to the real world the children know: cats do meow in 
reality. It is therefore possible that the question introduces some confusion in that 
particular situation; the children do not know whether they should reason in a real 
world or a contrary-to-fact situation. Although syllogisms are deductive tasks, 
people tend to make empirical biases (Evans et al., 1993). This point could explain 
the correlation with the false belief to self task. It could be argued that in order to 
answer the no syllogisms children require a stronger cognitive filter as reality is 
stated in the final question. It could be suggested that children who can answer the 
no-syllogisms correctly have a better ability to deal with contradictory 
representations and perform better on the false belief to self task. To some extent 
the false belief to self task can be seen as more embedded in the real world and 
real world knowledge. In the real world a Smartie container contains Smarties and 
not pencils. It is different in some respect from the false belief to others task and 
the counterfactual tasks. In the Sally and Ann task, for example, the ball can 
potentially be in either the box or the basket. Both possibilities have same 
probability of happening in the real world. The no-syllogisms and the false belief to 
self might have higher inhibitory demands as they ask the children in the first case 
to inhibit their knowledge of the real world while a question consistent with reality 
has just been asked to then (eg: Does George [cat] meow?), and in the second 
case they also need to inhibit their knowledge of the real world. 
In order to check this hypothesis regarding the no-syllogisms and the 
necessity for a stronger cognitive filter the no-syllogisms could be worded 
differently. The first two premises could be identical and the question could be 
'Does George moo?' It would still require a no-answer but it is now contrary-to-
fact. The nature of the no-questions can also be questionable in a different way; 
Does 'bark' mean 'not meow*? The experiments are designed having in mind that 
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'bark' is exclusive of 'meov/. For example in the syllogism 'All snow is black. Len is 
a snowman made of snow. Is Len white?' the question implies that white is the 
equivalent of not-black. However, some syllogisms are more ambiguous. For 
example the question 'Does Susie moo?' uses the verb 'moo' as exclusive of 
'bark', but it could be possible that a cow could quack and moo as they are 
different actions that could happen at different times. It would therefore be less 
confusing to use syllogisms were the two possibilities of mutually exclusive. 
Looking at the relationship between other types of tasks it is interesting to note 
that no correlation was found between counterfactual reasoning and contrary-to-
fact syllogisms. Although these two tasks involve suppressing knowledge of 
current reality and imagining a different situation they involve two different set of 
cognitive abilities. It seems that counterfactual reasoning and syllogistic reasoning 
are different types of reasoning. 
This study also included a memory measure, the CNRep. The CNRep 
positively correlated with counterfactual tasks and false belief to others tasks, but 
not very strongly. For both these tasks memory seems to be an important factor as 
the children need to remember what the situation was like at the beginning and it 
is now or what it could be now. A very small and non significant correlation was 
found with the false belief to self task. No correlation was found with contrary-to-
fact syllogisms. This could be explained by the fact that the main ability contrary-
to-fact syllogisms require is not so much remembering information but being able 
to suppress knowledge of the real world. 
In this experiment theory of mind was assessed using two different types of 
task: the false belief to self task and false belief to others task. These types of task 
could be thought of as being equivalent as they are both supposed to evaluate 
whether an individual can attribute false beliefs and as they seem equally difficult 
(as reported by Wellman, 2001). They are to some extent related as they did 
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correlate with each other in our study. They both involve attributing false belief and 
suppressing one's knowledge of the current state of affairs. In the false belief to 
others task, the children need to suppress this knowledge, for example, that the 
marble really is in the box, rather than in the basket. In the false belief to self task 
children need to suppress their knowledge that there is a pencil a Smartie box 
rather than Smarties. Both also correlated with the counterfactual task, suggesting 
that they include a counterfactual element, but they are also different in some 
respects as they correlated in different ways with the contrary-to-fact syllogisms. 
In conclusion, this experiment showed an interesting pattern. It confirmed a 
possible association between false belief to other tasks, false belief to self tasks 
and counterfactual thinking but suggested a dissociation between these tasks and 
contrary-to-fact syllogistic reasoning. This experiment showed that the correlation 
between false belief tasks and counterfactual tasks was probably due to the 
counterfactual element of the tasks rather than general reasoning abilities. The 
results also showed a link between contrary4o-fact syllogisms (especially the ones 
requesting a no answer) and the false belief to self task. This study also 
highlighted the difference between counterfactual thinking and contrary-to-fact 
thinking. This difference will be studied further in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5 
E X P E R I M E N T 4: THE E F F E C T OF CONTEXT ON 
COU NTERFACTUALS AND CONTRARY-TO-FACT 
S Y L L O G I S M S 
1 Introduction 
The previous chapter investigated the relationship between several 
cognitive tasks: false belief to self tasks, false belief to others tasks, counterfactual 
tasks, contrary-to-fact syllogisms and verbal memory. The results from the 
experiment showed a link between false belief to others tasks, false belief to self 
tasks and counterfactual thinking on one side, and another link between false 
belief to self tasks and contrary-to-fact no-syllogisms on the other side. A link was 
also found between false belief to self tasks and contrary-to-fact syllogisms (no) 
which suggested that both tasks involved similar cognitive processes; both these 
tasks could require a high inhibition. On the other hand, the findings also showed 
that counterfactual thinking and contrary-to-fact syllogisms did not correlate which 
suggested that different cognitive processes underlie each type of reasoning. The 
purpose of the present chapter was therefore to investigate this difference further. 
These two tasks differ in two respects: their structure and their content. In 
the particular case of the previous chapter and the present one the syllogisms 
have a contrary-to-fact content whereas the counterfactual tasks have a factually 
true content. Contrary-to-fact syllogisms, as defined in chapter 1 and chapter 4, 
include premises whose content is factually false (Markovits and Vachon, 1989). 
The content of these contrary-to-fact premises runs against the participants' 
beliefs and their knowledge of the real world. These premises can be statements 
such as 'all cats bark* (Dias and Harris. 1998) or 'if an object is placed in boiling 
water then it will become cold' (Simoneau and Markovits. 2003). According to 
Markovits (1989) reasoning with contrary-to-fact premises implies two abilities. 
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First of al l , the children need to be able to accept the contrary-to-fact premises as 
a basis for reasoning without interference from their empirical knowledge, and 
secondly children need to be able to reason formally. He explained that most 
mistakes children made in their study were inversion mistakes where they used 
their real world knowledge rather than their reasoning skills to solve the task. 
Contrary-to-fact syllogisms have been used in many studies with children to 
assess the impact of content on reasoning and it was found that children had 
difficulty correctly solving these tasks because of the unfamiliar content (see 
chapter 1). This difficulty with contrary-to-fact content was found with preschool 
children (eg: Leevers and Harris, 2000), but also with teenagers up to the age of 
18 (Markovits and Vachon, 1989). One of the first research papers on contrary-to-
fact premises was published by Hawkins, Pea, Click and Scribner (1984). They 
presented the children with syllogistic problems with three different types of 
content: fantasy, congruent or incongruent with practical knowledge. Their findings 
confirmed that young children can reason deductively and also showed that 
problem content has an effect on the reasoning performance of the children. When 
children were asked to solve contrary-to-fact problems their performance was 
lower than when they tried to solve problems congruent with their practical 
knowledge of the world. Subsequently the effect of contrary-to-fact premises has 
been studied in two main different reasoning paradigms: with syllogisms (e.g.: 
Dias and Harris, 1988) and with conditional problems (e.g.: Markovits and Vachon, 
1989); with many of these studies focusing mainly on the potential factors that 
could facilitate this type of reasoning. The main factor that has been studied is the 
effect of the context in which the contrary-to-fact premises are presented on 
performance (e.g.: Dias and Harris, 1990). It has been found that a variety of 
different contexts, especially fantasy context, could improve performance, and two 
main hypotheses offering an explanation for this effect have been presented in the 
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literature. Leevers and Harris (1999; 2000) argued that a fantasy context, as other 
non standard contexts, would give useful pragmatic clues to the children 
encouraging them to accept the contrary-to-fact premise as a basis for reasoning, 
whereas Markovlts (e.g.: Markovits, 1995, Markovits et al., 1996) offered a more 
cognitively orientated explanation. He suggested that a fantasy context would act 
as a cognitive filter reducing access to long-term memory and therefore to 
empirical knowledge then preventing inversion mistakes. The data from which both 
these theories were constructed is now going to be reviewed. 
DIas and Harris (1988) started this line of work on instructions, and pragmatic 
clues in particular, by giving children syllogisms including facts agreeing with their 
knowledge or facts contrary to their knowledge of the world. They used two 
different conditions to present the tasks: the verbal condition or the play condition. 
In the verbal group the children were read aloud standard instructions introducing 
the syllogisms, whereas in the play group condition the contrary-to-fact premise 
was acted out with toys. The children were then asked to answer the syllogisms 
and justify their answer. They found that children in the play group gave more 
accurate answers than in the verbal group for the contrary-to-fact syllogisms, and 
that they also provided more theoretical justifications and less empirical 
justifications for their answers. The play condition was a good help for the children 
when answering those questions. 
Intonation was studied as a make-believe clue by Dias and Harris (1990). 
They presented contrary-to-fact syllogisms to the children in either a make-believe 
intonation where the experimenter introduced dramatic emphasis into her voice, or 
a normal matter-of-fact intonation. The results showed that using a make-believe 
intonation increased the number of correct answers and theoretical justifications. 
In the same experiment Dias and Harris (1990) asked the children to make a 
picture In their head of the contrary-to-fact premises, for example 'a pig that flies'. 
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They found as previously that using imagery increased the number of correct 
answers and the number of theoretical justifications. The effect of imagery has 
been further studied by several authors. 
Leevers and Harris (1999) investigated whether the influence of pragmatic 
clues would carry over in time. They presented contrary-to-fact syllogisms in four 
different contexts: basic, thinking, imagery, or imagery and cognition. The basic 
group was a standard context without any further instructions. In the thinking group 
the children were encouraged to think about the premises. In the imagery group 
the children were asked to form a mental image of the premises. Finally in the 
imagery and metacognition group the children were encouraged to use imagery 
and were told that using imagery would be beneficial. The children in the three 
Instructed groups performed better than children in the basic group and the effect 
carried over for a week. This showed again the positive effect of instructions in 
general and imagery in particular. 
Contrary-to-fact syllogisms have also been studied with clinical populations. 
Leevers and Harris (2000) replicated their previous experiment with children with 
autism, children with learning disabilities and typically developing children matched 
for verbal receptive abilities by using the TROG. The children were tested under 
two conditions: the basic group and the instruction group where children were 
asked to use imagery. The results confirmed that the use of imagery improved 
performance for all the three groups, and that this effect carried over for 2 or 3 
weeks. However, the children with autism still performed at chance level and, 
instead of giving consistent logically or empirical justifications they used an 
unsystematic mixture of justification. The children with autism did not give more 
logical responses, in contrast to the other groups, and they tended to display a yes 
bias. Scott et al. (1999) studied the effect of context on contrary-to-fact syllogisms 
with autistic children as well and compared them to two control groups matched for 
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verbal mental age: typically developing children and children with moderate 
leaming difficulties. The syllogisms were presented either in a standard context or 
in a context where the children were asked to imagine the contrary-to-fact premise 
in their head and were encouraged to use their imagination. Both control groups 
performed as expected and improved their performance in the imagery condition. 
However, the children with autism performed more poorly in that condition. The 
authors suggested that these results could be due to the fact that children with 
autism have difficulty pretending. This could also be due to the fact children with 
autism tend to show a 'yes' bias, as shown by Leevers and Harris (2000), and that 
in this experiment all the syllogisms used required a 'yes' answer. 
The last type of instructions that will be discussed is fantasy context. Dias and 
Harris (1990) presented the contrary-to-fact syllogisms to children in two different 
contexts: 'the planet setting' and 'the non-planet setting'. In the planet setting the 
children were told that the experimenter was from a different planet where 
everything is different and he is going to tell them some stories about this planet. 
This context could be assimilated to a fantasy context. The 'non-planet' setting is 
just a standard context. The results showed that setting the story on a different 
planet increased the number of correct answers and theoretical justifications. 
All the studies reported so far consistently showed that non standard 
instructions such as play (Dias and Harris, 1988), make belief intonation (Dias and 
Harris, 1990), imagery (Dias and Harris, 1990; Leevers and Harris, 1999; Leevers 
and Harris, 2000; Scott et al., 1999), and fantasy (Dias and Harris, 1990) improved 
children's performance with typically developing children as well as children with 
learning disabilities. Leevers and Harris (1999; 2000) argued that this effect 
occurred because these instructions provided a pragmatic clue regarding the 
study. They signalled to the children that they needed to reason with the contrary-
to-fact premises. The children were no longer confused by the situation; they no 
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longer wondered whether they were tested on their reasoning skills or their 
knowledge of the world. Harris (2000) claimed that non-standard instructions act 
as a cue to encourage the children to focus on the initial contrary-to-fact premise 
leading them to accept this premise as a basis for reasoning. He supported his 
argument by saying that the effect of instructions was shown on contrary4o-fact 
premises as well as unfamiliar premises (Dias and Harris, 1988) as well as made-
up premises (Leevers and Harris, 1999) where no interference of real world 
knowledge could have interfered. 
Markovits and Vachon (1989) started another trend of studies with reasoning 
tasks including contrary-to-fact premises. They studied fantasy context in relation 
to contrary-to-fact premises included in conditional problems with children older 
than the ones tested in the all the previous experiments discussed. They found 
that children had difficulties with these tasks and tended to make many errors. 
They described the errors children made with contrary4o-fact reasoning problems 
as 'inversion errors'. These errors are made when children have difficulty in 
accepting empirically false premises without interference from their real world 
knowledge. Their hypothesis was then that if the contrary-to-fact problems were 
presented in a fantasy context then there would be less interference from empirical 
knowledge as the children would be able to construct a more coherent 
representation of the premises. Children should be able to accept contrary-to-fact 
premises more easily if they are set in a fantasy context. They tested children 
ages 5 and 7 using conditional problems including a contrary-to-fact premise: the 
problems were either set up in a simple or a fantasy context. In the fantasy context 
the children were told about an imaginary country where curious things happened. 
The results showed that again fantasy context improved performance for both age 
groups. They concluded that presenting contrary-to-fact premises in a fantasy 
context helps the children accept the premises without interference from the real 
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world. This supports the hypothesis that accepting contrary-to-fact premises 
'involves creating a coherent representation that does not Incorporate empirical 
knowledge' (p.410). In order to explain this effect in more depth Markovits 
conducted a series of studies including different types of reasoning problems. 
Markovits (1995) conducted an experiment with even older children, aged 
from 12 to 14, and presented them with contrary-to-fact conditional problems in 
either a realistic or a fantasy context. The children were presented with either 
modus pollens (MP) problems or affirmation of the consequent (AC) problems. 
The results showed, as previously, that fantasy context reduced the number of 
inversion errors, therefore reduced inference from empirical knowledge. Markovits 
(1995) explained that a fantasy context acts as a cognitive filter reducing access to 
long term memory. Subsequently the participants are less likely to produce a 
complete model of the major premises and It therefore reduces the number of 
correct answers to the invalid form (Affirmation of the consequent). 
In order to investigate further the hypothesis that fantasy context acts a 
cognitive filter Markovits et al. (1996) Investigated the effect of fantasy context on 
factually true premises. They tested 200 schoolchildren from the age of 7 to 13. 
The children watched some videotapes telling them stories. One story was set in a 
standard context and the other story in a fantasy context. Four conditional 
questions were asked of the children (MP, MT, AC, DC). The results showed that 
context had no effect on MP and MT, and that fantasy context made the task 
significantly more difficult for AC and DC, the uncertain forms. The results also 
showed that the pattern of justifications for MP was different depending on the 
context. In the standard context the children gave more justifications involving 
knowledge. This Is consistent with Markovits' theory that fantasy context acts as a 
cognitive filter blocking access to long term memory. This study showed that 
presenting true and familiar premises in a fantasy context reduces the children's 
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performance on uncertain logical forms (AC and DA). It seems that a fantasy 
context limits how children use their real-world knowledge when solving reasoning 
problems (Markovits et al . . 1986). 
Markovits' hypothesis regarding a cognitive filter could be tested using 
counterfactual tasks. In order to correctly answer a counterfactual task children 
need to undo an event and imagine what the present situation could be. In the 
context of this thesis the counterfactual task included only factually true premises. 
Solving a counterfactual task requires accessing knowledge of the world. For 
example in one the scenarios used in the previous chapter the counterfactual 
questions was 'What if Carol had taken her shoes off, would the floor be dirty?' In 
order to answer this question the children need to imagine that Carol took her 
shoes off but they need to access their knowledge of the real world, in that case 
they need to know that when children do not wear dirty shoes the floor stays clean. 
If fantasy context acts as a cognitive filter reducing access to long term memory it 
therefore implies that counterfactual tasks presented in a fantasy context will be 
more difficult for the children. 
The aim of the present experiment was to investigate the difference between 
contrary-to-fact syllogistic reasoning and counterfactual problems, and to explore 
the role of fantasy context on each on these tasks in relation to the cognitive 
demands of each task. According to the literature discussed above we can predict 
that fantasy context will facilitate contrary-to-fact syllogistic reasoning (e.g.: Dias 
and Harris, 1989; Leevers and Hams, 2000). The fantasy context should act as a 
cognitive filter and help children reason in isolation of their real world knowledge. 
For the same reason the effect of fantasy should be different on counterfactual 
reasoning. In order to solve a counterfactual question children need to ignore one 
element of the state of affairs but still need to use their real world knowledge, 
therefore it is predicted that it will increase the difficulty of the task if a cognitive 
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filter prevents them from accessing real world knowledge. This experiment should 
provide more knowledge regarding the difference between these two types of 
tasks. It should help us understand why they did not seem to correlate in the 
previous experiment and why they correlated with different tasks. 
2 Method 
2.1 Participants 
Seventy three children, including 47 girls and 26 boys, took part in this 
experiment. Forty one of them attended a nursery and 32 a reception class in 
Plymouth. 
The children were aged from 3;3 to 5;8 (mean: 4;7 - standard deviation: 8 
months). 
2.2 Material 
The children were presented with four counterfactual scenarios and four 
contrary-to-fact syllogisms either in a standard or a fantasy context. The context 
was counterbalanced between participants with 37 participants tested in the 
fantasy context and 36 in the standard context. The counterfactual scenarios and 
the contrary-to-fact syllogisms were randomised for each participant by using a 
randomisation software (www.randomizer.com) 
2.2.1 Counterfactual scenarios 
The counterfactual scenarios were acted out with puppets and toys and were 
very similar to the ones designed by Harris et al. (1996). Just a few details were 
changed because of physical constraints. This is one example of the scenarios 
acted out in the standard context: 
I'm going to tell you some stones. Listen carefully and then I'll ask you 
some questions. Are you ready? This is the first one. 
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One day in that forest this tree was standing up like that. (The 
experimenter puts one small plastic tree standing up on the table). But 
guess what! There was a storm and the wind blew the tree over like this, 
(The experimenter knocks the tree down). 
The children were then asked two control questions: the Now Control 
Question in relation to the final situation (e.g.: 'Is the tree standing up now?') and 
the Before Control Question in relation to the initial situation (e.g.: Was the tree 
standing up before?'). Finally the children were asked the test question (E.g.: 
'What if the wind had not come - would the tree be standing up?). 
Three other similar scenarios using different props were used (Appendix J). 
Altogether two episodes requested yes/no answers and the other two a selective 
pointing answer. Two of the test questions were negative (e.g.: What if the wind 
had not come, would the tree be standing up?) and the other two positive (e.g.: 
What it Lucy had taken her shoes off - would the floor be dirty?) 
One test question required a no answer, one a yes answer and the last two a 
selective pointing (i.e.: the children needed to point to a particular location to 
answer the question) in order to avoid any bias in the answers. 
In the fantasy context the structure stayed the same although the introduction 
differed and was as follows: 
/ now want you to imagine that a wizard have given you a magic carpet. 
He tells you that the carpet will fly you to lots of mysterious worlds in the 
sky. He also says that when you reach these strange places there will be 
someone there to meet you and tell you about the place where they live. 
So you get on the carpet and it flies off into the clouds. 
The introduction to each scenario was also slightly different. The first sentence 
reinforced the fantasy context. The example given above was a follows in the 
fantasy context: 
You fly over the rivers and you arrive in an enchanted wood. You meet a 
little boy who tells you that in this forest all the trees can walk like this 
(makes the tree walk). One day in that forest this tree was standing up 
like that. But guess what! There was a stonn and the wind blew the tree 
over like this. 
The actual scenarios and questions were the same as in the standard context. 
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2.2.2 Contrary-to-fact syllogisms 
The contrary-to-facl syllogisms were the same as the ones used by Leevers 
and Harris (2000). Four of the syllogisms were selected. In order to avoid any 
systematic yes or no answers two syllogisms were correctly answered by 
affirmation (yes problems) and the other two by denial (no problems). 
The syllogisms were as follows: 
1) All cows quack. Suzie is a cow. Does Suzie quack? (yes) 
2) All zebras have spots on their back. Alex is a zebra. Is Alex spotty? (yes) 
3) All snow is black. Len is a snowman made of snow. Is Len white? (no) 
4) All hedgehogs feel soft. Harry is a hedgehog. Does Han^ feel prickly? (no) 
The contrary-to-fact syllogisms were presented either in a standard context or 
a fantasy context. The standard context just set the scene, using the same . 
introduction as Leevers and Harris (1999) as follows: 
'Now we're going to think about little stories together. Some of the things 
in the stories may sound a bit funny, but we are going to think about what 
things would be like it all the things in the stories were true. ' 
In the fantasy context the introduction was the same as the one reported 
above for the counterfactual scenarios. 
2.3 Design 
A mixed design was used to investigate a possible interaction between the 
two types of tasks (counterfactual and contrary-to-fact) and context 
(standard/fantasy). The tasks were within participant and the context between 
participants. The children were presented with four counterfactual task and four 
contrary-to-fact syllogisms. The tasks were randomised. Half of the participants 




The participants were tested individually at the school or the nursery they 
attended over one session lasting between 10 to 15 minutes. 
3 Results 
The data of the counterfactual problems and the contrary-to-fact syllogisms 
can be analysed in two different ways according to whether the participants who 
did not answer the control questions of the counterfactual scenarios correctly or 
showed a bias when answering the contrary-to-fact syllogisms are included or not 
in the analysis. The first part of this results section, as in the previous chapter, will 
include all the data for the counterfactual questions regardless of whether children 
answered the control questions correctly but will exclude the data from the 
participants who showed a yes or a no bias when answering contrary-to-fact 
syllogisms. 
The score for each participant was the total number of right answers for the 
counterfactual scenarios or the contrary-to-fact syllogisms. Participants could 
score a maximum of 4 points for each type of task. The average score and the 
standard deviation were computed for each type of task in each context: 
counterfactual scenarios in standard context, counterfactual scenarios in fantasy 
context, contrary-to-fact syllogisms in standard context, and contrary-to-fact 
syllogisms in fantasy context. The results are presented in Table 18. 
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Tab le 18. M e a n and s tandard dev ia t ion of the scores for each type of 
tasks in the two di f ferent contexts . 
Standard context Fantasy context 
(n= 28) (n=27) 
Counterfactual tasks 2.28 (1.48) 1.77 (1.15) 
Contrary-to-fact syllogisms .85 (.75) 1.26 (1.19) 
A mixed design ANOVA 2*2 (context * task) was computed and showed a 
significant main effect of task, F (1 , 71) = 19.23, p<.01. 
The test of within-subject contrast showed that this difference was statistically 
highly significant, F(1 , 71) = 19.23, p<.01. The results suggested that the 
participants found the counterfactual task easier that the contrary-to-fact 
syllogisms independently of the context. 
The test of between-subjects showed that this effect was not significant, F (1 , 
71) = .054, p = .817. There was no effect of context on its own. 
The statistical analysis showed a significant Interaction between task and 
context, F (1 , 71) = 4.20, p<.05. This result Indicated that the context did not have 
the same effect on each type of task. It appears that fantasy context facilitates 
contrary-to-fact reasoning but increases the difficulty of counterfactual reasoning. 
As explained at the beginning, the data can be analysed in a different way by 
excluding the participants who did not answer correctly at least one control 
question. The results for the interaction did not differ in any meaningful way. These 
results are presented in appendix K. The interaction was not strictly significant with 
this reduced sample. This difference might be due to the lack of power when the 
sample size Is reduced. 
The tasks were also studied individually and the results were as follows. 
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The previous chapter showed that children found the yes syllogisms easier 
than the no syllogisms so the same comparison was examined in the present 
experiment. The mean and the standard deviation were calculated for each type of 
syllogism and the results are presented in Table 19. 
Table 19.Means and standard deviation for yes and no syllogisms. 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Yes Syllogisms .56 .65 
No Syllogisms .56 .71 
The means were identical and the standard deviations were similar. This 
experiment did not identify a difference between the yes and the no syllogisms, 
which was not the case in the previous experiment. 
The difference in performance between affirmative and negative 
counterfactuals was also Investigated. The mean and the standard deviation were 
computed for each type of counterfactual questions and the results are presented 
in Table 20. 




Affirmative Counterfactual .90 .74 
Negative Counterfactual 1.01 .69 
A paired sample t-test showed that this difference was not significant, t(73) = 
1.380, p = .172. This experiment did not identify any difference in performance 
between negative and affirmative counterfactual questions. 
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The previous chapter did not identify a correlation between counterfactual 
tasks and contrary-to-fact syllogism, so in order to compare the results with the 
present experiment some correlations were computed. The correlation matrix is 
presented in Table 21. 
Table 2 1 . Correlations. 




AffC.F. .892** 1 
(74) (74) 
Neg. C.F. .875** .562** 1 
(74) (74) (74) 
C.to.F -.015 -.048 .022 1 
(55) (55) (55) (55) 
C.to.F -.083 -.070 -.077 .757** 1 
(yes) (55) (55) (55) (55) (55) 
C.to.F .171 .135 .170 .780** .435** 1 
(no) (55) (55) (55) (55) (55) (55) 
'Significance value <.05 
** Significance value <.0/ 
No correlations were identified between counterfactual reasoning and 
contrary-to-fact syllogisms. However, on this occasion, there was a significant 
positive correlation between contrary-to-fact (yes) and contrary-to-fact (no), r=.435, 
p<.01. 
4 Discussion 
The aim of the present experiment was to investigate the effect of fantasy 
context on contrary-to-fact syllogistic reasoning and counterfactual reasoning. It 
was hypothesised that fantasy context would not have the same effect on both 
types of task. It was expected that it would improve performance on contrary-to-
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fact syllogisms and worsen performance on counterfactual scenarios. It was 
predicted that fantasy context would act as a cognitive filter preventing children 
from accessing their real world knowledge therefore it would help them solve 
contrary-to-fact syllogisms are they are a deductive tasks, but it would increase the 
difficult of counterfactual tasks and children need to access their knowledge of the 
world to solve them. 
The results showed a significant interaction between task and context 
suggesting that context influenced performance on these two types of tasks 
differently: fantasy context improved performance on contrary-to-fact syllogisms 
but decreased performance on counterfactual scenarios. 
The effect of fantasy context on contrary4o-fact syllogisms found in this 
experiment confirmed the hypothesis that had been made. This result was also 
consistent with previous findings reported in the literature. The findings were 
similar to Dias and Harris" (1990). Dias and Harris (1990) presented contrary-to-
fact syllogisms to preschool children in a fantasy context. They told them that the 
stories were taking place on a different planet where everything was different. 
Their results showed that fantasy context improved performance on contrary-to-
fact syllogisms. The children showed fewer empirical biases and gave more logical 
justifications for their answers. In Dias and Harris' (1990) experiment the 
participants' mean age was 4 years 9 months, which was very similar to the mean 
age of the children in the present experiment (mean age: 4 years 7 months). They 
argued that the planet setting allowed children to reason in another world where 
the contrary4o-fact premises might be true; that it helped the children accept the 
contrary-to-fact premises as a basis for reasoning. 
Markovits also conducted a series of studies with contrary-to-fact premises 
but in a different context, as the contrary-to-fact premises were included in causal 
scenarios rather than syllogisms, and they tested children from a different age 
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range: older children and teenagers. Markovits consistently found that presenting 
contrary-to-fact scenarios in a fantasy context helped children improve their 
performance (e.g.: Markovits, 1995; Markovits and Vachon, 1989; Markovits et al., 
1996). 
Two theories have been presented in the literature to try to explain the positive 
effect of fantasy context on contrary-to-fact reasoning tasks. Leevers and Harris 
(2000) provided an explanation relating to instructions in general. They explained 
that instructions provide a pragmatic clarification regarding the experimenter's 
intention, with fantasy context being just one particular type of instruction. 
Instructions would help children understand that the experimenter wanted them to 
act as if the contrary-to-fact premises were true and then solve the syllogisms 
within that particular framework. However, Markovits (1995) argued for a different 
theory suggesting that the fantasy context acts as a cognitive filter that prevents 
access to long term memory. The children then cannot access their knowledge of 
the real world as easily so they make fewer empirical mistakes. In order to 
successfully solve contrary-to-fact syllogisms children need to ignore their 
knowledge of the real world and reason with only the information presented to 
them in the syllogisms. Syllogisms are deductive tasks that do not require using 
knowledge about the world, whether they are contrary-to-fact or true-to-fact. All the 
information necessary to solve the task is provided in the premises. 
The interaction between context and task showed however, that context did 
not have the same effect on counterfactual tasks as it had on contrary-to-fact 
syllogisms. It seems that fantasy context decreases performance on 
counterfactual scenarios. In the present experiment children were presented with 
true-to-fact counterfactual scenarios, half of them were set in a standard context 
and the other half in a fantasy context, and they performed more poorly in the 
second condition. It is interesting to analyse these findings in relation to the two 
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theories mentioned above about fantasy context. Leevers and Harris (1999; 2000) 
argued that instructions help clarify the experimenters' intention. The 
counterfactual scenarios being true-to-fact a fantasy context would not really bring 
any clarification regarding the experimenter's intention. It could be argued that it 
might actually confuse the children who are then uncertain about whether the task 
should be solved using their empirical knowledge or not. This hypothesis could 
therefore be consistent with the finding that fantasy context make true-to-fact 
counterfactuals more difficult to solve for children. 
The second possible explanation, Markovits' (1995) cognitive filter theory, 
could also bring a convincing insight into this effect and does seem consistent with 
the present findings. Markovits (1995) explained that a potential cognitive filter 
would reduce access to long term memory and therefore to knowledge about the 
real world. The cognitive filter would help children to avoid making empirical 
mistakes and would help them reason with only the information presented in the 
reasoning task. This hypothesis is consistent with the results found for the 
contrary-to-fact syllogism but how would it apply to the counterfactual tasks? In 
order to solve a counterfactual scenario, children need to ignore one event and 
imagine an alternative present to the actual one. In the first scenario for example 
the test question was 'What if Lucy had taken her shoes off - Would the floor be 
dirty?'. The children need to suspend their knowledge that Lucy kept her shoes on 
and imagine the consequence of taking her shoes off. They need to suppress one 
causal relationship (e.g.: keeping dirty shoes on and making the floor dirty) but 
hold all the other causal relationships of the real world constant. They need to 
access real world knowledge to know what would happen if Lucy did not leave her 
shoes on. The cognitive filter provided by the fantasy context would then prevent 
children from accessing this necessary knowledge to solve the task, and therefore 
the children would not perform as well. The data on the counterfactual tasks 
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presented in a fantasy context seems to support Markovits' (1995) hypothesis 
regarding the cognitive filter. 
In summary in order to solve contrary-to-fact syllogisms children need to 
suspend their knowledge of the real world whereas in order to solve a 
counterfactual scenario they only need to suppress one particular event but refer 
to their knowledge of the world. The amount of knowledge to be suppressed could 
maybe explain the difference in performance found between these two tasks. The 
results did show that there was a main effect of task and that children performed 
better on counterfactual tasks than on contrary-to-fact syllogisms. However, it is 
difficult in this experiment to know whether this difference in performance was due 
only to the type of tasks (counterfactual scenarios versus syllogisms) or the 
contrary-to-fact element of the syllogisms, as all the counterfactual scenarios were 
true-to-fact and all the syllogisms were contrary-to-fact. For future research it 
would be interesting to compare performance on counterfactual scenarios and 
syllogisms controlling for contrary-to-fact and true4o-fact premises. The effect of 
fantasy could also be studied systematically in this context. Children could be 
presented with contrary-to-fact syllogisms and true-to-fact syllogisms in a fantasy 
context and explore the effect of context. The contrary-to-fact syllogisms could be 
similar to the ones used in this experience and an example of a true-to-fact 
syllogism could be as follows: 'All cows moo, Suzie is a cow, does Suzie moo.' 
Counterfactual thinking could be studied in the same way. True-to-fact 
counterfactual scenarios could be similar to the ones used in the present 
experiment and an example of a contrary-to-fact counterfactual scenario could be 
as follows: 'I'm going to tell you a story that may sound a little bit strange. I would 
like you to imagine that everything in the story is true. When Carol walks in the 
house with muddy shoes it cleans the floor. One day the floor is really dirty. Carol 
comes home and she doesn't take her shoes off. She comes inside and makes the 
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floor alt clean with her dirty shoes.' The children could then be asked the before 
control question (Was the floor clean before?) and the now control question (Is the 
floor clean now?). Finally a counterfactual question could be asked: What if Carol 
had taken her shoes off? Would the floor be dirty? The same scenario could also 
be presented in fantasy context elaborating on the magical world where Carole 
lives, and telling the children that wizards and fairies live in this magical world and 
that everything in that worid is different. This design would therefore allow us to 
compare counterfactual thinking and syllogistic reasoning and would also allow us 
to study the effect of fantasy context on contrary-to-fact premises on two different 
types of tasks. If Markovits' hypothesis is true some predictions can be made. As 
syllogisms are deductive tasks in nature not requiring any knowledge of the real 
worid it should not have an impact of the true-to-fact syllogisms. Regarding the 
counterfactual scenario it can be hypothesised than including a contrary-to-fact 
element (e.g.; muddy shoes clean the floor) would increase the difficulty of the 
counterfactual scenario in comparison to a standard one. In order to solve this 
particular scenario children need to know what the causal relation is between 
'muddy shoes' and 'cleanliness of the floor*. In the present case the elements 
given in the scenario conflict with real worid knowledge, therefore to succeed 
children need to suspend their real world knowledge. Logically it could then be 
predicted that a fantasy context, which would act as a cognitive filter, would help 
them solve this task. 
The present experiment provided some other results that are worth 
considering. First, there was still a clear lack of correlation between counterfactual 
tasks and contrary-to-fact syllogisms which replicated the findings reported in 
chapter 4. This confirms that contrary-to-fact syllogistic reasoning and 
counterfactual reasoning require different cognitive abilities. As mentioned above 
at this stage is it difficult to know if this difference is due to the task itself or the 
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nature of the content. Further research (as explained above) could help clarify this 
point. 
Secondly, no difference in performance was found between contrary-to-fact 
syllogisms requiring a yes answer and contrary-to-fact syllogisms requiring a no 
answer. The previous experiment had shown that children found no-syllogisms 
more difficult than yes-syllogisms. In the present experiment, children only had to 
answer two of each whereas in the previous one they answered four of each. It 
might be necessary to increase the number of data points collected to find this 
difference again. 
Thirdly, no difference in performance between negative counterfactual 
questions and affirmative counterfactual questions was found. This confirmed the 
findings reported in chapter four but not the finding reported in chapters 2 and 3. 
This particular difference between the experiments could be explained the nature 
of task. This point will be discussed in more detail in the final discussion of this 
thesis. 
In conclusion, it seems that contrary-to-fact syllogism and counterfactual 
scenarios require different skills, but further research is needed to investigate 
whether this difference is imputable to the nature of the tasks or their content. This 
experiment also showed that fantasy context does not influence these tasks in the 
same way and the finding supported Markovits' claim that fantasy context acts as 





The following discussion will include three main sections. The first section will 
review the main goals of this research. The second section will review the four 
experiments; their hypotheses, their main findings; as well as the links between 
them. These findings will be discussed in relation to the previous literature. The 
third section will discuss the applications of the findings and some ideas for further 
research. 
2 Main goals 
The main goal of this thesis was to investigate children's reasoning abilities, 
especially their abilities to solve counterfactual tasks. This study looked at three 
mains aspects of counterfactual thinking: the nature of counterfactual thinking 
itself, its relation with the false belief tasks and how a fantasy context can 
influence children's ability to solve the tasks. 
The very first goal at the beginning of the thesis was to investigate the 
influence of the polarity of counterfactual questions, that is to say the difference 
between affirmative and negative counterfactual questions. The work then 
concentrated on the investigation of children's reasoning abilities in relation to the 
false belief task. The false belief to others task, such as the Sally and Ann task 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1985) or the Maxi task (Wimmer and Perner, 1983), was 
designed to evaluate children's understanding of mental states, but its 
components have been studied in more depth recently. One of the main aims of 
this thesis was to investigate the components of the false belief to others task in 
relation to reasoning, especially to counterfactual reasoning, as Riggs et al. (1998) 
claimed that there was a counterfactual element embedded in the false belief task. 
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This line of work has extended to the study of the false belief to self task such as 
the Smartie task (Perner et al., 1987). There is a consensus in the literature that 
children can pass the false belief task from the age of four, therefore for this thesis 
it was decided to study typically developing children from the ages of 3 to 5. 
Finally, this thesis looked at the influence of context, in particular fantasy context, 
on children's ability to solve a counterfactual task. 
3 A review of the studies conducted in this thesis 
This thesis consists of four experiments each studying counterfactual 
reasoning and false belief tasks in relation to each other or in isolation. 
The first experimental study followed directly from Riggs et al.'s (1998) work 
on the relationship between counterfactual thinking and the false belief task. This 
experiment studied the difference between counterfactual thinking and future 
hypothetical thinking and investigated the effect of negative versus affirmative 
polarity on the test questions. Riggs et al. (1998) argued that the correlation they 
found between counterfactual thinking and the false belief task was due to the 
counterfactual element rather than the conditional element of the counterfactual 
tasks. They made this claim after showing that counterfactual thinking differed 
from future hypothetical thinking, as the children seemed to find the former more 
difficult than the latter. However, a confound could be identified in their experiment 
as all the counterfactual questions were negative and all the future hypothetical 
questions were affirmative. Work previously conducted on the processes involved 
in counterfactual thinking in adults claimed that counterfactual thinking and 
hypothetical thinking did not differ (Evans and Over, 1996), and some work using 
negated conditional questions showed that negation decreased reasoners' 
performance (Evans, 1998). Therefore, the first experiment of this thesis 
compared performance on negative counterfactual questions, affirmative 
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counterfactual questions, affirmative future hypothetical questions and negative 
future hypothetical questions. Very similar tasks to the ones designed by Riggs et 
al. (1998) were used. The tasks required children to physically classify objects into 
three different boxes according to one of their physical properties (e.g.: shape, 
colour...) and then answer a test question. The results showed that when 
controlling for negative versus affirmative questions there was no difference in 
performance between counterfactual thinking and future hypothetical thinking: the 
children performed at the same level on affirmative counterfactual questions and 
affimiative future hypothetical questions. The results also confirmed that negation 
increased the difficulty of the questions: children performed better on affirmative 
counterfactual questions than on negative counterfactual questions. Children 
performed close to ceiling level on the negative future hypothetical questions as 
they did not have to process the question to give a correct ansvrer. Therefore no 
conclusions could be drawn from the performance on this particular question. 
The second experiment aimed to study further the effect of negation on 
counterfactual questions and the relation between counterfactual thinking and the 
false belief task. The same tasks as in the first experiment were used. The results 
confirmed one of the findings of the first experiment which was that negative 
counterfactuals were more difficult for children than affirmative counterfactuals. 
The false belief tasks used in this experiment followed the same model as the 
counterfactual task, just the end of the scenario and, of course, the test questions 
differed. In this false belief task. Tidy Teddy physically classified some objects in 
three different boxes according to one of their physical properties. At some point. 
Tidy Teddy left the scene and while he was away the experimenter moved one 
object from one box to another one. When finally Tidy Teddy came back, the 
children were asked where they thought Tidy Teddy thought his object was or 
where he was going to look for it. In this experiment, no significant correlations 
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were identified between counterfactual thinking and the false belief task. These 
results did not confirm Riggs et al.'s (1998) findings. Riggs et al. (1998) claimed 
that the correlation they found between counterfactual thinking and the false belief 
task was due to the fact that children could not suppress their knowledge of 
current reality and this difficulty led them to make realist errors. However, their 
design did not allow them to analyse these mistakes. The tasks that we used in 
this second experiment allowed us to distinguish between realist and other types 
of mistakes. It appeared that about a third of the mistakes children made were not 
realist errors. This showed that the difficulty with counterfactual thinking and false 
belief task was not exclusively due to a difficulty with suppressing knowledge of 
current reality. 
The third experiment studied further the relationship between counterfactual 
thinking and the false belief task. The main rationale behind this experiment was to 
investigate whether a potential correlation between counterfactual thinking and 
false belief was due to a counterfactual element or more general reasoning 
abilities, therefore a set of contrary-to-fact syllogisms was also included in this 
experiment. Two types of false belief tasks were used: the false belief to others 
task and the false belief to self task. In this instance, overall, the experimenter 
used more traditional tasks, such as the Sally and Anne task (Baron-Cohen et al., 
1985) and the Smartie task (Wimmer and Perner, 1983) to assess theory of mind, 
and tasks similar to the ones designed by Harris et al. (1996) to assess 
counterfactual thinking. The results showed an interesting pattern of correlations. 
The findings showed that counterfactual thinking correlated with both types of false 
belief tasks but did not correlate with contrary-to-fact syllogisms. These findings 
suggested that there might be a counterfactual element embedded in both types of 
false belief task. The results also highlighted that children found counterfactual 
tasks easier than the false belief to self task but of the same difficulty as the false 
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belief to others task. In this experiment, no difference in difficulty was found 
between the affirmative and the negative counterfactual questions, which 
contradicted the previous two experiments. This difference could be due to the 
tasks themselves. This point will be discussed further in the next section. Overall, 
the contrary4o-fact syllogisms did not correlate with any of the false belief tasks, 
only contrary-to-fact syllogisms that required a no-answer correlated with the false 
belief to self task. One possible explanation for this correlation could be the high 
level of inhibition that both these tasks required. The fact that counterfactual 
thinking correlated with both types of theory of mind tasks, but contrary-to-fact 
syllogisms did not, supports Riggs et al.'s (1998) claim that this correlation is due 
to the counterfactual element itself rather than general reasoning abilities. Another 
interesting finding was that no link was found between contrary-to-fact and 
counterfactual reasoning. This lack of relationship and two different patterns of 
correlations suggests that these two types of reasoning differ from each other in 
terms of their processes. Both tasks involved suppressing knowledge of current 
reality but the contrary-to-fact task required children to suppress their knowledge 
of the relations that hold in the real worid whereas the counterfactual tasks 
required children to undo only one particular fact or action. 
The last experiment further investigated the difference between counterfactual 
and contrary-to-fact reasoning. The children were asked to answer four 
counterfactual scenarios (two affirmative and two negative ones) and four 
contrary-to-fact scenarios (two yes-syllogisms and two no-syllogisms). These 
tasks were presented either in a standard context or in a contrary-to-fact context. 
According to Markovits (1995) a fantasy context acts as a cognitive filter 
preventing access to long term memory. Therefore it was expected, as reported in 
the literature (e.g.: Dias and Harris, 1989). that it would increase performance on 
contrary-to-fact reasoning, but it was hypothesised that it would increase the 
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difficulty of counterfactual tasks as children need to access their knowledge about 
the real world to solve them. In order to solve a counterfactual scenario, children 
need to refer to the causal relationships that happen in the world to imagine a new 
outcome after the antecedent has been potentially modified. The results confirmed 
this prediction. They showed an interaction between task and context. The context 
did not have the same effect on both types of tasks. The fantasy context facilitated 
contrary-to-fact reasoning but increased the difficulty of counterfactual reasoning. 
These results were consistent with Markovits's (1995) claim. In order to solve a 
contrary-to-fact syllogism children need to ignore their knowledge about the real 
world and the cognitive filter helps them to do that. On the contrary, in order to 
answer a counterfactual question children need to ignore only one fact about a 
particular situation but they need to access their knowledge of the real world. 
When looking at the performances on each type of task no difference in difficulty 
was found between affirmative and negative counterfactual questions or between 
yes and no syllogisms. 
Some of the similarities and differences between these experiments and their 
results will now be discussed. 
4 Main issues 
4.1 Counterfactual thinking 
All of the experiments in this thesis included some counterfactual tasks. The 
first findings suggested that counterfactual thinking was not different from future 
hypothetical thinking when controlling for negative and affirmative questions. This 
difference between affirmative and negative was investigated further. The results 
gained from comparing affirmative and negative counterfactual questions were not 
consistent across all the experiments. In experiments 1 and 2 it was found that 
negative counterfactual questions were more difficult than affirmative 
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counterfactual questions but this difference was not found in experiments 3 and 4. 
These differences could be explained by looking at the tasks used. There are good 
theoretical reasons (see chapter 2) suggesting that introducing a negation in a 
conditional question increases the difficulty of this question (Evans, 1998). This 
was confirmed in experiments 1 and 2 but not in experiments 3 and 4. 
Experiments 1 and 2 used the same types of task whereas experiments 3 and 4 
included a different set of tasks. The tasks in the first two experiments were 
adapted from Riggs et al.'s (1998) experiment and we will refer to them as the 
'boxes tasks'. In these tasks the children had to physically classify objects in a 
particular box according to one of their physical properties. Then this particular 
physical property, and therefore the classification, was changed and the children 
were asked a counterfactual question. These tasks did not involve following a 
narrative scenario and they were highly controlled as all the tasks were very 
similar to each other, only the material varied between tasks. 
In contrast, experiments 3 and 4 used some more traditional tasks similar to 
the ones designed by Harris et al. (1996). These tasks involved listening to a short 
narrative scenario and then answering a counterfactual question. The four tasks 
used each time involved different types of answer. One of the negative and one of 
the affirmative counterfactual questions required the children to point to a 
particular location to answer the questions whereas the other affirmative 
counterfactual question required a no answer and the other negative 
counterfactual questions a yes answer. It could be argued that in that particular 
configuration the affirmative questions were made more difficult by requiring a no 
answer and the negative questions easier by requiring a yes answer. The 
variations of the type of answer expected could have influenced the results. In the 
first two experiments the tasks were very similar and the type of expected answer 
was the same for each question; the children were just required to point to the 
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right location. Experiments 3 and 4 required different types of answers therefore 
they might not be the best way of testing the difference between affirmative and 
negative counterfactual questions. In order to investigate the difference between 
affirmative and negative counterfactual questions it is necessary to control the task 
even more. An experiment could be conducted with traditional tasks with, for 
example, all the tasks requiring the children to point to a location to answer the 
question. Because of the theoretical background (e.g. Evans, 1998) and the more 
controlled design in experiments 1 and 2 it does seem that introducing a negation 
would increase the difficulty of a counterfactual questions. 
4.2 Counterfactual thinking and the false belief task 
An association between false belief tasks and counterfactual tasks was not 
systematically found in all the experiments. No significant correlation between 
counterfactual thinking and the false belief task was found in experiment 2 but 
there was a trend in the right direction with a correlation coefficient equal to .172. 
A significant correlation was found in experiment 3. In experiment 2 the 'boxes 
tasks' were used for counterfactual questions and the false belief task. In 
experiment 3 traditional counterfactual and traditional false belief tasks were used. 
It is difficult to know if the lack of significant correlation found in experiment 2 was 
an isolated event or if an explanation can be given. As mentioned above the tasks 
used in experiment 2 and in experiment 3 were very different. One of the main 
differences between these tasks was the importance of narration. Very little 
narration was involved in experiment 2 but more narration was used in experiment 
3. The correlation between counterfactual thinking and the false belief tasks found 
could be due to language ability. Most of the research on the link between 
counterfactual thinking and the false belief tasks has been conducted with 
traditional tasks (e.g.: Grant et al., 2004) but when verbal abilities were partialled 
out the correlations remained. The difference between experiment 2 and 3 cannot 
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be explain in terms of narration and language abilities. There is a strong probably 
that a significant correlation would be found in experiment 2 if the power on this 
study was increased. 
A correlation was also found, in experiment 3, between counterfactual thinking 
and false belief to self task (e.g. Smartie task). It therefore seems that 
counterfactual thinking is linked to false belief tasks in general. Both types of task 
involved undoing an event and holding two conflicting representations of a 
situation. 
4.3 Contrary-to-fact syllogisms 
Traditionally children find contrary-to-fact syllogisms difficult (see chapter 4), 
but their performance tends to be improved if the syllogisms are presented in a 
fantasy context. The results of experiment 4 confirmed those claims and supported 
Markovits* (1995) theory that fantasy context acts as a cognitive filter reducing 
access to long term memory. Experiment 3 suggested that there was a difference 
between the syllogisms requiring a yes answer and the ones requiring a no 
answer as children found the first type easier, but this difference was not found in 
experiment 4. Experiment 3 included eight contrary-to-fact syllogisms (four yes 
and four no) whereas experiment 4 only included four contrary-to-fact syllogisms 
(two yes and two no). This difference in number of data points collected for each 
type of syllogism could explain why no difference was found between the yes and 
the no syllogisms in experiment 4. Leevers and Harris (2000) found that children 
with autism gave more logical justifications for the yes syllogisms than for the no 
syllogisms. Their results supported the previous findings suggesting that no 
syllogisms are more difficult than the yes. According to Leevers and Harris (2000) 
only the children with autism found the no syllogisms more difficult but the results 
presented in this thesis suggested that typically developing children also find the 
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no syllogisms more difficult. A hypothesis regarding the greater difficulty of no-
syllogisms could be that they require a higher level of inhibition. An example of a 
no syllogism could be as follows: All snow is black; Len is a snowman made of 
snow; is Len white? In this case, the final question restates reality. As children 
need to inhibit their knowledge of the real world to solve this type of syllogism, 
inhibition needs to be increased with a no-syllogism as a real world question is 
asked at the end. This special characteristic of the no-syl(ogisms could explain 
their correlations with the false belief to self task. In the false belief to self tasks a 
strong inhibition is required as, for example in the Smartie task, smartie containers 
contain smarties. Children need to inhibit this real world knowledge. 
4.4 Counterfactual thinking and contrary-to-fact syllogisms 
Experiments 3 and 4 have shown a dissociation between these two types of 
reasoning tasks. In experiment 3 they correlated with different tasks and did not 
correlate with each other, and in experiment 4 it was shown that fantasy context 
did not influence performance in the same way. Both types of task require the 
children to suspend their knowledge of the real world and imagine a new situation. 
In the 'floor' scenario the counterfactual question was 'What if Carol had taken 
her shoes off? Would the floor be dirty?' Children need to suppress their 
knowledge that Carol had her shoes on and need to imagine what would have 
happened if she had taken her shoes off. They then need to hold these two 
representations in their mind and use then both to solve the task as they need to 
compare the two. 
In a contrary-to-fact syllogism such as 'All cows quack, Suzie is a cow. does 
Suzie quack? They need to suppress their knowledge that cows moo and now 
accept as a basis for reasoning that cows quack. They do not need both these 
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representations to solve the task, they just need to refer to the new state of the 
world. 
This could explain why counterfactual thinking correlated with the false belief 
task and contrary-to-fact syllogisms did not. In false belief tasks, such as the Sally 
and Anne task, the children need to built two representations of the real situation 
where the marble changed location, and the false belief that Sally has got about 
the situation. Again, as in the counterfactual task, they need both representations, 
they need to compare them to solve the task. 
4.5 Control questions: do they have their place? 
Traditionally the false belief tasks and the counterfactual tasks have included 
some control questions to check that the children understand the task. They check 
in particular if the children can remember the situation at the beginning of the task 
and that they are aware of the final situation. The results of experiments 2 and 4 
were analysed in two different ways: with the whole sample or with the sample 
only including the data of the children who passed all the control questions. The 
results from both these analyses did not significantly differ. The results were the 
same; the second analysis was just more powerful. These results raise the 
question of the usefulness of the control questions, at least for typically developing 
children. When the children are asked control questions then they have to answer 
2 to 3 times as many questions overall. As the answers to these questions do not 
seem to influence the results, it could be argued that control questions could 
confuse the children and decrease their level of attention. The results might 
therefore be more reliable if no control questions were asked when the sample is 
made up of typically developing children. 
Experiment 3 also showed that the link between counterfactual thinking and 
the false belief task was mainly due to the counterfactual element as the false 
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belief tasks correlated with the counterfactual tasks and not the other reasoning 
tasks (the contrary-to-fact syllogisms). 
4.6 The role of imagination 
The role of imagination maybe highlighted in relation to this work; it seems to 
be a common factor in most of the tasks that have been used. Imagination 
emerges in the second year of life when children children start engaging in pretend 
play (Harris. 2000), and the absence of imagination, even this early in life, is seen 
as pathological as it is one of characteristics of autism (Baron-Cohen, 1994). 
The contrary-to-fact syllogisms require children to suppress their knowledge of 
the real world and imagine a pretend world. They need to imagine what the world 
would be like if the first contrary-to-fact premise was true. In a counterfactual 
scenario children need to use their imagination to consider an alternative 
sequence of events if the antecedent had been different (Harris, 2000): they need 
to imagine a new consequence. It can also be argued that imagination is important 
to pass the false belief task as the children need to imagine what the false belief of 
the character is. 
Harris (2000) studied the importance of children's imagination and claimed 
that it is usually well adapted to social engagement and interaction, mainly through 
shared pretend play, and also from a cognitive point of view, it helps children 
analyse reality. He even claimed that 'children's analysis of reality is infused by 
their ability to imagine what might have happened' (Harris, 2000, p. 138). 
Imagination seems to be key to children's social and cognitive development. 
5 Theoretical background to the findings 
This section will link the findings summarised above to a theoretical 
perspective. We will argue that the findings of this thesis support the 
representational theory of mind view as described by Perner (1991). Perner (1991) 
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argued that children need to develop and manipulate their representations of the 
world to understand theory of mind. They need to be able understand that mental 
representations are representations, or models, of the world and they also need to 
be able to compare 'true' or 'false' representations. The representational view can 
also be applied to other aspects of chfldren cognition than just theory of mind. 
Starting with the end of the present work, experiments 3 and 4 of this thesis 
showed a clear distinction between counterfactual reasoning and contrary-to-fact 
reasoning. First of all the impact of fantasy context in experiment 4 was not 
identical on both types of tasks. Fantasy context acts as a cognitive filter 
preventing access to long term memory (Markovits, 1995) and it therefore 
facilitates contrary-to-fact syllogistic reasoning, as children need to suppress their 
knowledge of the world, but it increases the difficulty of counlerfactual reasoning 
as children need to access their knowledge of the world in this case (see chapter 5 
for more details). The different impact of fantasy context on both these types of 
tasks indicates that these are not underpinned by the same processes. This 
difference could be explained in representational terms. Contrary-to-fact 
syllogisms do not require children to represent different situations - they just 
require them to suppress their knowledge of the world whereas counterfactual 
scenarios require children to represent an alternative world and compare it to the 
actual situation. With the contrary-to-fact scenarios they only need to ignore, for 
example, that cows quack in the real world, but they do not need to represent a 
new model of the world. In the 'dirty shoes' counterfactual scenario, however, they 
need to represent two different models of the world, one where Carol walked into 
the room with dirty shoes on and another one where Carol had taken her shoes 
off. 
The difference between contrary-to-fact syllogisms and counterfactual 
reasoning was also highlighted in chapter 4 where it was found that they did not 
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correlate with the false belief tasks in the same way: counterfactual tasks 
correlated with both false belief to others tasks and false belief to self tasks 
whereas contrary-to-fact syllogisms did not correlate with any of them. The 
distinction regarding representational difference between these two types of task 
can explain this difference in correlation with theory of mind tasks found in 
experiment 3. With the counterfactual task, children need to compare two 
representations of the world: the one that is consistent with current reality and the 
one of what the world could be If the antecedent had not happened. False belief 
tasks shares similar characteristics: with the traditional false belief to others tasks 
children need to compare their own representation of the world with the other 
character's representation of the situation and with the false belief to self tasks the 
children need to compare their current representation of the situation with their 
previous representation of the same situation. The representational approach is 
successful in explaining the correlation between the false belief tasks and 
counterfactual thinking as well as the lack of correlation with contrary4o-fact 
syllogisms as contrary-to-fact syllogisms do not require children to build model of 
the worid. However, the representational approach does not seem to be able to 
explain the correlation found between contrary-to-fact (no) syllogisms with the 
false belief to self task. This link needs to be explored further. 
The representational mind account can also explain the possible dissociation 
between negative and affirmative counterfactual questions found in experiment 1 
and 2. It could be argued that negative counterfactual questions require a higher 
level of representation than affirmative questions. Going back to experiment 1 an 
affirmative counterfactual could be 'What if I had put a star sticker on the mouse's 
brick, which box would it be in?' The children need to represent, in their mind, a 
brick with a star sticker, instead of a round sticker, and reason counterfactually to 
answer the question. The situation to represent is cleariy stated to the child. The 
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affirmative counterfactual question in that similar situation could be 'What if I 
hadn't put sticker on the mouse's brick, which box would it be in?'. In that situation 
the representation to construct is not as obvious as in the first case. The child 
need to represent a model where the sticker has not a star on and it opens the 
door to a number of other possible models. This type of model is therefore more 
difficult to construct. This might be why negative counterfactual questions tend to 
correlate more with the false belief task. Most of the literature exploring the link 
between counterfactual thinking and theory of mind used negative counterfactual 
questions only finding therefore a link between the counterfactual scenarios 
requiring more skills to build a model. 
The representation view seems to explain most of the findings of this thesis; 
however some findings are not explained by it. For example the con-elation 
between the contrary-to-fact syllogisms (no answer) with the false belief to self 
task could be explained by the fact that both tasks require a high level of inhibition. 
The no syllogisms (e.g.: All cats bark. George is a cat. Does George meow?) state 
the real world in the last premise therefore soliciting higher inhibition capacity from 
children. In the false belief to self children are expect to ignore their own previous 
false belief which could be argued requires a higher level of inhibition. This link 
between both these tasks with inhibition could be investigated further. 
6 Future work 
A number of issues have been discussed in the previous section and some of 
these could be studied further in future research projects. 
First of all the difference between yes and no syllogisms could be explored 
further. It was found in experiment 3 that children found no syllogisms more 
difficult that the yes syllogisms. It was hypothesised that this was because the 
question associated with a no syllogism was consistent with the real word, 
167 
therefore the children needed to have an even stronger inhibition (e.g.: All cats 
bark. George is a cat, does George meow?). The no-syllogisms could be 
rephrased in such a way that the question is not consistent with reality. For 
example, it could be as follows: All cats bark, George is a cat, Does George moo? 
The experimental design could include four no-syllogisms and four yes-syllogisms, 
all presented in a similar context, to typically developing children between the age 
of 3 to 5. Their performance on both types of task could then be compared. A link 
was found in experiment 3 between no-syllogisms and the false belief to self task. 
This new experiment could then be combined with four false belief to self tasks 
and an inhibition measure, such as a stroop task, to test the hypothesB that this 
link was due to higher demands on inhibition. This experiment would test whether 
inhibition is a factor that needs to be taken into account. 
Then, the dissociation between contrary-to-fact syllogisms and counterfactual 
thinking could be explored further. Experiments 3 and 4 suggested that these two 
types of reasoning abilities differ significantly. Experiment 4 showed that fantasy 
context did not influence the performance on these tasks in the same way. A 
fantasy context tends to improve performance on contrary-to-fact syllogisms but 
increases the difficulty of counterfactual scenarios. However, it could be noted that 
the counterfactual scenarios in this experiment were true-to-fact. It is therefore 
difficult to know whether this difference is due to the reasoning element or the 
contrary-to-fact element. 
First of all it would be interesting to investigate the difference between true-to-
fact syllogisms and counterfactual reasoning. The children could be given four 
examples of each and all of them would be presented in a neutral context. A true-
to-fact syllogisms could be as follows: All cats like milk, George is a cat, Does 
George like milk? The same counterfactual scenarios as in experiment 4 could be 
used. Performance on these tasks would then been compared. 
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It would be interesting to run a similar experiment with contrary-to-fact 
syllogisms and contrary-to-fact counterfactual scenarios. One example of a 
scenario could be as follows: 
You are in a magical land where fairies live. You meet a fairy who is 
called Lucy. Lucy tells you that in her world houses are cleaned with 
muddy shoes. One day, in her house the floor was dirty. But guess what! 
Lucy comes how that she doesn't take her shoes off, she makes the floor 
all clean with her shoes! 
Before control question: Was the floor clean before? 
Now control question: Is the floor clean now? 
Test question: What if Carol had taken her shoes off? Would the floor be 
dirty? 
The children could be presented with four contrary-to-fact syllogisms and four 
contrary-to-fact counterfactual scenarios. There could be two conditions: a 
standard context and a fantasy context. It would still be predicted that fantasy 
context would improve performance on contrary-to-fact syllogisms. From 
experiment 4, it appears that fantasy context decreases performance on 
counterfactuals but, in this particular case, it might help children to accept the 
contrary-to-fact situation as a basis for reasoning, as claimed by Harris (2000). 
The finding could be that two opposite effects cancel each other and that, overall, 
fantasy context has no effect on contrary-to-fact counterfactual scenarios. 
The work conducted in this thesis on theory of mind could be replicated with 
children with autism. Children with autism tend to show a specific deficit in theory 
of mind (Baron-Cohen, 1995). Baron-Cohen developed the theory that children 
with autism lacked a theory of mind and specifically developed the Sally and Ann 
task to test this hypothesis (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). The link between the false 
belief task, counterfactual thinking and contrary4o-fact syllogisms could be 
explored with this special population. It would be expected that children with 
autism would find the false belief task difficult, as previously reported in the 
literature (e.g.Baron-Cohen, 1981). Children with autism should also find 
counterfactual reasoning more difficult than typically developing children as was 
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demonstrated by Grant et al. (2004) and Peterson and Bowler (2000). Grant et al. 
(2004) also found a correlation between counterfactual thinking and the false belief 
task when testing children with autism. This correlation could be due to the 
impairment of imagination that children with autism present (Baron-Cohen, 1987). 
Harris (2000) claimed that children use imagination for three main purposes: firstly 
to enter a make-believe world where many causal principles are retained, 
secondly to make comparison between actual outcomes and other possible 
outcomes and finally to explore impossible and magical events. This claim strongly 
suggested that imagination is necessary to solve counterfactual tasks and false 
belief tasks. In order to solve a counterfactual task, children need to compare the 
actual outcome with other possible outcomes. To solve a false belief task, children 
need to imagine a different world as well. The imagination of children with autism 
can be explored further by presenting them with contrary-to-fact syllogisms as they 
then need to enter a make believe world and test impossible events. It has been 
previously found that children with autism find contrary-to-fact syllogisms difficult 
(e.g. Leevers and Harris, 2000; Scott et al., 1999). It can also be predicted that a 
fantasy context would not help children to solve these syllogisms as they require 
children to imagine a pretend worid. It would be interesfing to run experiments 3 
and 4 with children with autism to test these hypotheses. Children would have to 
be matched for intelligence and language in order to make the results comparable. 
The influence of early interactions on the development of theory of mind can 
be studied with deaf children. Several studies have shown that deaf children from 
hearing families presented a delayed acquisition of theory of mind (e.g.: Deleau. 
1996; Peterson and Siegal, 1995). Peterson and Siegal (1998) even showed that 
these children perform to the same level as children with autism on the false belief 
task. However, when native signers (i.e. deaf children from deaf families) were 
presented with the false belief task the delay previously found disappeared: these 
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children performed at least as well as hearing typically developing children 
(Courtin and Melot, 1998; Woolfe, Want and Siegal. 2002). The interaction 
between false belief tasks, counterfactual thinking and contrary-to-fact syllogisms 
could be studied with deaf children. The tasks would be presented in sign 
language to prevent language difficulties influencing the results. 
6.1 Conclusion 
This work of this thesis has mainly focused on the cognitive skills necessary to 
pass the false belief task and counterfactual tasks. The experimental work has 
shown a relationship between counterfactual thinking and both types of false belief 
task: false belief to others and false belief to self. This work has also highlighted 
the difference between counterfactual thinking and contrary-to-fact syllogistic 
reasoning. 
A large part of the research looked at the influence of negation, in the 
phrasing of a question but also in the answer expected. The results of experiments 
1 and 2 showed that introducing a negation in a counterfactual question increased 
the difficulty of this question. Experiment 3 showed that syllogisms requiring a no-
answer were more difficult than syllogisms requiring a yes-answer. 
It also seems that imagination might be a strong common factor in all these 
tasks, including contrary4o-fact syllogisms. Imagination seems to be important for 
children's reasoning as it allows them to imagine alternative possibilities (Harris, 
2000). Imagination is also a basis for scientific reasoning as children are required 
to imagine possible outcomes to experiments. 
This thesis highlighted that the ability to construct models of the worid in order 
to solve counterfactual tasks and false belief tasks is important, therefore 
supporting Perner's (1991) theoretical account of theory of mind. However, 
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another factor, inhibition, needs to be studied too as some results suggested that it 
might be an important factor too. 
Another aspect that must not be forgotten is the way children use their theory 
of mind in the real world. Being able to reason counterfactually is not enough to 
pass the false belief task, children still need to take into account people's mental 
states, and passing a false belief task is not as complex as dealing with people's 
mental states in a naturally occurring social interaction. 
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APPENDIX A 
RECORDING SHEET FOR EXPERIMENT 1 
Participant Scenario Questions + Expected answer Answers Right or 
Wrong Number Gender Aue 
I Cars + CFaf f 1. What is on this car now? (circle) 
2. Where shall we put this car now? 1 
3. I f I had put a square sticker on this 
car, which box would in be in? 2 
Colours + CFneg 1. What is on this card now? (Orance) 
2. Where shall we put this card now? 1 
3. I f I hadn't drawn on this card, which 
box would it be in? 3 
Dough + FHaf f I f I roll the dough into a ball, which box 
wi l l it fto into? 1 
Drawing + FHneg I f I don't draw anything on this piece o f 
paper, which box w i l l it go into? 3 
2 Dough + CFneg 1. What shape is the dough now? (ball) 
2. Where shall we put the dough now? 1 
3. I f I hadn't rolled the dough at al l , 
which box would it be in? 3 
Drawing + CFaf f 1. What is on this p. o f p. now? (circle) 
2. Where shall we put this p.of p. now? 1 
3. I f 1 had drawn a square on this p.of p., 
which box would it be into now? 2 
Cars + FHneg I f 1 don't put a sticker on this card, which 
box wi l l it go into? 3 
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Colours + FHaf f I f I draw an orange patch on this card, 
which box wi l l it RO into? 1 
3 Drawing + FHafT I f ! draw a circle on this p. o f p., which 
box w i l l it KO into? 1 
Dough + FHneg I f I don*t roll the dough at al l , which box 
w i l l it Ro into? 3 
Colours + CFaf f 1. What is on this card now? (orance) 
2.Whcrc shall we put this card now? 1 
3. I f I had drawn a green patch on this 
card, which box would it be in? 2 
Cars + CFneg 1. What is on this car now? (Circle) 
2. Where shall we put this car now? 1 
3. I f I hadn't put a sticker on this car, 
which box would it be in? 3 
4 Colours + FHneg I f I don't draw on this card, which box 
wi l l it ^0 into? 3 
Cars + FHafT I f I put a round sticker on this car, which 
box w i l l it ^0 into? 1 
Drawing + CFneg 1. What is on this p. o f p. now? (Circle) 
2. Where shall we put this p. o f p. now? 1 
3. I f 1 hadn't drawn anything on this p. o f 
p., which box would it be into? 3 
Dough + CFaf f 1. What shape is the doueh now? (ball) 
2 Where shall we put this dough now? 1 
3. I f 1 had rolled the dough into a 
sausage, which box would it be in? 2 
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APPENDIX B 
OTHER COUNTERFACTUAL AND FUTURE 
HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIOS USED IN 
EXPERIMENT 1 
Play dough and shapes 
The play dough could have the shape of a ball, a sausage or be squashed. 
Counterfactual (affirmative): What if I had rolled the dough as a sausage, which 
box would it be in? 
Counterfactual (negative): If I hadn't rolled the dough at all, which box would it be 
in? 
Future hypothetical (affirmative): If I roll the dough into a ball, which box will it go 
into? 
Future hypothetical (negative): If I don't roll the dough at all, which box will it go 
into? 
Sheets of paper and shapes 
On each sheet of paper there could be a square, a circle or nothing drawn on. 
Counterfactual (affirmative): If 1 had drawn a square on this piece of paper, which 
box would it be into now? 
Counterfactual (negative): If I hadn't drawn anything on this piece of paper, which 
box would it be into? 
Future hypothetical (affirmative): If I draw a circle on this piece of paper, which box 
will it go into? 
Future hypothetical (negative): If I don't draw anything on this piece of paper, 
which box will it go into? 
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Cards and colours 
On each card there could be a green patch, an orange patch or nothing. 
Counterfactual (affirmative): If I had drawn a green patch on this card, which box 
would it be In? 
Counterfactual (negative): If I hadn't drawn on this card, which box would it be in? 
Future hypothetical (affimnative): If I draw an orange patch on this card, which box 
will it go into? 




RECORDING SHEET FOR EXPERIMENT 2 
Right / Answers Questions Scenano Participant Wron 
Number Gender Ace 
now? (circle) What's on this Shapes + CF A f f 
Colours + CF Neg 
Playdough + ToM (t/1) 
Bricks + ToM (1/t) 
2. Where shall we put this p. of paper now? ( i ) 
3. I f 1 had drawn a square on this p of p which 
box would it be in now? 
1. What's the mlour on this p of P now? (red) 
2. Where shall we put it now? (1) 
3. I f I hadn't drawn on this p of p which box 
would it be in now? (3) 
1 • What shape is the playdough now? (ball) 
2. Where shall we put it now? (1) 
3. Where does the mouse think his playdough is? 
4. Where wil l the mouse look for his playdough 
first?13i 
5. Where was the mouse's playdough at the 
beginning? (3) 
1. What's on this brick now? (circle) 
2. Where shall we put it now? (1) 
3. Where wil l the Mouse look for his brick first? 
4. Where does the Mouse think his brick is? (3) 




A n n O • * A on 




Faces + CF A f f 1. What sort of glasses does the man wear now? 
(round) 
2. Where shall we put this man now? (1) 
3. I f I had drawn a square glasses for this man 
which box would he be in now? (2) 
Bob + CF Neg 1 What sort of hat does Bob wear now? (round) 
2 Where shall we put Bob now? (1) 
3. I f I hadn't drawn a hat for Bob which box 
would he be in now? (3) 
Teletubbies + ToM (t/1) 1 What colour is the ball now? (blue) 
2. Where shall we put it now? (1) 
3 Where does the mouse think his Teletubby is? 
4. Where will the mouse look for his Teletubby 
first? (3) 
5. Where was the mouse's Teletubby at the 
beginning? (3) 
Teddies + ToM (1/t) 1 What colour is the box tie now? (blue) 
2. Where shall we put it now? (1) 
3 Where will the Mouse look for his Teddy first? (3) 
4 Where does the Mouse think his Teddy is? (3) 
5 Where was the Teddy at the beginning? (3) 
Combination l/b 
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Participant Scenario Questions Answers 
Right / 
Wrong 
Colours + CF A f f 1. What^s on this p. of paper now?(red) 
2. Where shall we put this p. of paper now? (1) 
3. I f I had drawn a blue patch on this p of p 
which box would it be in now? (2) 
Shapes + CF Neg 1. What's on this p of p now? (circle) 
2. Where shall we put it now? (1) 
3. I f I hadnH drawn on this p of p which box 
would it be in now? (3) 
Bricks+ T0MI (t/1) 1. What's on this brick now? (circle) 
2. Where shall wc put it now? (1) 
3. Where does the mouse think his brick is? 
4. Where wil l the mouse look for his brick first? 
5. Where was the mouse's brick at the 
beginning*^ 
Playdough + ToM2 (1/t) 1. What shape is the plavdough now? (ball) 
2. Where shall we put it now? (1) 
3. Where wil l the Mouse look for his playdough 
first? 
4. Where does the Mouse think his plavdough is? 





Scenario Questions Answers 
Right / 
Wrong 
Bob + CP A f f 1. What son of hat docs Bpb wear now? (round) 
2. Where shall we put Bob now? (1) 
3. I f I had drawn a pointy hat on Bob's head 
which box would he be in now? (2) 
Faces + CF Neg 1. What sort of glasses does this man wear now? 
(round) 
2. Where shall we put this man now? (1) 
3. I f I hadn't drawn glasses for this man which 
box would he be in now? (3) 
Teddies + T o M l (t/1) 1. What colour is the tie bow now? (blue) 
2. Where shall we put it now? (1) 
3. Where does the mouse think his Teddy is? (3) 
4. Where wil l the mouse look for his Teddy 
first? 
5. Where was the mouse's Telelubby at the 
beginning? (3) 
Tubbies + ToM2 (1/t) 1. What colour is the ball now? (blue) 
2. Where shall we put the teletubbie now? (1) 
3. Where will the Mouse look for his Teletubby first? 
4. Where docs the Mouse think his Teletubby is? 
5. Where was the Teletubby at the begmning? 
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Number I Gender Age 
Phydough + CF Neg 1. What shape is the plavdough now? (ball) 
2. Where shall we put the plavdough now? (1) 
3. I f I hadn't rolled the playdough which box 
would he be in now?(3) 
Bricks + CF A f f 1. What shape is on this brick now? (circle) 
2. Where shall we put this brick now? (1) 
3. I f 1 had put a star on this brick which box 
would he be in now? (2) 
Shapes + ToM2 (lA) I . What's on this p of p now? (circle) 
2. Where shall we put it now?( l ) 
3. Where wil l the mouse look for his p of p first? 
(21 
4. Where does the mouse think his p of p is? (3) 
5. Where was the mouse's p of p at the 
'^(3) beginning 
of p now? (blue) What colour is on this Colour + ToM 1 (l/l) 
now? (1) Where shall we 
Where does the Mouse think his p of p is? 
Where wil l the Mouse look for his p of p first? 
at the beginning? Where was the 
Combination 3/a 
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Teddy + CF A f f 
Faces + ToM2 (l/l) 
3. I f 1 hadn't coloured in the ball which box 
would he be in now?(3) 
I . What colour is the tie bow now? (red) 
2. Where shall we put this teddy now? (1) 
3. I f I had coloured the tie bow in blue which 
box would he be in now? (2) 
1. What sort of glasses does this man wear now? 
(round) 
2. Where shall we put this man now? (1) 
3. Where will the mouse look for his p of p first? 
13) 
4. Where does the mouse think his p of p is? (3) 
5. Where was the mouse's p of p at the 
beginnmg 
What sort of hat does Bob wear now? (blue) Bob + T o M l (t/1) 
Bob n o w ? ( n Where shall we 
Where does the Mouse think his Bob is? 
Where wil l the Mouse look for his Bob first? 
Where was the Mouse's Bob at the beginnin 
Combination 3/b 
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Right / Answers Questions Participant Wron 
Gender Number 
Scenario 
Bricks + CF Neg 
Playdough+CF A f f 
Colour + ToM2 (1/t) 
Shapes + ToM I (t/1) 
1. What shape is this brick now? (circle) 
2. Where shnll we put this brick now? (1) 
3. I f 1 hadn't put a sticker on this brick which 
box would he be in now?(3) 
What shape is the playdough now? (circle) 
2. Where shall we put this playdough now? (1) 
3. I f I had rolled the playdough into a sausage 
which box would he be in now? (3) 
1. What colour is on this p of p now? (blue) 
2. Where shall wc put it now? (1) 
3. Where will the mouse look for his p of p first? 
4. Where does the mouse think his p of p is? (3) 
5. Where was the mouse's p of p at the 
beginning? (3^ 
this p of p now? (circle) 
Where shall we put this p of p now? (1) 
does the Mouse think h i s p o f p is? Where 
wil l the Mouse look for his p of p first*? Where 
at the beginning? Where was the 
Combination 4/a 
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Tubbies + CF AfT 
Bob + ToM2 (1/t) 
Faces + T o M l (t/l) 
3. I f 1 hadn't coloured in the tie bow which box 
would it be in now?(3) 
1. What rnlnur is the ball now? (blue) 
2. Where shall we put it now? (1) 
3. I f I had coloured tlie ball in red which box 
would it be in now? (2) 
What sort of hat does Bob wear now? (round) 
2. Where shall we put Bob now? (1) 
3. Where will the mouse look for his Bob first? 
4. Where does the mouse think his Bob is? (3) 
5. Where was the mouse's Bob at the beginning? 
1. What sort of glasses does this man wear now? 
roun 
this man now? (1) Where shall we 
Where does the Mouse think his p of p is? 
wil l the Mouse look for his p of p first? Where 
at the beginning? Where was the 
Combination 4/b 
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Faces+ ToMl (t/1) 
Bob + ToM2 ((1/t) 
Tubbies + CF aff 
Teddy + CF neg 
Combination 5/a 
1. What sort of glasses does the man wear now? 
(round) 
2. Where shall we put the man now? (1) 
3. Where does the mouse think his p of p is' 
4. Where wil l the mouse look for his p of p first? 
5. Where was the mouse's p of p at the 
innipf**^ begm mg? 
1. What sort of hat does Bob wear now? (round) 
2. Where shall we put Bob now? (1) 
3. Where will the mouse look for his p of p first? 
4. Where does the mouse think his p of p is? 
5. Where was the mouse's p of p at the 
beginning'^ 
1. What colour is the ball now? (blue) 
2. Where shall we put it now? (1) 
1. What colour is the bow tic now? (blue) 
2. Where shall we put it now? 
3. I f I had not coloured in the bow lie which box 
would it be in? (3" 
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Right / Answers Questions Participant Wron 
Number Gender Age 
of p now? (round) What's on this 
Scenario 
Shapes + ToM 1 (t/l) 
Colours + ToM2 ((1/t) 
Playdough + CF aff 
Bricks + CF neg 
CombinalionS/b 
2. Where shall we put this p of p now? ( I ) 
3. Where does the mouse think his p of p is? 
4. Where wil l the mouse look for his p of p first? 
5. Where was the mouse's p of p at the 
9 beginning 
1. What colour is on this p of p now? (blue) 
2. Where shall we put it now? ( I ) 
3. Where wil l the mouse look for his p of p first? 
4. Where does the mouse think his p of p is? 
5. Where was the mouse's p of p at the 
beginning*^ 
What shape is the playdough now? (ball) 
2. Where shall we put it now? (1) 
3. I f I had rolled the playdough into a sausage 
which box would it be in now? (2) 
What's on this brick now? (blue) 
2. Where shall we put it now? 
3. I f I had not put a sticker on this brick now 
which box would it be in? (3^  
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Participant 
Number I Gender | Age 
Scenario Questions Answers 
Right / 
Wrong 
Bob + ToM 1 (t/1) 
Faces + ToM2 (1/t) 
Teddy + CF aff 
Tubbies + CF neg 
Combination 6/a 
1. What sort of hat does Bob wear now? (round) 
2. Where shall we put it now? (1) 
3. Where does the mouse think his p of p is? 
4. Where will the mouse look for his p of p first? 
5. Where was the mouse's p of p at the 
beginning? 
1. What sort of glasses does this man wear now 
ill 
2. Where shall we put it now? (1) 
3. Where wil l the mouse look for his p of p first? 
4. Where does the mouse think his p of p is? 
5. Where was the mouse's p of p at the 
7 beginning 
1. What colour is the bow tie now? (blue) 
2. Where shall we put it now? (1) 
3. I f I had coloured the bow tie in red which box 
would it be in now? (2) 
What colour is the ball now? (blue) 
2. Where shall we put it now? 
3. I f I hadn't coloured in the ball which box 
would it be in now? (3^ 
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Participant Scenario Questions Answers Right / 
Wrong Number Gender Age 
Colours + T o M l (t/l) 1. What colour is on this p of p now? (blue) 
2. Where shall we put it now? (1) 
3. Where does the mouse think his p of p is? 
4. Where wil l the mouse look for his p of p first? 
5. Where was the mouse's p of p at the 
beginning? 
Shapes + ToM2 (1/t) 1. What's on this p of p now? (circle) 
2. Where shall we put it now? (1) 
3. Where wil l the mouse look for his p of p first? 
4. Where does the mouse think his p of p is? 
5. Where was the mouse's p of p at the 
beginning? 
Bricks + CF aff 1. What's on this brick now? (circle) 
2. Where shall we put it now? (1) 
3. I f 1 had put a star sticker on this brick, which 
box would it be in now? (2) 
Playdough + CF neg 1. What shape is the playdough now? 
2. Where shall we put it now? 
3. I f I hadn't rolled the playdoug which box 
would it be in now? 
Combination 6/b 
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Participant Scenario Questions Answers Right / 
Wrong Number Gender Age 
Tubbies + ToM2 (1/t) 1. What colour is the ball now? (blue) 
2. Where shall we put it now? (1) 
3. Where wil l the mouse look for his teletu first? 
4. Where does the mouse think his teletubby is? 
5. Where was the mouse's teletubby at the 
beginning? 
Teddy+ T0MI (t/1) 1. What colour is the bow tie now? (blue) 
2. Where shall we put it now? (1) 
3. Where does the mouse think his teddy is? 
4. Where wil l the mouse look for his teddy first? 
5. Where was the mouse's p of p at the 
begirming? 
Faces + CF neg 1. What sort of glasses does the man wear now? 
(round) 
2. Where shall we put it now? (1) 
3. I f 1 had not drawn any glasses on this man 
which box would it be in now? (3) 
Bob + CF afT 1. What sort of hat does Bob wear now? (blue) 
2. Where shall we put it now? 
3. I f 1 had drawn a pointy hat on Bob's head 
which box would he be in now? (3) 
Combination 7/a 
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Participant Scenario Questions Answers Right / 
Wrong Number Gender Age 
Playdough + ToM2(l/t) 1. What shape is the playdough now? (ball) 
2. Where shall we put it now? (1) 
3. Where will the mouse look to his playdough 
first? 
4. Where does the mouse think his playdough is? 
5. Where was the mouse's playdough at the 
beginning? 
Bricks + ToM 1 (t/l) 1. What's on this brick now? (round) 
2. Where shall we put it now? (1) 
3. Where does the mouse think his brick is? 
4. Where will the mouse look for his brick first? 
5. Where was the mouse's brick at the 
beginning? 
Shapes + CF neg 1. What's on this p of p now? (circle) 
2. Where shall we put it now? (1) 
3. I f I hadn't drawn anything on this p of p 
which box would it be in now? 
Colour + CF A f f 1. What colour is on this p of p now? (blue) 
2. Where shall we put it now? 
3. I f I had drawn a red patch on this p of p which 
box would it be in now? (2) 
Combination 7/b 
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Participant Scenario Questions Answers Right / 
Wrong Number Gender Age 
Teddy + ToM2(l/t) 1. What colour is the bow tie now? (blue) 
2. Where shall we put it now? (1) 
3. Where wil l the mouse look for his teddy first? 
4. Where does the mouse think his Teddy is? 
5. Where was the mouse's playdough at the 
beginning? 
Tubbies + T o M l (t/l) 1. What colour is the ball now? (blue) 
2. Where shall we put it now? (1) 
3. Where does the mouse think his teietubby is? 
4. Where will the mouse look f a his teletubby 
first? 
5. Where was the mouse's telelubby at the 
beginning? 
Bob + CF neg 1. What sort of hat does Bob wear now? (round) 
2. Where shall we put him now? (1) 
3. I f I hadn't drawn anything on Bob's head 
which box would he be in now? 
Faces + CF A f f 1. What sort of glasses does this man wear now? 
2. Where shall we put him now? 
3. I f I had drawn square glasses on this man 
which box would he be in now? (2) 
Combination 8/a 
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Participant Scenario Questions Answers Right / 
Wrong Number Gender Age 
Bricks + ToM2( l / l ) 1. What's on this brick now? (circle) 
2. Where shall we put it now? (1) 
3. Where w i l l the mouse look for his brick first? 
4. Where does the mouse think his brick first? 
5. Where was the mouse's brick at the 
beginning? 
Playdough + T o M 1 (t/1) 1. What shape is the playdough now? (round) 
2. Where shall we put it now? (1) 
3. Where does the mouse think his playdough is? 
4. Where w i l l the mouse look for his playdough 
first? 
5. Where was the mouse's playdough at the 
beginning? 
Colour + CF neg 1. What colour is on this p o f p now? (red) 
2. Where shall we put it now? (1) 
3. I f I hadn't drawn anything on this p o f p 
which box would it be in now? 
Shape-f CF A f f 1. What's on this p o f p now? (circle) 
2. Where shall we put it now? 
3. I f I had drawn a star on this p o f p which box 
would it be in now? (2) 
Combinat ion 8/b 
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APPENDIX D 
DESCRIPTION OF THE TASKS USED IN 
EXPERIMENT 2 
Testing the link between counterfactual situation and false belief task: 
affirmative and negative counterfactual. and standard false belief task using three 
different boxes in order to be able to analyse the mistakes children might make. 
Do they stick to reality or not? 
For each scenario, the children are explained how the objects are classified in 
each box. A reminder card is placed in front of each box to prevent memory from 
getting overloaded. The children are then asked to physically classify a few 
objects. 
During the task the experiment is helped by a mouse puppet. 
S C E N A R I O 1: pieces of paper and shapes 
3 boxes containing pieces of paper which have either a circle, a square or no 
shape on. 
The experimenter is helped by the mouse. The mouse adds a blank piece of paper 
to box 3 and then goes sleep in the experimenter's bag. 
The experimenter removes the mouse's piece of paper and draws a circle on it. 
Q 1 : 'What is on this piece of paper now?' 
Q2: 'Where shall we put this piece of paper now?' 1 
Counterfactual reasoning 
CF Negative: Q3: 'If I hadn't drawn a shape on this piece of paper, which 
box would it be in?' 3 
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CF Affirma: Q4: 'If I had drawn a square on this piece of paper, which box would 
it be in?' 2 
^ False belief condition 
The mouse comes back and he wants to play with the piece of paper. 
ToM : Q5: 'Where will the mouse look for his piece of paper first?' 
Q5bis: 'Where does the mouse think his the piece of paper is? 
Memory question 
Q6: 'Where was the mouse's piece of paper at the beginning?' 
S C E N A R I O 2: Cards and colours 
There are three boxes containing cards with either a red patch on, a blue patch on 
or no colour. 
The mouse adds a blank card into box 3, and then he goes to sleep in the 
experimenter's bag. 
The experiment removes the mouse's card from box 3 and draws a red patch on it. 
Q 1 : 'What colour is on this piece of paper now?' 
Q2: 'Where shall we put this piece of paper now?' 1 
^ Counterfactual situation 
CF negative: Q3: 'If I hadn't drawn this piece of paper which box would it be in?' 3 
CF affrrmat: Q4: 'If I had drawn a blue patch on the mouse's card, which box 
would it be in?' 2 
^ False belief condition 
The mouse comes back and he wants to play with his card. 
ToM: Q5: 'Where will the mouse look for his piece of paper first?' 
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Q5bis: 'Where does the mouse think that his piece of paper is? 
Memory question 
Q6: 'Where was the piece of paper at the beginning?' 
S C E N A R I O 3: Play dough 
3 boxes containing play dough which either has a round shape, a sausage shape 
or a 'squashed' shape. 
The experimenter is helped by the mouse. The mouse adds a 'squashed' piece of 
dough to box 3 and then goes sleep in the experimenter's bag. 
The experimenter removes the mouse's dough and rolls it into a ball. 
Q 1 : 'What shape is this piece of dough now' 
Q2: 'Where shall I put this piece of dough?' 1 
^ Counterfactual reasoning 
CF Negative: Q3: 'If I hadn't rolled the play dough, which box would it be in 
now?* 3 
CF Affirma: Q4: 'If I had rolled the play dough into a sausage, which box would it 
be in?' 2 
^ False belief condition 
The mouse comes back and he wants to play with his dough. 
ToM : Q5: 'Where will the mouse look for his play dough first?* 
Q5bis: 'Where does the mouse think that his play dough is?' 
^ Memory question 
Q6: 'Where was the mouse's play dough at the beginning?' 
S C E N A R I O 4 : B r i cks and s t ickers 
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3 boxes containing bricks which either have a round sticker, a star sticker or no 
sticker on. 
The experimenter is helped by the mouse. The mouse adds his brick with no 
sticker on to box 3 and then goes sleep in the experimenter's bag. 
The experimenter removes the mouse's brick from the box and puts a round 
sticker on it. 
Q 1 : 'What is on this brick now?' 
Q2: 'Where shall we put this brick now?' 1 
^ Counterfactual reasoning 
CF Negative: Q3: *lf I hadn't put a sticker on the mouse's brick, which box 
would it be in?' 3 
CF Affirma: Q4: *lf I had put a star sticker on the mouse's brick, which box would 
it be in?' 2 
^ False belief condition 
The mouse comes back and he wants to play with his brick. 
ToM : Q5; 'Where will the mouse look for his brick first?' 
Q6bis: 'Where does the mouse think that his brick is? 
^ Memory question 
Q7: 'Where was the mouse's brick at the beginning?' 
S C E N A R I O 5: F a c e s and G l a s s e s 
3 boxes containing pictures of men wearing either some round glasses, square 
glasses of no glasses. 
The experimenter is helped by a mouse. The mouse adds picture with no glasses 
on to box 3 and then goes sleep in the experimenter's bag. 
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The experimenter removes the mouse's picture from the box and draws some 
round on it. 
Q 1 : 'What sort of glass does this man wear now?' 
Q2: 'Where shall we put this man now?' 1 
Counterfactual reasoning 
CF Negative: Q3: 'If I hadn't drawn glasses for this man, which box would 
he be in?* 3 
CF Affirma: Q4: 'If I had drawn a pair of square glasses for this man. which box 
would he be in?* 2 
False belief condition 
The mouse comes back and he wants to play with his picture. 
ToM : Q6: 'Where will the mouse look for piece of paper first?' 
Q6bis: 'Where does the mouse think that his piece of paper is? 
^ Memory question 
Q7: 'Which box was the mouse's piece of paper at the beginning?' 
S C E N A R I O 6: Teddies and Bow ties 
3 boxes containing pictures of teddies wearing either a blue bow tie, a red bow tie 
or a bow tie with no colour. 
The experimenter is helped by the mouse. The mouse adds his own picture of a 
teddy with a bow tie with no colour to box 3 and then goes sleep in the 
experimenter's bag. 
The experimenter removes the mouse's picture from the box and colour the bow 
tie in red. 
Q 1 : 'What colour is the bow tie now?' 198 
Q2; 'Where shall we put it now?' 1 
Counterfactual reasoning 
CF Negative: Q3: 'If I hadn't colour the bow tie, which box would it be in 
now?' 3 
CF Affirma: Q4: 'If I had coloured the bow tie in blue, which box would it be in 
now?' 2 
^ False belief condition 
The mouse comes back and he wants to play with his brick. 
ToM : Q6: 'Where will the mouse look for his Teddy first?' 
Q6bis: 'Where does the mouse think that his Teddy is? 
^ Memory question 
Q7: 'Where was the mouse's Teddy at the beginning?' 
S C E N A R I O 7: F a c e s and Hats 
3 boxes containing drawings of faces (the character was called Bob) which either 
wear a pointy hat, a round hat or no hat. 
The experimenter is helped by the mouse. The mouse adds his own doll with no 
hat in to box 3 and then goes sleep in the experimenter's bag. 
The experimenter removes the mouse's drawing of Bob from the box and puts a 
pointy hat on it. 
Q 1 : 'What sort of hat does Bob wear now?' 
Q2: 'Where shall we put Bob now?' 1 
Counterfactual reasoning 
CF Negative: Q3: 'If I hadn't a hat on Bob, which box would it be in?' 3 
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CF Affirma: Q4: 'If I had put a round hat on Bob, which box would it be in?' 2 
False belief condition 
The mouse comes back and he wants to play with Bob. 
ToM : Q6: 'Where will the mouse look for Bob first?' 
Q6bis: 'Where does the mouse think that Bob is? 
^ Memory question 
Q7: 'Where was the mouse's Bob at the beginning?' 
S C E N A R I O 8: Teletubby and balls 
3 boxes containing pictures of Teletubby which either carry a red ball, a blue ball 
or a white ball. 
The experimenter is helped by the mouse. The mouse adds his own picture of a 
Teletubby with a white ball in to box 3 and then goes sleep in the experimenter's 
bag. 
The experimenter removes the mouse's Teletubby from the box and colour his ball 
red. 
Q 1 : 'What colour is the Teletubby*s ball now?* 
Q2: 'Where shall we put the Telebubby now?' 1 
Counterfactual reasoning 
CF Negative: Q3: 'If I hadn't coloured the Teletubby's ball, which box would 
it be in?' 3 
CF Affirma: Q4: 'If I had coloured the Teletubby's ball in blue, which box would it 
be in?' 2 
^ False belief condition 
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The mouse comes back and he wants to play with his Teletubby. 
ToM : Q6: 'Where will the mouse look for his Teletubby first?' 
Q6bis: 'Where does the mouse think that his Teletubby is? 
^ Memory question 
Q7: 'Where was the mouse's Teletubby at the beginning?' 
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APPENDIX E 
EXPERIMENT 2: ANALYSIS WITH THE REDUCED 
SAMPLE 
Theory of Mind (excluding data when children did not answer the control question 
correctly) 
For the following analysis the children who answered at least one control 
question incorrectly were excluded from the analysis. This sample will be called 
the reduced sample, it includes 25 children. 







Tab le 1 M e a n s and s tandard deviat ions for the th ink or look quest ions 
(n=25) . 
A t-test showed that the difference between the 'think' and the 'look' questions 
was not significant. t(24) = -.258, p=.799. 
The percentages of right answers for th ink i , look2, look1 and think2 were 
calculated and are presented in the following chart. 













39.021 37 80: 
Thinkl Look2 Look! 
QuMttons 
ThinK2 
Figure 1 P e r c e n t a g e of r ight answers for each fa lse bel ief quest ion 
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An ANOVA showed that there was no significant difference between the false 
belief questions. F(3; 72) = .065, p=.978. Therefore there is no difference between 
'think' and 'look', and there is no order effect. 
Errors on the false belief tasks 
As explained in the results section in chapter 3 children can make 'realist' and 
'non-realist' errors. The total number of each type of errors was computed and is 
presented in the following table. 
Realist errors Non realist Total 
errors 
Total number 64 28 92 
Tab le 1 : Number of errors by type 
A one sample t-test showed that the number of children making realist errors 
(t(24) = 4.575, p<.001) was highly significantly different from chance level. 
Comparison between counterfactual thinking andfalse belief task 
The performances on counterfactual tasks and false belief tasks were 
compared. The total number of correct answers on counterfactual tasks was 
computed and the total number of correct answers on false belief questions was 
calculated and divided by two to obtain a score out of four for each set of data. 
The means and the standard deviations were calculated for each type of 
questions. The results are presented in the following table. 
Type of Question Mean Standard Deviation 
Counterfactual 3.20 1.08 
questions 
False Belief Questions 2.44 1.16 
Tab le 2: M e a n and s tandard dev ia t ion for the total o f correct answer for 
counter fac tua l ques t ions and fa lse bel ie f ques t ions (n=25) . 
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A t-test showed that the difference of performance between counterfactual 
questions and false belief questions was significant, t(24)=2.27, p<.001. 
Correlations between counterfactual thinking andfalse belief tasks for the reduced sample. 
The link between counterfactual thinking and false belief task was investigated 
















Think .837(") .011 
1 
T.o.M. 
Look .828('*) -.056 
.386 1 
C.F. 
Aff -.029 .733(") .087 -.138 
1 
C.F. 
Neg -.016 .864(**) -.049 .024 
.290 1 
V^ UI I cidtiw) I .iiy . . . — 
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). k i „ f t o d . 
Tab le 3 Corre lat ions be tween counter factua l th ink ing and false belief task 
'^ The results show that there is no significant correlation between any of the 
theory of mind questions and the counterfactual questions. 
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The link between the number of realist errors and the false belief questions 
were investigated by running correlations. The results are presented in the 
fol lowing table. 
Realist 
Think! Look 2 Look 1 Think 2 Think Total Look Total Errors 
Think 1 1 
Look 2 .425(*) 1 
Look 1 .249 .4950 1 
Think 2 .552(") .178 .254 1 
Think Total .876(") .340 .286 .886(") 
1 
Look Total .391 .867r-) .862(-) .250 
.362 1 
Realist .274 -.034 -.006 .142 .235 
-.023 1 
Errors 
. . L _ A nei r.1 /Q^aitaHX 
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (24ailed). 
Tab le 4 : Corre lat ions be tween the number of real ist errors and the fa lse 
bel ief quest ions for the reduced samp le (n=25) . 
The results showed no significant correlations between the number of realist 
errors on counterfactual questions with any of the false belief task questions. 
The number of realist errors on the theory of mind questions and the other 
tasks have been compared. The results are presented in the following table. 
No Realist 
Errors C F 
ToM realist 
errors TOM CF Total 
No Realist Errors C F 1 -.219 .079 -.791('*) 
ToM realist errors -.219 1 -.619(") .033 
TOM .079 -.619(") 1 
-.026 
C F Total -.791(-) .033 -.026 
1 
T a b l e 5: Corre la t ions be tween number of er rors and tasks. (n=25) 
The results showed that the number of realist errors in counterfactual and 
theory of mind tasks did not correlate and that there was not correlation between 




COUNTERFACTUAL SCENARIOS USE IN 
EXPERIMENT 3 
Scenar io 2: Y e s / No 
One day the tree was standing up like this. But guess what! There was a storm 
and the wind came along and blew the tree over like this. 
Now control question: Is the tree standing up now? (No) 
Before control question: Was the tree standing up before? (Yes) 
Test question: What if the wind had not come - would the tree be standing up? 
(Yes) 
Scenar io 3: Selective pointing 
One day Ruddy the Rat has some chocolate, he holds the chocolate in his mouth 
like this. But guess what! He drops the chocolate and it falls on the floor. 
Now control question: Where is the chocolate now? Can you show me? 
Before control question: Where was the chocolate before? Can you show me? 
Test question: What if Ruddy had not dropped the chocolate - where would the 
chocolate be? Can you show me? 
Scenar io 4 : Selective pointing 
Robert the bunny lives in this box. But guess what! One day the door is not shut 
properly. So the bunny rabbit opens the door and he goes to sit here, outside the 
box. 
Now control question: Where is the bunny rabbit now? Can you show me? 
Before control question: Where was the bunny rabbit before? Can you show me? 
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Test question: What if the door of the box had been shut properly - where 
would the bunny rabbit be? Can you show me? 
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APPENDIX G 
FALSE BELIEF TO OTHERS TASK USED IN 
EXPERIMENT 3 
Pooh bear task 
A closed wooden box and an open plastic bowl of similar dimensions were 
placed on the table. The child was introduced to a 'Winnie-The-Pooh' puppet who 
was enjoying a snack from his honey-pot. which was then placed in the bowl prior 
to his departure. 'Piglet' then entered, took the honey-pot from the bowl, ate from 
it, and placed it in the closed box. 
The child was then reintroduced to Pooh, and told that he was hungry. 
FB question: 'Where do you think Pooh will look for the honey?' Wooden Box 
Reality question 1: 'Where is the honey really?' Silver Box 
Memory question 2: 'Where did Pooh put the honey?' Wooden Box 
Maxi 
'Mother returns from her shopping trip. She bought chocolate for her cake. 
Maxi may help her put away the things. He asks her: 'Where should I put the 
chocolate?' 'In the blue cupboard' says the mother. 
Maxi put the chocolate into the blue cupboard. [A toy chocolate is put into the 
blue cupboard box.] Maxi remembers exactly where he put the chocolate so that 
he could come back and get some later. He loves chocolate. Then he leaves for 
the playground. [The boy doll is removed] Mother starts to prepare the cake and 
takes the chocolate out of the cupboard. She grates a bit into the dough and then 
she does not put it back into the blue but the green cupboard. [Toy chocolate is 
thereby transferred from the blue to the green cupboard] Now she realises that 
she forgot to buy eggs. So she goes to her neighbour for some eggs. Then Maxi 
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comes back from the playground, hungry, and he wants to get some chocolate. 
[Boy doll appears]. He still remembers where he had put the chocolate.' 
Belief question: 'Where will Maxi look for the chocolate? 
Reality question: Where Is the chocolate really?' 
Memory question: 'Where did Maxi put the chocolate?" 
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APPENDIX H 
FALSE B E L I E F TO S E L F T A S K S USED IN 
EXPERIMENT 3 
Cereal Box Task 
The material included: 2 boxes: cereals + opaque box. Before the experiment 
was run the content of the cereal box was moved to the opaque box. The children 
were told the following instructions and questions: 
The children were shown both closed boxes and asked the false belief 
question: 'Where are the breakfast cereals?' (Right answer: in the cereal box) 
The children were then asked to open both boxes, one after the other and 
check their content. They discovered that the cereals were in the unmarked box 
and that the cereal box was empty. Both boxes were closed again, and the 
children were then asked the test question: 'Where did you think the breakfast 
cereals were before you opened the boxes?' 
Finally the children were asked the reality control question: 'Where are the 
breakfast cereals really?' 
Crayon Task 
Before the experiment crayons were removed from a crayon box and replaced 
by a rubber. 
The children were shown the crayon box and asked the false belief question; 
'What is inside the box?' (Right answer: crayons) The children were then asked to 
open the box and found a rubber instead. They were then asked the test question: 
'What did you think was inside the box before you opened it?' Finally they were 
asked the reality control question: 'What is inside the box really?" 
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APPENDIX I 
CONTRARY-TO-FACT SYLLOGISMS USED IN 
EXPERIMENT 3 
Instructions: 
'Let's try this one together. Now, I'm going to tell you something that may 
sound funny, but I want you to think about it. I want you to imagine a picture in 
your head. It could be; All fish live in trees. So, the fish you are thinking about, in 
the picture in your head, do they live in trees? Yes? Good. So now I'm going to tell 
you some stories and every time I tell you a story I want you to think about it. I 
want you to make another picture inside your head of it.' 
Yes problems: No problems: 
1.AII cows quack 5.AII cats bark 
Susie is a cow George is a cat 
Does Susie quack? (Yes) Does George meow? (No) 
2.AII thegrassisblue. 6.AII water feels dry 
The garden is covered in grass. Ann had her hand in some water 
Is the garden blue? (Yes) Does Ann's hand feel wet? (No) 
3.AII ice feels hot. 7.Allsnow is black 
Jill has her hand in some ice. Len is a snowman made of snow 
Does Jill hand feel hot? (Yes) Is Len white? (No) 
4.AII zebras have spots on their back 8.AII hedgehogs feel soft 
Alex is a zebra Harry is a hedgehog 
Is Alex spotty? (Yes) Does Harry feel prickly? (No) 
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APPENDIX J 
COUNTERFACTUAL SCENARIOS USED IN 
EXPERIMENT 4 
Scenario 2: 
This is Lucy. One day, in her house the floor was nice and clean like that. But 
guess what! Lucy comes home and she doesn't take her shoes off. She comes 
inside and she makes the floor all dirty with her shoes. 
Before control question: Was the floor clean before? 
Now control question: Is the floor clean now? 
Test question: What it Lucy had taken her shoes off - would the floor be dirty? (no) 
Scenar io 3: 
A turtle has some chocolate; he holds the chocolate in her mouth like this. But 
guess what! He drops the chocolate and it falls on the floor. 
Now control question: ^Nhere is the chocolate now? Can you show me? 
Before control question: Where was the chocolate before? Can you show me? 
Test question: What if the Turtle had not dropped the chocolate - where would the 
chocolate be? Can you show me? 
Scenario 4: 
Robert the bunny lives in this box on the magic farm. But guess what! One day the 
door is not shut properly. So the bunny rabbit opens the door and he goes to sit 
here, outside the box. 
Now control question: Where is the bunny rabbit now? Can you show me? 
Before control question: Where was the bunny rabbit before? Can you show me? 
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Test question: What if the door of the box had been shut properly - where would 
the bunny rabbit be? Can you show me? 
213 
APPENDIX K 
SECOND ANALYSIS FOR EXPERIMENT 4 
The data from experiment 4 can be analysed in a different way. It can decided 
to remove all the participants who failed at least one control question in the 
counterfactual scenario and all the participants who presented a yes or a no bias. 
By done this the sample was reduced to 36 participants. 
The mean and the standard deviation were calculated for each type of task in 
each context and the results are presented in the following table. 
Standard context Fantasy context 
(n= 18) (n=18) 
Counterfactual tasks 2.57 (1.53) 2.00 (1.13) 
Contrary-to-fact syllogisms .89 (.80) 1.44 (1.29) 
in the two different contexts. 
A mixed design ANOVA 2*2 (context * task) was computed and showed a 
significant main effect of task. F (1. 35) = 15.52. p<.01. 
The test of within-subject contrast showed that this difference was statistically 
significant. F(1, 35) = 23.18. p<.01. They results suggested that the participants 
found the counterfactual task easier that the contrary-to-fact syllogisms 
independently of the context. 
The test of between-subjects showed that this effect was not significant, F (1, 
35) = .003, p = .959. There was no effect of context on its own. 
The statistical analysis showed a near significance interaction between task 
and context, F(1, 35) = 3.942, p=.55. This result t suggested that the context might 
not have the same effect on each type of task. 
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